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THE CONSTRUCTION OF OTTOMAN ASIA AND ITS MUSLIM 
PEOPLES IN WELLINGTON HOUSE’S PROPAGANDA AND 
ASSOCIATED LITERATURE, 1914-1918
Sadia McEvoy, King’s College London
Whilst the subject of the British propaganda project  during World War One has attracted 
a reasonable amount of attention, this has focused largely on Britain’s war with 
Germany, on the Home Front or else on efforts to win American support.  Beyond the 
study of events in Armenia, very little consideration has been given to how 
propagandists and writers responded to her war with Turkey.  This thesis uses a range of 
materials, primarily books, pamphlets and illustrated newspapers produced by 
Wellington House, or by writers associated with it, to chart the nature and development 
of Britain’s construction of Ottoman Asia and its Muslim peoples during the war. 
Beginning by chronologically reviewing the development of the government’s official 
policy towards the Ottoman Empire, it then turns more specifically  to the evolution of 
propaganda relating to the Middle East, concluding with an examination of fiction 
written largely  by novelists co-opted by Wellington House.  The thesis shows a 
relatively benign and unfocused approach giving way in mid-1916 to a more coherent 
and aggressive policy  which continued for the remainder of the war.  It demonstrates 
that Britain’s response was not just a reflection of static cultural assumptions as is 
frequently supposed but a careful balancing act as she sought to maintain the support of 
the Empire’s one hundred million Muslim subjects whilst also engaging in war against 
the Ottoman caliphate and, in due course, laying claim to her territory.  The construction 
of the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim peoples in British propaganda was part of a 
bigger, and longer, picture of imperial history and ambition.  Above all, it  was a textual 
exercise in which the propagandists attempted to articulate and legitimise Britain’s 
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Introduction
This study is not an account of Britain’s war with Turkey and is concerned only 
indirectly with military and diplomatic events.  It does not claim to be a 
comprehensive survey of the British wartime propaganda project. Nor is  it an 
analysis of Islam or of the Ottoman Empire during the war.  What it does attempt 
is  an investigation of wartime attitudes towards Ottoman Asia and its Muslim 
peoples  through official propaganda and associated literature.  Or, more 
precisely, perhaps, it is an investigation of the ‘politics of knowledge’ regarding 
Ottoman Asia and its Muslim peoples.1   Knowledge is not produced, 
disseminated or received spontaneously but in a specific time and place, and to 
understand it requires  context.  The thesis seeks to do just that: to show not only 
what was said but why it was said.   As A.P. Thornton observed, ‘If we do not 
think to ask, “Why did they think that?”, we know less about the past than we 
think’.2       
Resting on the belief that knowledge is culturally constructed and historically 
determined, this study is  less concerned with ‘truths’ about the wartime Ottoman 
Empire than it is with understanding British representations of it.  Fundamental 
to this process is a recognition of the importance of Britain’s imperial past, her 
imperial strategies  and her imperial goals.  This is  therefore a study as  much 
concerned with empire and imperialism as it is  with the Great War.  A familiar 
narrative of British imperial history has the war as a watershed, a point at which 
the Empire’s struts  began to crumble.  In Judith Brown’s words, it became part of 
the textbook orthodoxy of twentieth-century history that world war was  ‘a 
6
1 Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism 
(Cambridge, 2010), p.2.
2 A. P. Thornton, ‘The Shaping of Imperial History’ in Robin W. Winks ed., The Oxford History of the 
British Empire: Volume V: Historiography (Oxford, 1999), pp. 612-634, p.616.
powerful solvent of the overseas empires of European states’.3  From this point 
of view the war years  are sacrificed as a distinct period in which the nature of 
British imperialism can usefully be studied.  To approach the past in this  way is, 
in the words of Jay Winter, ‘to invite distortion by losing a sense of its messiness, 
its non-linearity, its vigorous  and stubbornly visible incompatibilities’.4   War 
demands that, to survive, an imperial power must be at its most coherent and 
ruthless and so, far from being merely a bookmark between the Empire’s zenith 
and the onset of its decline, the war years offer a stimulating, vital period in 
which to explore how British imperial power was sustained and understood.
At the heart of the British imperial project, at least the imperial project as it stood 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, was an idea: that British 
imperialism was a force for good, underwritten by the self-evident virtues of 
British civilisation, the cornerstones of which were perceived as morality and 
progress.  During the war the idea of the British imperial project coalesced with 
the notion that the Entente was fighting, not to destroy a nation, but to preserve 
‘civilisation’ against a ‘nest of evil ideas’.5  In H.G. Wells’s words ‘the ultimate 
purpose of this war is propaganda, the destruction of certain beliefs, and the 
creation of others’.6  If the war was a ‘conflict of cultures’, then Britain’s culture 
was informed by her imperial self.7   Thus, wartime propaganda and imperial 
ideology were intimately connected and whilst this contention is true of all of her 
propaganda, it applies particularly to representations of non-Western peoples.  
7
3 Judith M. Brown, ‘War and the Colonial Relationship: Britain, India and the War of 1914-1918’, in 
M.R.D. Foot (ed.), War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J.R. Western 1928-1971 
(London, 1973), pp.85-106, p.85.
4 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History 
(Cambridge, 1995), p.5.
5 H.G. Wells, The War That Will End War (London, 1914), p.90.
6 Ibid., p.91.
7 Ibid., p.90.
Britain’s wartime relations with Muslims offer an excellent justification for 
Winter’s  cautionary words.  It was a messy, complex situation that required 
careful handling.  On the one hand, she was dependent on her Empire, ‘said to 
contain a hundred million Mohammedan subjects of the King’, to contribute to 
her war effort and preserve her imperial status.8    On the other, she was at war 
with Turkey, ostensible head, both temporal and spiritual, of the Islamic faith. 
Whilst promoting self-determination for the Muslim minorities of the Ottoman 
Empire, she simultaneously sought to preserve the status quo in India and Egypt. 
Propagandist literature reveals these outward concerns, whilst also illuminating 
the inward preoccupations and conflicts  besetting Britain during this period both 
as belligerent and as  a nation and society coming to terms with the challenges 
posed by the onset of the twentieth century.  
Propaganda and the War
The authoritative overview of the First World War and official propaganda 
remains British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918 by Sanders 
and Taylor, published in 1982.9   The other two significant, and much cited, 
secondary sources are Buitenhuis’ The Great War of Words and Messinger’s 
British Propaganda and the State in the First World War, although neither use 
primary source material as  thoroughly or effectively as do Sanders and Taylor.10 
Since 1989 there have been a further two noteworthy edited collections, A Call 
To Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War, and, 
8
8 ‘Appendix (b) Official Press Bureau Instructions’, Notice D.607, 15 November 1917, TNA INF 4/4B. 
9 M.L. Sanders and P.M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918 (London, 
1982).
10 Peter Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words: Literature as Propaganda 1914-1918 and After (London, 
1989) and Gary S. Messinger, British Propaganda and the State in the First World War (Manchester, 
1992).
more recently, World War I and Propaganda.11  In addition, Philip Taylor, widely 
considered the leading scholar of propaganda in the Anglophone world, 
contributed a further chapter on the Great War in his 1995 overview of the 
history of propaganda, Munitions of the Mind.12   Two trends stand out from a 
reading of these books: first, a geographical focus on the Western and Home 
Fronts and on propaganda aimed at the United States and, second, an inclination, 
similarly Western-centric, to measure the success of the British propaganda effort 
against equivalent German efforts, primarily to sustain morale or else to secure 
the sympathy, and in due course the outright support, of America.  Only in 
Paddock’s 2014 book is there an emphasis on how imperial obligations and 
ambitions helped shape aspects  of the propaganda effort during the war.  In 
engaging with this relatively fresh perspective, Paddock’s compilation, whilst not 
including essays on Turkey or the Middle East, considers Indian and African 
soldiers in European propaganda, and contains contributions on Ireland, South 
Africa, and Jamaica, amongst others. 
Academic attention concerning propaganda relating to the Ottoman Empire has 
to date been principally concerned with the atrocities  committed by the Turks 
against the Armenian population in 1915.  There are a number of scholarly works 
on the subject whose most substantive discourse concerns  attempts to identify 
intent and ascribe responsibility for atrocities  that are often depicted as a Muslim 
versus Christian clash but are also attributed to other causes such as a backlash 
against the actions  of Armenian revolutionaries or merely as  the consequence of 
the pressures and privations of war.  It remains an emotive and heavily politicised 
topic.  For example, earlier this – centenary – year, by defining the massacres as 
‘genocide’, Pope Francis incurred the wrath of the Turkish government, which 
9
11 Troy Paddock (ed.), A Call to Arms. Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War 
(Westport, Connecticut, 2004) and Troy Paddock (ed.), World War I and Propaganda (Leiden, 2014).  
Whilst the number of overviews is limited, there are a number of important works that consider specific 
aspects, such as Alan Kramer and John Horne, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New 
Haven, 2001) and David Monger’s detailed analysis of the NWAC, Patriotism and Propaganda in First 
World War Britain (Liverpool, 2012).
12 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the 
Present Era (Manchester, 1995). 
continues to rebut this  definition, and occasioned the withdrawal of the Turkish 
envoy from the Vatican.13   American demographer Justin McCarthy is probably 
the most vocal Western scholar to oppose the definition of genocide.  A prolific 
writer on the subject, McCarthy has expressed outrage that whereas Viscount 
Bryce’s  report on German atrocities committed against civilians in 1914 in 
Belgium and France (the ‘White Book’) was discredited after the war, Bryce’s 
propagandist work on Turkish atrocities against Armenian civilians (the ‘Blue 
Book’) was not.  Its continued endorsement, McCarthy argues, reflects ongoing 
Western efforts to undermine and vilify the East.14   Of greater relevance to this 
research are more nuanced accounts as found, for example, in the work of Joanne 
Laycock, Donald Bloxham and, in the context of scholarship on the war from the 
Ottoman perspective more generally, that of historians such as Michael Reynolds 
and Eugene Rogan.15   Such research moves beyond the polemical by attempting 
to place the genocide within its geopolitical context.  Bloxham and Reynolds, for 
example, convincingly demonstrate how Western interference and a growing 
appreciation, dating from the Congress of Berlin in 1878, of the necessity of 
using the national idea to legitimise and consolidate power, undermined and 
eventually destroyed the polyethnic basis of the Ottoman state structure. 
However, this  thesis is less concerned with why the massacres  occurred, or the 
humanitarian response they engendered, than with the propagandists’ reaction to 
them, which was, of course, determined within the context of bigger strategic 
concerns.  Thus, for example, it offers fresh insights on how and why the Blue 
10
13 In this research it is taken as a given that the events occurred, that they were officially orchestrated and 
that they fall within the legal definition of genocide as defined by the Geneva Convention of 1948. 
14 See, for example, Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire: Historical Endings 
(London, 2001) and Justin McCarthy, The Armenian Rebellion at Van (Salt Lake City, 2006).  Michael M. 
Gunter’s, Armenian History and the Question of Genocide (Basingstoke, 2011) is a more recent attempt at 
putting forward the Turkish version of events and does so in a more balanced and historical fashion than 
McCarthy.
15 Joanne Laycock, Imagining Armenia: Orientalism, Ambiguity and Intervention (Manchester, 2009), 
Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the 
Ottoman Armenians (Oxford, 2005), Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires, The Clash and Collapse 
of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918 (Cambridge, 2011) and Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the 
Ottomans, The Great War in the Middle East, 1914-1920 (London, 2015).
Book was produced but does not seek to probe the accuracy of its contents or the 
extent to which it prompted a philanthropic response.
The war and its  consequences have drawn increasing attention from historians of 
the Middle East, including interest in propaganda efforts  connected to the 
campaigns  in Mesopotamia and Palestine.  With an emphasis on the Zionist 
movement, Eitan Bar-Yosef and James Renton have considered the nature of the 
propaganda effort in 1917 and 1918, as British successes in the Middle East led 
to the ‘liberation’ of significant and symbolic places like Baghdad and 
Jerusalem.16  As both Renton and Bar-Yosef contend, during the last two years  of 
the war the British government actively promoted a propaganda campaign in the 
Middle East to draw attention to, and generate support for, future military action 
there, as well as to lay the ground for their own imperial intervention.  This thesis 
develops the ideas  and research of Bar-Yosef and Renton to some extent in that it 
too considers official propaganda during this period, but diverges by attempting a 
survey of the entirety of the war, taking a broader geographical perspective, and 
synthesizing official propaganda with associated fiction.  It also looks more 
closely at the role of Mark Sykes as a propagandist.  Inevitably, Sykes, author of 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, is  a familiar figure in the historiography of policy-
making in the Middle East.  He is  also the subject of two biographies, and yet a 
comprehensive review of his role as a propagandist working in collaboration with 
Wellington House, the Foreign Office and India Office remains to be 
undertaken.17  
Whilst this study considers the practical organisation of the undertaking, its 
primary aim is to understand what the propagandists said and wrote in order to 
11
16 See Eitan Bar-Yosef, ‘The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-1918’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, 36 (2001), pp. 87-109, Eitan Bar-Yosef, The Holy Land in English 
Culture,1799-1917 (Oxford, 2005) and James Renton, ‘Changing Languages of Empire and the Orient: 
Britain and the Invention of the Middle East, 1917-1918’, The Historical Journal, 50:3 (2007), pp.
645-667.
17 Shane Leslie, Mark Sykes: His Life and Letters (London, 1923), a hagiography by his cousin, and 
Roger Adelson, Mark Sykes: Portrait of an Amateur (London, 1975), a substantial and scholarly work by 
an expert on the region.  
better construct their contemporary cultural reality.  In other words, it is less 
concerned with who shaped opinion, and how, than with why.  It uses Ottoman-
related propaganda to explore, in the words of John Horne, ‘the ideas and 
languages of wartime’ and participate in the discovery of ‘the meanings that 
contemporaries gave to the war’.18   Of course, when the source material is 
propagandist literature, the historian must take into account that it was  produced 
with a conscious intent to persuade or influence others.  Only by grasping how 
they comprehended propaganda and what they sought to achieve with it, is it 
possible to attempt to interpret it.  Philip Taylor explains the overwhelmingly 
pejorative understanding that the word connotes from the perspective of our 
modern information and communications  age.  It is ‘the enemy of independent 
thought and an intrusive and unwanted manipulator of the free flow of 
information and ideas .... a “dirty trick” utilized by “hidden persuaders”, “mind 
manipulators” and “brainwashers”’.19   This emotive, and subjective, response 
was undoubtedly ignited in the aftermath of the war.   Harold Lasswell and 
Arthur Ponsonby wrote damning accounts of wartime propaganda, particularly 
atrocity propaganda, in the late 1920s which, coinciding with the 
‘disillusionment’ literature of the period, contributed to the idea of the public’s 
cynical exploitation by officialdom.20  Recent work, on the other hand, has drawn 
attention to the possibility that this post-war response may also have been a 
reaction to the discomfiture felt at the hatred and belligerency that had been 
aroused on the Home Front during the war.21   Such insights  demonstrate the 
importance of moving away from a consideration of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
12
18 John Horne, ‘Public Opinion and Politics’ in John Horne (ed.), A Companion to World War I 
(Chichester, 2012), pp. 279-294, p.281.
19 Taylor, p.1.
20 See Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I (Cambridge, Mass., 1971) (originally 
published as Propaganda Technique in the World War in 1927), Arthur Ponsonby, Falsehood in Wartime 
(Melbourne, 1980) (first published 1928) and J.D. Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in The 
United States: From 1914 to 1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1935).  The assertion by American isolationists 
that they had been ‘duped’ by British propagandists into entering the war further tarnished its reputation, 
as did Hitler’s professed admiration of the British campaign in Mein Kampf and his use of the British 
model for the propagation of Nazi ideology.
21 See, for example, Heather Jones, ‘As the Centenary Approaches: The Regeneration of First World War 
Historiography’, The Historical Journal, Volume 56, Issue 3, September 2013, pp.857-878, pp. 869-70.
propaganda, based on its effect, back to an understanding that sees it simply as 
the process by which officials sought to ‘persuade’ others to their point of view. 
Certainly, it was in such neutral terms that it was understood during the war.22  As 
Taylor points  out, ‘in the centuries  before nuclear technology and psychology, 
before the likes of Einstein and Oppenheimer, of Freud and Jung, neither 
propaganda nor warfare had been demystified or discredited’.23
The use of propaganda as a tool for promoting imperialism in Victorian and 
Edwardian Britain is amply illustratrated in John MacKenzie’s  important work 
Propaganda and Empire, The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 
1880-1960, originally published in 1984.24   Whilst MacKenzie pays scant 
attention to the war years themselves, his  work offers valuable insights  into how 
imperial propaganda contributed to the cultural norms of 1914-18.  He posits that 
a dominant ideology existed in the British psyche consisting of ‘imperial 
nationalism, compounded by monarchism, militarism, and Social Darwinism, 
through which the British defined their own unique superiority vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world’ and that this ideology was transmitted via a range of 
communication media, including print culture, but also by the theatre, cinema, 
imperial societies and other devices.25   Much communication media was overtly 
propagandist as it was produced with the conscious and deliberate aim of 
manipulating opinion, but promotion of the imperial message could be 
inadvertent, constituting instead ‘self-generating ethos reinforcement, a constant 
repetition of the central ideas and concerns of the age’, as opposed to 
propaganda.26   Certainly, the full-blown Empire of the late nineteenth and early 
13
22 The word originated in the context of the seventeenth-century Vatican’s efforts to defend the ‘true 
faith’ against the challenge of the Reformation.  Even as late as 1911, according to the Encyclopædia 
Britannica the word was defined as ‘an activity relating largely to religious persuasion’ (See Taylor, p.
197).
23 Taylor, p.9.




twentieth century was a preoccupation of Edwardian Britain.  Writing in 1911 
historian, Ernest Barker, noted that ‘in England, of recent years, the term 
“Empire” and the conception of imperialism have become prominent and 
crucial’.27   As Adam Tooze observes, ‘modern global imperialism was a radical 
and novel force, not an old-world hangover’ and comprehending it, justifying it 
and legitimising it at home and abroad were prevailing concerns.28
Many observers have noted with an element of bemusement that although the 
British propaganda effort was an exercise in improvisation it was also considered 
more successful and sophisticated than that of the other belligerents.29  This may 
stem from a propensity to focus on propaganda in the Western-centric ways 
described above.  By looking beyond matters such as mobilisation and morale, it 
is  possible to see that Britain’s  imperial past had ensured that she was far from 
uninitiated in the arts of propaganda when war broke out.  Her long history of 
legitimising her imperial ambitions both at home and abroad were readily 
translated into the way in which she defined herself and justified her 
belligerency.  By following this path, this thesis  seeks to offer something new: to 
look at Britain’s wartime propaganda not as a phenomenon peculiar to the 
conflict but as part of a continuum, a dialogue of justification and legitimisation 
that was a component of her imperial story and continued into the war as a means 
of communicating who she was, why she fought and what she was entitled to.   
Empire and the First World War
As will be discussed in Chapter One, for the purposes of propaganda, the war 
was perceived predominantly as a European war between civilised nations. 
Indeed, as Hew Strachan has written, the term ‘world war’ was largely 
14
27 Ernest Barker, ‘Empire’ in Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th Edition, Vol.9.
28 Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order, 1916-1931 (London, 
2014), p.20.
29 See, for example, Sanders and Taylor, Chapter One.
understood to denote the importance of the war to European powers, rather than a 
statement about its geographical scale.30  But the reality was that the war’s reach 
and implications extended far beyond Europe, and not only because of, in the 
words of George Robb, ‘fighting in overseas  colonies and by colonial soldiers’.31 
Financial and commercial links also rendered the war’s impact worldwide, as did 
the unique opportunity it provided for racial and cultural intermingling.  Empire, 
of course, lay at the heart of the global nature of the war.  The manpower and 
material resources of imperial territory drew soldiers  and non-combatants, money 
and materials, into the conflict from across the world, whilst imperial ambitions 
determined the setting of many of the war’s ‘sideshows’.  
For Britain, her small size and island status  had always necessitated a bigger 
perspective.32   With a pre-war population of around 45 million, she was able to 
mobilise approximately 6 million men during the war.  Germany, with a 
population of almost 68 million, and a tradition of universal military service, 
mobilised 13 million.  Only by relying on the Empire was Britain able to bolster 
her military might.  The greatest contributor to her cause was India.  ‘While 
Britain prepared one expeditionary force in August [1914], India formed four – 
one each for Europe, Egypt, Mesopotamia and East Africa.  India raised 1.4 
million soldiers during the war, of which 1.1 million served outside the 
subcontinent’.33  Over a million more troops came from the (white) dominions  of 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa.  In addition, hundreds of 
thousands of Indians, Africans, Chinese, and West Indians  served in military 
labour units.
15
30 See Hew Strachan, ‘The First World War as a Global War’, First World War Studies 1, No.1 (2010), pp. 
3-14 , p.5. 
31 George Robb, British Culture and the First World War (Basingstoke, 2002), p.11.
32 See Linda Colley, ‘Size Does Matter’, The Times Literary Supplement, September 20 2002, pp.12-14, 
p.12.
33 Strachan, ‘Global War’, p.8.
The Empire might have given Britain her strength and global standing but it was 
potentially her Achilles heel.  The British elite had been taught that the world’s 
greatest territorial empire, Rome, had declined because of over-expansion, and 
they feared the extent of their own imperial reach.  In the words of Robinson and 
Gallagher, in their seminal study of Victorian imperialism, the Empire had ceased 
to be a ‘dynamic force and [was] becoming a static power’ where officials  were 
principally concerned with guarding and consolidating what had been won.34 
India remained the cardinal interest and, with its large Muslim population, pan-
Islamism, and the threat of religiously driven resistance, was a potential 
destabiliser.  Indeed, from the Indian Mutiny in 1857 onwards, this prospect was 
seen by many as the greatest potential source of danger to British rule.  Whilst 
the Islamic world had always benefited from networks of scholars and mystics, 
growing numbers of Muslims  performing the pilgrimage to Mecca along with the 
growth of the press, most significantly in India and Egypt, led to the formation of 
deeper connections with, and greater knowledge of, other Muslim societies. 
Such links were encouraged by scholars and used by the Ottoman sultan, 
Abdülhamid II (1876 to 1909), and his  successors, the Young Turks, who, 
capitalising on the sultan’s claim to be caliph, Prophet Mohammad’s successor as 
the head of the community of Sunni Muslims, sought to cement the crumbling 
Ottoman Empire by identifying a common cause.  
In an age where sovereignty was increasingly seen in the West as tied to 
ethnocultural identity (according to Reynolds, the term ‘pan-Islam’ was coined 
by Europeans, not Muslims), the logic of Muslim unity was a preoccupying 
concern.35   Should Britain’s Muslim subjects in India (but also in Zanzibar, 
Nigeria, Egypt, the Sudan, the Persian Gulf and the Malay States) put their faith 
in religion above their loyalty to the British imperial project, the Empire’s future 
would be at stake.  Paranoia regarding pan-Islam was such that, in the view of 
16
34 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, The Official Mind of Imperialism 
(London, 1961), p.470.
35 Reynolds, Shattering Empires, p.89. 
Orientalist scholar, Maxime Rodinson, ‘a triumphant Europe saw all resistance to 
its domination as  a sinister conspiracy …. [W]henever there was any show of 
anti-imperialism, even if it was a purely local reaction, pan-Islam was blamed’.36 
This was  a recognition of the fact that Britain’s imperial power depended much 
less on coercion than it did on the co-operation of the colonised, and preservation 
of her reputation, her prestige, was perceived as critical to maintaining this.  As 
Brown observes (in relation to the Raj, but it applies equally to the British 
Empire as a whole) ‘[it] was only as strong as it was  thought to be; and 
consequently the British stood jealous guard over their prestige’.37   Anything 
which undermined it weakened their power, and Islamic unity had the potential 
to do just that.  In this context, it is unsurprising that war with Turkey was met 
with a degree of ambivalence and trepidation in November 1914.  Fear of an 
Islamic uprising was compounded by the delicate matter of deploying Indian 
Muslims in a conflict against other Muslims under the authority of the Ottoman 
sultan-caliph. A disproportionate number of sepoys were Muslim and the vast 
majority were destined to fight in the Middle East.38   The fact that Britain had 
allied herself with Russia, commonly perceived as Islam’s historic enemy, also 
exacerbated the situation.  Furthermore, there remained a strong sense in many 
quarters, if not of kinship, then at least of respect for the Turks, who, as the 
power base behind the Ottoman Empire, had played an important role, if 
somewhat dormant in recent years, in maintaining the balance of power in 
Europe.  
The potential of pan-Islam, and its corollary, jihad, as  a unifying and galvanising 
force was not lost on the Central Powers.  In the nineteenth century the Ottomans 
had a history of discriminate invocation of jihad and Enver Pasha (secular Young 
Turk and member of the CUP triumvirate) had seen its  value as  a mobilising 
17
36 Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam (London, 1988), p.67.
37 Brown, p.90.
38 The Punjab contributed the largest number of sepoys to the Indian Army (producing 360,000 soldiers 
during the war).  Around 40% of Punjabis were Muslim.  During the course of the war 80% of Indian 
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force at first hand in 1911 when Libyan tribesmen joined the Turks in guerrilla 
warfare against the Italians, whilst many in German high command viewed 
Turkey’s religious status as her greatest asset in the Central Powers’ war effort.39 
Within the Ottoman Empire jihad could be used to cultivate loyalty and for 
military recruitment.  Externally, Islamic revolt not only had the potential to 
distract and dilute the Entente’s European war effort by opening up fronts 
elsewhere but held the prospect of furthering the Central Powers’ own imperial 
ambitions at the expense of those of the Entente.  Accordingly, on 14 November 
1914 a call for holy war was read out in front of the Mosque of Mehmed the 
Conqueror in Constantinople appealing to Muslims  throughout the world – not 
only within the Ottoman Empire but in India, North Africa, China, and elsewhere 
– to rise up against the Entente Powers, in other words, to commence a jihad.   
In the event the call to jihad had a negligible effect as a means of inciting revolt 
within Entente imperial territory but Islam was nevertheless perceived by both 
sides as a potent weapon.   As will be shown, whilst Britain did not respond to 
the Central Powers’ invocation in kind, she nevertheless deployed Islam as a 
propaganda tool in subtler ways.  Her self-proclaimed expertise in governing 
Muslims sensitively and respectfully was a means of demonstrating her fitness to 
rule as well as the superiority of her mode of civilisation.  Religion also became a 
powerful means of undermining CUP prestige.  With careful handling, labelling 
the Unionists as unbelievers  – kafirs – enabled the condemnation of their actions 
and policies without risking the sensibilities  of ‘true’ Muslims.  Such an approach 
became increasingly valuable once the Ottoman Empire’s dismantlement seemed 
a certainty and the Entente powers sought to scratch out their own claims to 
Ottoman Asia.
This study seeks to demonstrate that despite the damp squib that the Central 
Powers’ jihad proved to be, the idea of it was nevertheless  a prevailing and 
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enduring concern.  Indeed, whilst the Ottomans’ military potential was arguably 
never perceived as a serious threat, despite the setbacks in the Dardanelles and 
Mesopotamia, the ideological threat posed by the Ottomans’ religious status was 
taken extremely seriously because of its  potentially destructive effect on the 
Empire.  Examining how Britain’s  propagandists  navigated the difficult terrain 
that resulted from her status  as an imperial power both dependent on her Muslim 
subjects but simultaneously at war with the holders of the caliphate enables a 
better understanding of the articulation of her imperial identity and ambitions and 
the means by which she managed the Empire during the war.
Empire and Culture
Whilst on the one hand politicians and propagandists followed official policy 
they remained individuals, shaped by ‘a particular set of ideas and cultural 
concepts, a mentalité’.40   Accordingly, in the following chapters, the strategic 
concerns that determined particular propagandist responses are viewed in tandem 
with existing cultural norms to which Britain’s imperial history, and the sense of 
self engendered by it, contributed.  Relying again on the words of Robinson and 
Gallagher: ‘strategy is not merely a reflection of the interests  which it purports to 
defend, it is  even more the register of the hopes, the memories and neuroses 
which inform the strategists’ picture of the world’.41   Strategy was informed by 
culture and culture was informed by empire.  As Michael Howard observes, in 
pre-1914 Britain,
the books and newspapers of the period are full of references to the Imperial Race, 
the Island Race, the Island Breed, British stock, and so on, without a shadow of 
apology or even of self-consciousness.  This was the way it  was.  The white man 
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was superior to the dark-skinned man; a position which gave him privileges and 
responsibilities, rights and duties.42  
This conviction in the superiority of Western civilisation, and in those who 
created it, is  evident throughout the documents  considered in this research, and 
Britain’s imperial history, especially her nineteenth-century experience of 
conquest in Asia and Africa, clearly played an integral role in shaping her self-
image.  An initially tolerant approach to other races, particularly in India, had 
been gradually replaced by more doctrinally oriented attitudes as  military 
successes reinforced ‘race-consciousness’ and a growing belief in the racial 
superiority of Western Europeans.  Such attitudes were part of a general shift in 
attitude from the universalist ideology of the Enlightenment to a Eurocentric 
world view, where, as well as military prowess, economic, technical, political 
and cultural dominance led to an emphatic belief in Western superiority and a 
view of the East as stagnant and degraded.  Social Darwinism fed such attitudes. 
As Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, the late nineteenth-century pro-Arab aristocrat and 
poet, observed, it presented a new world view where life was no longer an 
‘ordered harmony, but … a struggle for existence where whatever right there was 
was on the side of might, and where it was a waste of pity to deplore the 
extinction of less  capable races, either of beast or man, before the competition of 
their more capable rivals’.43   
In explaining the psychology behind imperial rule, historian, Albert Hourani, 
observed that it necessarily involves taking up an attitude that includes both ‘a 
kind of proprietary feeling towards  those who lie in one’s power’ and ‘a sense of 
superiority which is natural in the circumstances’.44   For the Victorians, such 
national arrogance stemmed not only from a belief in their superior genes and 
civilisation but also from the fact that they identified a moral purpose to their 
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enterprise, an endeavour to bring that civilisation to the less  advanced.  It was a 
self-perpetuating process whereby imperial success proved superiority, and 
superiority in turn justified intervention and control.  These attitudes were, to a 
large extent, equally applicable to the other world powers.  The United States, 
Russia, France and Germany thought and defined themselves in imperial terms, 
although they each followed their own distinctive path to global colonialism. 
World order, pre-1914, was based on assumptions  regarding the right of Western 
powers to seek and maintain domination over the rest of the globe.
As Dominic Lieven contends, for the majority of Europeans ‘the concept of 
empire was a positive one’.45   Those who diverged included the burgeoning 
socialist movement for whom imperialism was synonymous with territorial 
aggrandisement and hence morally wrong.46    Other commentators, notably J.A. 
Hobson, argued that it did not make economic sense.  Whereas ‘true 
colonialism’, a genuine expansion of nationality such as in Canada or New 
Zealand, was acceptable, imperialism, consisting of ‘a small minority wielding 
political or economic sway over a majority of alien and subject people, 
themselves under the despotic political control of the Imperial Government or its 
local nominees’ was not.47  This ‘New Imperialism’ was bad for the subject races 
and for the imperialists  whose own society stultified when its energies  were 
consumed by imperial ambitions.  Hobson, too, viewed the British Empire as 
‘closely analogous’ with the Roman Empire, warning that ‘the laws which, 
operative throughout nature, doom the parasite to atrophy, decay, and final 
extinction, are not evaded by nations any more than by individual organisms’.48 
A fear of decay, lay not only at the heart of the imperial project but within British 
society more generally.  Urbanisation, and the experience of the Second Boer 
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War (1899-1902), had led to anxiety regarding the quality of Anglo-Saxon 
fighting stock.49   Coupled with a sense of physical disintegration were the 
intellectual and ideological challenges posed by modernity.  An increasingly 
industrialised, urban society with mass enfranchisement challenged the existing 
order, not only socially but spiritually as confidence in the deeply felt religious 
purpose of English Protestantism gave way to doubt and confusion in the face of 
such profound change.50  
This dichotomy between arrogant entitlement on the one hand, and insecurity and 
uncertainty on the other, is pervasive in the documents scrutinised in this thesis. 
By recognising that the imperial experience was both a refraction of domestic 
concerns as well as an influence upon them (and vice versa), it is  possible to 
endorse MacKenzie’s assertion that imperialism created ‘for the British a world 
view which was  central to their perceptions of themselves’.51   This, in turn, 
reflects an endorsement of an approach to studying ‘world history’ based not on 
an analysis of ‘the walled-off tribe or nation, but the nexus of contact between 
peoples’.52   British identity, like that of most peoples, was a consequence not of 
isolation but of interaction.
Engaging with Orientalism and its legacy
‘A rich body of scholarship has already grown around “Orientalism”, the ways 
Westerners define themselves in relation to an “Other.”  In this agenda for 
research, war is mostly in the background.  Yet war is a potent site of 
Orientalism.  In and through war, people formulate what it means to be Western 
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or non-Western’.53   So writes Patrick Porter, author of Military Orientalism: 
Eastern War Through Western Eyes, in his  valuable examination of the ways in 
which the West has sought to define and understand itself and its enemy by 
viewing conflict as a clash between ‘the West and the Rest’.  Like Porter’s 
analysis, this research proceeds on the basis that Edward Said’s  Orientalism, first 
published in 1978, and the debate it stimulated offers  a useful starting point for 
engaging with broader questions regarding the representation of the ‘other’ and 
the relationship of such representations to power.54  Said’s theory paid homage to 
the work of Michel Foucault whose central assertion, that objective truth is 
inaccessible and that knowledge is always the product of the social context in 
which it is produced, also has resonance in this  thesis.55   As Zachary Lockman 
summarises, ‘who and what we are is not only shaped or influenced but 
produced, constituted, by socially prevalent systems of meaning’.56  This  is what 
Foucault referred to as ‘discourse’, an idea Said took and applied to the imperial 
experience in the East, arguing that the Western intellectual elite, including 
scholars, writers, artists, explorers  and statesmen, created a discourse in which 
the Orient was ‘known’ to be degenerate, uncivilised, lazy and violent, in contrast 
to a vision of the West as morally, culturally and intellectually superior.  He 
elaborated upon Foucault’s theory by identifying a deliberate intent to shape 
knowledge with an identifiable objective, namely, to undermine the East as  a 
means of legitimising the West’s actions.
This study recognises an imperial discourse.  Who and what Britain was in 
1914-1918 was  in part a product of it.  But it was not a systematic or deliberate 
creation.  The attribution of intent by Said assumes a coherence and consistency 
of thought that was lacking in the imperial project, which reacted to circumstance 
and context and, as shall be shown, was capable of an intricate response far 
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exceeding a simple East versus  West dichotomy.  Said’s idea of a culturally static 
Oriental ‘other’ also requires revision in the context of this study.  For example, 
during the war cultural preconceptions which had been applied to Islam and the 
East were turned on the Germans who, from the outset of the war, were the 
primary focus against whom Britons  sought to identify themselves.  Thus, while 
imperial Britain may have had well-developed ideas about the inferiority of non-
white races, it became expedient to put such ideas  to one side and instead focus 
on deconstructing fellow Europeans.  Propped up by the perceived scientific 
validity of eugenics, which could as readily be applied to Europeans  as  to other 
races, the Germans  were depicted as  boorish, primitive, fanatically militaristic, 
immoral and atavistic.  ‘In one explicitly racist formulation, the Germans were 
referred to as  the “Zulus  of Europe”’.57   Germans became the ‘other’, in 
opposition to civilised, democratised Britons, just as, in the nineteenth century, 
Africans and Asians had been depicted as inferior to Europeans  as a means of 
justifying imperial expansion.  In the early stages of the war there was little room 
for another enemy, specifically for an Islamic ‘other’ in the form of the Turks. 
Even Jews were an easier target than Muslims; anti-semitism was rife in Britain 
during the war but the Ottomans were a remoter entity.  Indeed, as will be shown, 
there was concern amongst official circles during the war at the apparent regard 
in which the Turks continued to be held within British society.  
This is  not to say that the war years are a barren period for considering the 
conflict between East and West, far from it.  The lack of anti-Turkish sentiment 
in the early part of the war is as telling of the flexibility of cultural assumptions 
as is the subsequent alacrity with which the British wholeheartedly reverted to 
traditional stereotypes in its later stages.  Equally, the imperative in the second 
half of the war to differentiate Turks from Arabs and Indian Muslims called for a 
sophisticated, tightly controlled approach, beyond crude racism and cliché.  By 
examining how and why Britain constructed Ottoman Asia and its peoples  during 
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the war, this thesis engages with the legacy of Orientalism and attempts to 
illustrate the fluidity and complexity of the relationship between East and West. 
Print Culture
In her introduction to Media and the British Empire Chandrika Kaul discusses 
the concept of ‘communication media’ which she identifies as including electric 
telegraphs, news agencies, newspapers, books  and printed ephemera, 
photographs and cinema.58  Communication media did not just convey traditional 
news.  They were also vital to the transmission of notions of identity, race and 
culture, and in the context of Britain’s imperial experience, it was the primary 
means, aside from firsthand experience, by which the metropole’s  encounter with 
the colonised was shaped.  Empire was, in the words of Elleke Boehmer, ‘itself, 
at least in part, a textual exercise .... conceived and maintained in an array of 
writings’.59  As alluded to above, British rule depended on more than successful 
administration or military might.  The articulation of who they were and what 
they stood for was essential to the sustenance of British power.  Contemporaries 
frequently understood and referred to this as Britain’s ‘prestige’, which 
constituted ‘both the cement which supported the foundation of their rule and the 
ideology which they used to explain their superiority over the millions of people 
they ruled’.60  
By focusing on printed material, predominantly books, pamphlets and illustrated 
magazines, this  study explores the functional purpose of communication media 
in both the exposition and legitimisation of empire and of Britain’s belligerency 
during the war, and indeed, the interconnection between the two.  The inclusion 
of fiction is, in part, a recognition of the importance of such cultural 
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representations  in perpetuating imperial relations.  Spearheaded by Said’s 
Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism, a number of scholars have used 
fictional prose and poetry to explore the process of colonisation.61  Of particular 
assistance in this study has been Priya Satia’s Spies in Arabia, an examination of 
the ‘cultural actors’ who shaped knowledge of the Middle East in Edwardian 
society through their fiction, travel writing and official correspondence.  As Satia 
undertakes in relation to the work of British intelligence experts in the Middle 
East, so this thesis seeks to understand the ideas and cultural concepts that 
determined the propagandists’ representations of Ottoman Asia during the war.
Whilst there have been many valuable contributions on the subject of empire 
writing during the period of the long nineteenth century, Satia’s is unusual in its 
wartime focus.62   The trauma of trench warfare, the horror of shell shock, the 
scale of loss; these are the tropes that captured, and continue to hold, the 
imagination.63   In recent years, however, a growing recognition has arisen of the 
diversity of literary expression and the value of such sources to historians 
seeking to look beyond the narratives of high culture, and at elements of the war 
less examined.64   As shall be seen in Chapter Five, popular literature offers 
valuable source material for examining the way in which Ottoman Asia and its 
peoples  were constructed during the war era.  The relevance of such work lies in 
both subject matter and in the proximity of many writers to official circles.  A 
number of writers who engaged with Eastern themes in their fiction, such as 
Arthur Conan Doyle, Rudyard Kipling, William Le Queux, John Buchan and 
26
61 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London, 1993).
62 Overviews include, for example, Elleke Boehmer, Migrant Metaphors; Douglas Kerr, Eastern Figures, 
Orient and Empire in British Writing (Hong Kong, 2008); and, Robin W. Winks and James R.Rush eds. 
Asia in Western Fiction (Manchester, 1990).
63 See, for example, Trudi Tate ‘The First World War: British Writing’ in Kate McLoughlin (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to War Writing (Cambridge, 2009), pp.160-174, which contains not a single 
mention of Turkey or the Ottoman Empire or any literature connected thereto. 
64 See, for example, Mary Hammond, Reading, Publishing and the Formation of Literary Taste in 
England, 1880-1914 (Aldershot, 2006) and Mary Hammond and Shafquat Towheed (eds.), Publishing in 
the First World War: Essays in Book History (Basingstoke, 2007).
Gilbert Parker, were also directly engaged in producing material for Wellington 
House.  
Whilst the wartime experiences  of prominent figures such as  Kipling and Buchan 
have been scrutinised closely by historians  in the intervening century, it is 
surprising, given their intimate association with imperial matters, that the 
relationship between their wartime propaganda and the British imperial agenda 
during the war has seemed less  deserving of attention.  In particular, Buchan, 
whose novel Greenmantle can be read as a key text in the dissemination of 
Britain’s wartime imperial ideology, is the subject of a number of biographies, 
articles and essays, many of which address his role within Wellington House and 
as a propagandist, but few give anything more than a cursory reference to the 
novel.65   Similarly, Kipling’s attitude towards Germany, and his  anti-German 
propaganda work such as Mary Postgate, have benefited from a great deal of 
scholarly attention, whereas  his  epistolic propaganda piece The Eyes of Asia, 
concerned with how Muslim soldiers from the Empire responded to the 
experience of the Western Front, has not.66   Another writer, Marmaduke 
Pickthall, is also under-studied in the context of his wartime writing on Ottoman 
Asia.  Although little known today, he was a popular novelist in Edwardian 
England and highly regarded as an expert on the region.  Chapter Four uses his 
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journalism and novels to explore his position as astute and trenchant critic of 
Wellington House’s Eastern propaganda.
Methods and Structure
Chapter One – Propaganda Production at Wellington House, 1914-1916
This chapter takes as  its  focus the material produced by the War Propaganda 
Bureau (commonly referred to as Wellington House, the location of the Bureau’s 
offices) between the start of the war and the end of 1916.  Chapter Two takes a 
similar approach in relation to the latter half of the war.  Whilst there were a 
number of other propaganda organisations within the government, Wellington 
House was, in the words  of Philip Taylor, ‘the single most important branch of 
the British propaganda organization between 1914 and 1917’.67   It was tasked 
with conveying Britain’s position on the war to allied and neutral countries, and 
it did so in close collaboration with the Foreign Office.  As will be explained, it 
was to Wellington House that responsibility for propaganda relating to Ottoman 
Asia and other countries  with a Muslim population fell.  This was, however, an 
evolutionary process, and it was  only in 1916 that a clearly defined remit began 
to emerge.  
The primary source material for this  chapter consists of pamphlets, books, 
government documents (such as the Blue Book) and illustrated newspapers 
produced by or on behalf of Wellington House.  These, and not the popular press, 
were the means by which the propagandists believed they could most effectively 
convey their message.  The importance of mass popular opinion had, in 1914, yet 
to be fully appreciated, and officials  still considered that influencing opinion-
makers was more effective than directly influencing public opinion.  Sir Claude 
Schuster expressed a commonly held view when he observed, in December 1914, 
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that ‘it is better to influence those who can influence others than to attempt a 
direct appeal to the mass of the population’.68  Consequently, Wellington House 
employed authors and academics  to produce pamphlets and books – often 
amounting to several hundred pages – that veered towards the scholarly and dry. 
The exception to this approach was  in the production of illustrated papers.  As 
Chapters One and Two will show, al-Haqīqah, a paper produced expressly for 
Muslims, was aimed precisely at popular (Muslim) opinion.  It was  an important 
part of Wellington House’s Muslim propaganda and is a valuable and previously 
untapped resource for understanding preconceptions regarding Muslims as well 
as how officials sought to influence them in the interests of strategic concerns 
relating to the war and the Empire.  
Any review of Wellington House’s practices is circumscribed by its covert 
operational methods and the paucity of original documents relating to its 
organisation.  Shortly after the war, the bulk of its records were destroyed 
including all policy papers and the whole contents of its Record Department 
library.69   What did survive includes a ‘Schedule of Wellington House 
Literature’, containing a substantive list of pamphlets and books produced during 
the war.  Whilst not exhaustive, the Schedule is a valuable way of identifying 
propaganda material, and most of the wartime pamphlets and books referred to in 
this  thesis appear in it.70  Other important sources are three reports produced by 
Wellington House on their activities between June 1915 and September 1916. 
Whilst this method of reporting ceased with the third report, papers relating to 
two investigations into Wellington House’s activities in 1917, conducted by 
Robert Donald on behalf of the government, enable an appreciation of its  work 
during that year, and there is sufficient archival material, predominantly in 
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Foreign Office and India Office papers, to supplement what remains from 
Wellington House itself.  As will be shown, these sources  indicate that in the 
period 1914-16 the provision of propaganda concerning Britain’s war with the 
Ottoman Empire was not a priority.  For example, between November 1914 and 
September 1916, during which period approximately four hundred books and 
pamphlets were distributed in up to seventeen European languages, only one 
pamphlet was  translated into Turkish and only three into Arabic.71   Instead, it is 
largely by considering material written for Wellington House’s  target audience, 
namely ‘allied and neutral’ countries, that it is possible to chart representations in 
the first half of the war.  This target audience reflected the overriding official 
motivation for the propaganda campaign, which was to communicate and justify 
Britain’s role in the war.  In the second half of the war, they sought to influence 
those same recipients in support of their ongoing belligerency and their post-war 
ambitions.  Part of this process  meant elaborating upon Britain’s role as an 
imperial power, deeply familiar with governing subject races, including Muslims. 
They claimed a special relationship with, and a special knowledge of, Muslims 
based on experience in India and Egypt, and it was largely in this context that 
Ottoman Asia and its peoples were depicted.
Concerns regarding the impact of the war with the Ottomans on the British 
Empire’s Muslim subjects and soldiers, in particular the potential damage to 
prestige and the prospect of religiously motivated revolt, and the effects  of the 
destabilisation of the traditional balance of power within Europe, contributed 
towards an initial period of stasis  in relation to propaganda specifically aimed at 
‘the East and Among Moslems generally’.72   Fear and lack of direction were 
compounded by an overwhelming preoccupation with understanding, explaining 
and justifying Britain’s war with a fellow European nation.  As will be shown, it 
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was only in 1916, in light of military failures in the Dardanelles and 
Mesopotamia and events in Armenia and the Middle East, that a more decisive 
approach began to emerge.
Chapter Two – Propaganda Production at Wellington House, 1917-1918
This chapter takes  a similar approach to Chapter One but focuses primarily on 
Turkey, leaving the Middle East for Chapter Three.  By the onset of Lloyd 
George’s  government, the official position regarding the Ottoman Empire’s 
future had crystallised.  Woodrow Wilson’s  enquiry to the belligerents in 
December 1916, in which he asked them to state their peace terms, proved to be 
the catalyst for Lloyd George to state definitively that Britain was opposed to the 
continuation of the Ottoman state in its current form and to condemn its methods 
of government as a ‘murderous tyranny’.73   Thereafter, Lloyd George himself 
was instrumental in launching a new campaign within Wellington House whose 
purpose was, in the words of John Buchan, ‘to make it a platitude among Allies 
and neutrals’ that the Turk must go.74  
In 1917 and 1918 the propagandists took a new tack, one which resulted not only 
in a great deal more activity but which also became more complex as Britain 
sought to prepare the ground for the Ottoman Empire’s dismantlement and the 
staking of her own claim to the Empire’s former territories, whilst continuing to 
manage the sensitivities of the Empire’s Muslim population and address matters 
of prestige.  Part of this process involved adopting and running with Wilson’s 
wartime rhetoric of self-determination and nationalism, but, in turn, this 
necessitated a reshaping of Britain’s imperial identity for external consumption. 
The benefits of the British mode of imperialism were articulated not only in 
pamphlets and books aimed at allies and neutrals, which naturally also decried 
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the Turkish and German versions, but in the illustrated papers aimed at Muslims. 
Despite the apparent failure of the Central Powers’ efforts to incite a jihad and 
the reversal of the Entente’s military fortunes in the Middle East, Wellington 
House continued to produce al-Haqīqah, and implemented additional papers 
aimed at Muslims, suggesting that both prestige and jihad remained prevailing 
concerns until the end of the war. 
Chapter Three – Mark Sykes and Middle Eastern Propaganda  
Mark Sykes’s role in the ‘Turk Must Go’ campaign forms part of Chapter Two. 
This chapter explores his role in Middle Eastern propaganda but places it in the 
context of his wartime trajectory from novice MP and amateur Orientalist to 
government authority on Eastern policy and Eastern propaganda.  Sykes 
identified, as early as October 1915, the need for propaganda connected with 
Ottoman Asia.  He took a more bullish approach than either Whitehall or Delhi 
when it came to managing the sensitivities of the Empire’s  Muslim subjects, 
believing Britain should be unapologetic regarding her war with the Ottomans. 
Instrumental in establishing the ‘Eastern Propaganda’ element within Wellington 
House, and in the creation of al-Haqīqah, by mid-1916, with the completion of 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the inception of the Arab Revolt, he also began, 
virtually singlehandedly, to implement a pro-Arab propagandist strategy.  For the 
rest of the war, he remained a primary protagonist in a propaganda campaign that 
supported the Ottoman Empire’s minority peoples, including the Armenians and 
Jews, as well as the Arabs.  Extensive use is made of his  personal papers as well 
as the pamphlets  and newspaper articles he produced, his commentary for the 
War Committee’s  Arabian Reports and his  parliamentary speeches, to trace the 
nature and development of this element of the government’s  propaganda 
campaign.    
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Charming and witty, but equally arrogant and naïve, Sykes is usually dismissed 
as, at best, an amateur with a cavalier attitude to the people whose future lay in 
his hands, at worst, as a cynical manipulator prepared to go to any lengths  to 
further British imperial interests.  This chapter seeks to go beyond the usual 
responses to Sykes and undertake instead a comprehensive review of how he set 
about shaping and implementing Britain’s Middle Eastern propaganda campaign. 
Examining his perspective in this chapter is  a recognition not only of his 
importance in shaping Middle Eastern propaganda but of the need, in this  case, to 
delve beyond official papers and understand the man himself, with all his traits 
and foibles.  Indeed, the assertion that ‘policy is  fragile to the touch of 
individuality, and the peculiar influence of each new-comer has to be reckoned’ 
is  one that holds particularly true in relation to Sykes and the Middle East.75 
However, Sykes, like other protagonists in this thesis such as  John Buchan, 
Charles  Masterman, Arnold Toynbee, Marmaduke Pickthall and Aubrey Herbert, 
whilst an individual with his own ideas and agendas, was also a member of a 
dominant social group with a remarkably consistent set of shared ideals.  By 
examining Sykes – his beliefs, his  preoccupations, his neuroses – it is possible to 
gain not only a clearer picture of the development of Britain’s Middle Eastern 
propaganda but of the collective cultural mentality of decision makers in the pre-
war period and during it.
Chapter Four – Marmaduke Pickthall: The Dissenter’s Perspective
In the preceding paragraph the ideological homogeneity of the social and 
political ruling class during the war was asserted.  Indeed, the enlistment of 
established writers and academics by Wellington House is  frequently proferred in 
the historiography of the war as evidence of this cohesion.76    They had a shared 
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vision of the world and Britain’s  place within it.  They believed that peace, 
democracy and progress could best be achieved through growth of the British 
form of civilisation.  So, too, did Marmaduke Pickthall, a well-known novelist, 
journalist and Orientalist, but where he diverged was in relation to Britain’s 
policy towards Turkey and Islam.  Although ambivalence about war with the 
Ottomans was not uncommon, Pickthall appears to have stood alone in providing 
an incisive critique not only of British policy but more specifically of Britain’s 
Eastern propaganda, taking issue with the work of both Sykes and Toynbee. 
With friends in high places, including Lord Cromer and Aubrey Herbert, and in-
depth knowledge of the region, his was a powerful and unique voice, and one 
that was feared by the authorities to the extent that in 1917 his prosecution under 
the Defence of the Realm Act was contemplated.  Using his published novels  and 
journalism, Chapter Four will consider the dissenter’s view by examining 
Pickthall’s writing both in terms  of his  response to official propaganda and, more 
broadly, in relation to his divergence from established wartime views regarding 
the Ottoman Empire and Islam, and Britain’s relationship with them.   
Chapter Five – Fiction and Ottoman Asia
Wellington House called on the nation’s novelists, many of whom were already 
deeply engaged in a dialectic concerning British identity and also possessed a 
keenly developed sense of the didactic.  Chapter Five starts  by reflecting on the 
pre-war predilection for Eastern-based fiction and contextualises  it within 
Edwardian society.  Whilst its popularity lay in its exoticism and romance (and 
frequently in the comfort of the familiar as the same old tropes were rehashed 
time and again), such fiction was simultaneously a conduit for contemplation of a 
multitude of contemporary issues  and concerns.  Political, social and spiritual 
anxieties were reflected in topics  such as  pan-Islamism, Islamic fanaticism, the 
existential and invigorating appeal of primitive cultures, the virility of the 
‘Mohammedan’ and his  attractiveness to English women, as well as in more 
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overt and traditional subjects  such as  the merits of the imperial project and the 
future of the Empire.  
Chapter Five then turns to the war years themselves, contending that, as in 
official propaganda, the centrality of the ‘Hun’ to Britain’s wartime psyche 
resulted in a loss of interest in a Muslim oppositional figure.  Even in 
Greenmantle, a wartime novel set largely in Turkey and concerning a plot to 
ignite a jihad against the Allies, the primary enemy is manifestly Germany. 
However, this  chapter will show that although Germany was the ‘other’ against 
whom Britain defined herself in the war, Greenmantle is a crucial source for this 
thesis  capturing not only prevailing strategic concerns but also the essence of the 
propagandist message Britain sought to convey to the world in the summer of 
1916, revealing much about both her self-perception as well as the ways in which 
she defined and understood others.  It will also consider Kipling’s propagandist 
piece, The Eyes of Asia, which, although it concerns Indian Muslims, in the 
context of certain India Office papers, offers  a valuable insight into how official 
propagandists sought to represent Muslim soldiers  and their relationship with 
their colonial masters for broader consumption.
Finally, this  chapter will offer some insights  into the notable resurgence of a 
subtly changed Eastern romantic trope immediately after the war and suggest 
how the events of the war and the work of the propagandists  may have 
influenced the ways in which Muslims and Ottoman Asia were represented.  
※
Whilst wartime propaganda has received a reasonable level of attention from 
historians, it is contended that a comprehensive review of how propagandists 
wrote about Ottoman Asia remains to be undertaken.  Approaching the 
investigation from the perspective of Britain’s imperial status enables  an analysis 
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in which it is  possible to discern how propagandist writing formed part of an 
existing discursive framework regarding the purpose and legitimacy of the 
British Empire which meshed in the war years with Britain’s justification of her 
belligerency.  Within this  bigger picture, the propagandists’ response to war with 
the Ottomans was determined by two principal objectives: to project an image of 
British imperialism as  tolerant, progressive and nurturing across  the globe and to 
retain the sympathy and support of the British Empire’s own Muslim subjects. 
These objectives were the bedrock upon which it was believed the safety and 
security of the Empire could be assured during the war and after.  The following 
chapters will show how they were pursued and how their pursuit was 
circumscribed, in particular by Turkey’s  status as the cynosure of the Islamic 
world.  As alluded to above, anxiety dogged the imperial project, and never more 
so than in the shape of pan-Islam and Islamic fanaticism.  Despite growing 
confidence in the support of her imperial subjects for the Entente’s cause, and the 
failure of the Central Powers’ call to jihad, unease remained pervasive 
throughout the war.  Islamic fanaticism, like German militarism, underlined not 
just the Empire’s vulnerability but a sense of uncertainty within British cultural 
identity more generally, wrought by the seismic changes of the era.  This  point 
highlights the overarching purpose of the thesis  which is to demonstrate how 
narration of the progression of propagandist constructions of Ottoman Asia 
enables a better understanding not only of the mutability and complexity of the 
response to Muslims and the East but also how Britain defined herself, not 
simply as belligerent, but more, fundamentally as a global power, an imperial 
power with both a past to be defended and a future to be secured.
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Chapter One – Wellington House, 1914-1916
This chapter will consider Wellington House’s  propaganda output from the onset 
of the war until the end of 1916 and fall of Asquith’s  government.  It will begin 
by giving some background on the propaganda machinery during the first half of 
the war before providing a short examination of the way in which Germany was 
depicted, on the grounds that depiction of the Ottomans can only be understood 
in conjunction with an awareness of how their ally, and ‘ring leader’, was 
depicted.  Equally important is  an understanding of the way that Britons 
perceived themselves in contrast to the Central Powers.  As suggested in the 
Introduction, Britain’s imperial psyche played a critical role in determining her 
self-perception and section 1.3 will develop this idea.  Sections 1.4 to 1.6 turn to 
a more in-depth analysis of the material relating specifically to the Ottoman 
Empire, starting with the early material relating to the outbreak of hostilities and 
encompassing the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia campaigns.  Section 1.5 centres 
on the preoccupation during the early part of the war with the maintenance of 
British ‘prestige’ which, it will be argued, was the most important aspect of their 
Muslim-related propaganda during the first half of the war.  Finally, in section 
1.6, Wellington House’s careful response to the Armenian massacres will be 
examined, and it will be shown that official willingness to condemn them was 
circumscribed by larger strategic concerns.  Indeed, as the chronological period 
covered by this  chapter drew to a close, those concerns resulted in the 
crystallising of Whitehall’s policy towards the Ottomans and, as will be shown, 
new modes of representation began to emerge.
1.1 The Evolution of Wellington House
In contrast to the ‘small wars’ that preceded it, the First World War witnessed war 
on a new scale affecting all aspects of life and society.  Not only did it have a 
personal, physical, effect on everyone but it challenged values and ideological 
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assumptions that lay at the heart of what it meant to be British.  It was soon 
recognised that successful propaganda was a vital ingredient, not only to 
maintain morale and co-opt allies, but also to control and manipulate public 
opinion, without which the war effort could not be sustained.  The challenge of 
producing effective propaganda took place in a new communications  era, 
stimulated by factors such as increased literacy, mass readership of newspapers, 
the global cable network enabling the rapid transmission of information, the 
growing ubiquity of photography, and the dawn of the age of cinema.  According 
to Sanders and Taylor, Britain was the most astute, sophisticated and adept of all 
the belligerents at harnessing these new channels of communication and 
effectively conveying their propagandist message.  They were responsible ‘for 
opening a Pandoran box which unleashed the weapon of propaganda upon the 
modern world’.1 
One of the first bodies  to be formally set up, in August 1914, was the Press 
Bureau, designed to undertake press  censorship.  A number of other bodies also 
addressed propagandist matters  (and frequently overlapped in the manner in 
which they did so) including the Neutral Press Committee (supplying 
information relating to the war to neutral countries), the Foreign Office News 
Desk (providing statements concerning foreign policy to the press, for example, 
via Reuters) and the War Office’s MI7 (military affairs), and yet it was felt that 
there was still a need for a body directly tasked with counteracting German 
propaganda in foreign countries, especially the US and the Dominions, and with 
presenting the ‘allied case and Great Britain’s share in the war in the proper 
light’.2   The possibility of directing a psychological offensive at the enemy had 
yet to develop and was not fully addressed until the creation of the Enemy 
Propaganda Department in 1918.  More immediately, Whitehall wished to 
counteract a manifesto published by prominent German academics in support of 
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the invasion of Belgium.  To address the task, C.F.G. Masterman, a cabinet 
minister, was appointed chief of Britain’s  War Propaganda Bureau with offices in 
Wellington House, Buckingham Gate.  He immediately called a meeting of 
twenty-five authors  and academics to discuss the ways in which they could 
contribute.  This group, which included H.G. Wells, Arthur Conan Doyle, J.M. 
Barrie, John Galsworthy, Thomas Hardy, Gilbert Murray, A.E.W. Mason and 
Rudyard Kipling, was to have a sustained influence on war propaganda in the 
years to follow.3   On 7 September, Masterman called a second meeting.  The 
attendees this  time were publicists and members of the press although newspaper 
proprietors were not included: ‘the power he wanted to harness was  in the 
wordsmiths, not in their business sponsors’.4 
There was no radio, television or social media to challenge the authority of these 
‘wordsmiths’ and, in the absence of competition, writers  enjoyed a level of 
prestige unimaginable today.  ‘Not only through their writings, but also through 
the earnings they amassed, the access they were given to the social networks of 
the politically and economically powerful, and the letter-writing correspondence 
they maintained with numerous loyal readers, these men were as influential a 
group of writers as the world has ever produced’.5  Furthermore, their supposed 
neutrality, untarnished by political affiliation, attached to them an aura of 
sincerity, creating a sense that, in the words of Stefan Zweig, ‘a writer could be 
trusted as the best guarantor of independent opinion’.6 
As outlined in the Introduction, the prime target of Wellington House’s 
propaganda effort was her allies and neutrals, particularly the Americans, and it 
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was largely in this context that the Ottoman Empire was represented.  In 
Masterman’s first account of Wellington House’s activities, dated 7 June 1915, a 
need for a concerted approach towards propaganda targeting Muslims, or to 
counteract Turkey’s popular image within Britain, had yet to be identified.  There 
was only one small reference to the Muslim world, which stated: ‘Arabic, 
Turkish, and Chinese translations have ... been made of some of our publications 
and distributed by steamship companies and local representatives of the Foreign 
Office, Colonial Office, and India Office, in appropriate quarters’.7  With regards 
to India, the report stated ‘we have left the question of propaganda entirely in the 
hands of the Government of India’.8 
Whilst America was the primary target of Wellington House’s propaganda, the 
concern was less about persuading them to join the Allies  than to ensure they did 
not join the Central Powers.  Yet contrasting Germany with Britain required 
careful negotiation of American sensibilities.  Lord Robert Cecil of the Foreign 
Office observed that, ‘Our national habit of self-depreciation is a handicap. 
Moreover, in many countries  we are suspected of arrogance, and the most 
moderate criticism of foreign countries is, for this and other reasons, bitterly 
resented’.9  The aim, therefore, was to be as subtle and indirect as  possible whilst 
simultaneously conveying a strong sense of British values and purpose, often 
relying on her history and imperial past to do so.  The covert approach entailed 
going to great lengths to hide the official origins of their material.  As John 
Buchan put it in 1917, ‘Camouflage of the right kind is a vital necessity.  It [i.e. 
propaganda] can advertise its wares, but it dare not advertise the vendor’.10  This 
was perceived as the antithesis of the overt, heavy-handed, German approach 
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which was seen to have failed in the US because, rather than gaining sympathy, it 
had simply alerted the Americans  against efforts by foreign powers to manipulate 
their allegiances.  In a report of September 1916, Wellington House proudly 
stated that:
In the method of distribution we have endeavoured as far as possible to avoid that 
promiscuous and obviously Government-inspired deluging with literature upon all 
persons alike, whether they desire it  or otherwise, which has distinguished the 
German methods, and which has excited both indignation and weariness among the 
recipients.  Practically all our literature bears the mark of some printer or publisher, 
and there is nothing to trace it to any Government origin.11
The methods adopted by Gilbert Parker, a Canadian novelist and MP for 
Gravesend, with responsibility for American propaganda until mid-1916, were 
typical of Wellington House’s style.  Pamphlets and books, produced by 
commercial printers and publishers, would be sent by him, as a purportedly 
‘concerned bystander’, directly to Americans he considered to be influential. 
Parker used compliment slips with his private address printed on them, or wrote 
personalised notes to accompany the publications, a method he called the ‘policy 
of the personal approach’.12  
Some literature was written by employees within Wellington House, some was 
commissioned by them and written by third parties, and on occasion they would 
identify and purchase bulk copies of material already in the public domain which 
they considered would make good propaganda.  The deals were generally struck 
by Alexander Watt, Wellington House’s  ‘business  adviser’ and one of London’s 
leading literary agents, who also happened to represent many of Wellington 
House’s most prominent authors including Kipling, Conan Doyle, Gilbert Parker 
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and Buchan.13  It was a small, and incestuous, world.  The publishing house on 
whom Wellington House relied most heavily was Hodder & Stoughton, whose 
authors included not only many of Alexander Watt’s clients, but also many 
prominent political figures, including Grey, Churchill and Balfour.  When 
Wellington House began publishing material directly in America, they frequently 
used George Doran, a publisher whose business was one-third owned by 
Hodder.14  Ernest Hodder’s publishing services during the war were so extensive, 
they earned him a knighthood in 1919.
By June 1915, it was reported by Wellington House that two and a half million 
copies of books, pamphlets and other forms of literary propaganda had been 
circulated in seventeen different languages since the outbreak of war.15  In 1916 
their output was  even more impressive and yet, during this  period, only four 
pamphlets were published on Britain’s war with Turkey, and only one in relation 
to the Middle East.  Furthermore, until November 1916, and the publication of 
the Blue Book, only one pamphlet was published on the Armenian atrocities 
despite the fact that they had largely taken place a year and a half earlier in the 
spring of 1915.16   In contrast, as the Table on page 93 demonstrates, over the 
same period more than one hundred and fifty pamphlets  and books were 
produced on the causes of the war and on atrocities committed by the Central 
Powers within Europe.  As this chapter will show, in the first half of the war, 
Germany was almost exclusively the object of the propagandists’ attention. 
However, how they wrote about Germany, and about Britain in comparison, 
particularly when they used the past to demonstrate the righteousness of her 
cause, the propagandists had much to say about empire, Muslims and the East. 
Furthermore, from early 1916, Wellington House’s inactivity was increasingly 
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addressed as changing circumstances, such as the failures in the Dardanelles and 
Mesopotamia, Mark Sykes’s growing involvement in Middle Eastern 
propaganda, and the need to address American concerns about atrocities in 
Armenia, demanded a more dynamic approach.
1.2 Germany as the Object of Hate
From the beginning propaganda was focused upon, and obsessed with, Germany, 
the ‘jungle enemy of civilization’.17   The invasion of Belgium and the atrocities 
committed there and in France against civilians between August and October 
1914, set the tone for this approach.  Emphasising German barbarity was a way 
of garnering sympathy from neutrals and gave meaning to the war on the home 
front and the propagandists  wasted little time in producing the Bryce Report of 
May 1915 which concluded that Germany had indeed committed atrocities  as 
part of a deliberate strategy of terror.  Wellington House emphasised the success 
of the document in the Third Report: ‘Of official Government publications the 
Bryce Report in eleven languages (80pp.) with its Appendix (over 300pp.) on the 
German atrocities easily takes first place, and stands secure as a document of 
permanent historical value’.18   It consolidated the horror stories which had 
appeared in the press  from August 1914 and which had effective currency 
throughout the war, stories  of mass rape, the bayoneting of babies, the cutting off 
of children’s hands and women’s breasts and hostage murders.  Its findings were 
reinforced in pamphlets such as The Death of Edith Cavell (translated by 
Wellington House into eight languages) and The Horrors of Wittenberg (nine 
languages) and by German methods of warfare such as their use of naval mines, 
the introduction of gas attacks, the sinking of the Lusitania (which occurred five 
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days before the Bryce Report was published) and zeppelin raids, all of which 
signalled their departure from the standards of Western civilisation.19
The depiction of the Germans as uncivilised brutes is well illustrated in the 
lively, detailed writings of novelist Gilbert Parker for Wellington House.  For 
example, he emphasised that the Kaiser took as  his exemplar Attila the Hun 
‘whose chief gift, apart from sheer military prowess, not, it is  understood 
possessed by his imitator, was  sacking towns and murdering helpless civil 
populations’.20   He stressed that such uncivilised behaviour was especially 
heinous because of the
age in which we live; not  the age of the Inquisition, of hanging for the stealing of a 
sheep, of mutilation for an offence against  the law – the method of the Mahdi in the 
Soudan.  The Mahdi, the Khalifa, the Mad Mullah, Attila, Alva and Tilly, each 
inspired their armies with energy, courage, and the love of loot, lust  and cruelty; 
and the last  monarch of the Brandenburgs [the Kaiser] has been able to do the 
same.21  
Parker picked out various  Muslim leaders  for his  first three examples, 22 and later 
he compared the Kaiser’s philosophy with that of Mohammed: ‘The new 
religion, then, is  founded on Force.  To the German, as  to Mohammed, “War is 
not only heroism, it is the Divine act.”’23   He reinforced the similarities later, 
when he claimed:
The Kaiser is indeed the Mohammed of the modern world, imbued with the spirit 
of the destroyers of the Alexandrian Library, whose belief was that all it  contained, 
“Is either in the Koran or is unworthy of attention.” .... So far as the comparison 
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between the aims of Mohammed and the Kaiser is inexact, the moral advantage lies 
with the Arab, in that Germany has invented her creed to sanctify her aggression.24
According to Parker, the Germans bore comparison with Mohammedans for their 
sanctification of war and disregard of knowledge and culture, which was in 
contrast to civilised nations who were essentially peace-loving and cultured, but 
Germans were ‘worse’ than Muslims because their creed had been cynically 
invented as opposed to being the consequence of genuine religious belief.  
As Nicholas  Martin has observed, many British propagandists, including Parker, 
were quick to associate German militarism with a crude understanding of 
Nietzschean philosophy.25   Nietzsche’s philosophy of power, his rejection of 
Christianity, his  adoption of the concept of the Übermensch, provided grist for 
the mill of propagandists seeking a means by which Europe’s shared history and 
civilisation could be broken down and that of the Entente distinguished from that 
of Germany and Austria.  Accordingly, Nietzsche became an ‘outlet for hysterical 
anti-German feeling’, representing Germany’s godlessness, immorality and 
megalomania.26   In this formulation the Germans were not Christians but 
idolators who, in the words of one army chaplain, worshipped ‘the idol of the 
earth – a cruel and crude monster who lives on human blood’.27   Their ethos was 
‘no less than the betrayal of civilization by the very nation which, like one who 
went out and hanged himself, was most correct in its professions of loyalty to 
culture and morality’.28   Whereas savages, such as ‘Chaka the Zulu’ could be 
excused because their standards of what constituted civilised behaviour were low, 
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Germany had ‘sinned against the light ... .  She has ignored the spirit of civilized 
warfare’.29 
Throughout Parker’s book, he emphasised historical continuities  to support his 
current indictment of the Germans.  Frequent reference to the past was a common 
approach in the Wellington House pamphlets.  As John Buchan observed in 1914, 
‘we are a history-loving people desirous  of keeping open our communications 
with the past and basing our institutions  on historical rather than logical 
grounds’.30   For these writers, history was more than an objective, fact-gathering 
exercise.  It was  also a means of understanding Britishness, which was the 
product of historical experience, and now served to help define the righteous 
cause for which they were fighting. Was this  propaganda?  Taking John 
MacKenzie’s  definition, that ‘propaganda can be defined as the transmission of 
ideas  and values from one person, or groups of persons, to another, with the 
specific intention of influencing the recipients’ attitudes’, then yes it was.31 
However, to condemn it as nothing more than cynical manipulation of public 
opinion ignores the conviction with which many held the beliefs  they put into 
words. Wellington House’s  writers generally saw nothing reprehensible in 
seeking, like advocates  in a court of law, to influence others provided they told 
the truth, but, of course, what they ‘knew’ to be the ‘truth’ was part of a discourse 
founded on the experience and beliefs  of the society in which they lived and 
worked.  These were (largely) upper class  Edwardian Britons, holding an 
unwavering confidence in enlightened, benevolent British rule.  History, in 
particular Britain’s just and democratic society at home and its philanthropy 
overseas, proved to them the innate righteousness  of her cause.  Men like 
Masterman, Buchan and Parker took pride in their belief that not only did they 
tell the truth but, unlike the Germans, they did not tell lies.  What was not 
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acknowledged was their selectiveness.  Of course, the reality of imperialism for 
many of the colonised, the dispossession, cruelty and privation, was 
unmentionable.  Avoiding the use of fabricated material may have been their 
modus operandi, but so too was the omission of uncomfortable facts that sat 
uneasily with the messages they sought to convey.32 
In his propaganda piece, France at War, Kipling, too, saw the fight as one 
between civilisation and barbarism and stressed that the one vital point which 
England had to realise was that, ‘we are dealing with animals  who have 
scientifically and philosophically removed themselves inconceivably outside 
civilization’.33   Recounting an encounter with some German prisoners of war, he 
described them as of a ‘breed’ which 
at  the word of command, had stolen out  to drown women and children; had raped 
women in the streets at the word of command; and, always at the word of 
command, had sprayed petrol, or squirted flame; or defiled the property and 
persons of their captives.  They stood there outside all humanity.34
Kipling’s de-humanised depiction of the Germans  was more explicitly rendered 
in a short story written in 1915 called Mary Postgate.35   The eponymous 
protagonist is a devoted English servant, whose young employer (a trainee pilot) 
has died in the war.  She gains revenge by leaving a German airman, whose plane 
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has crashed nearby, to die slowly, in agony, while she watches and gloats.36   At 
first she had assumed he was British but then she sees his  scalp, which, unlike 
the ‘dark and glossy’ heads of the British pilots  she has  met, was ‘as  pale as a 
baby’s, and so closely cropped that she could see the disgusting pinky skin 
beneath’.37   Immediately, there can be no doubt of his nationality, and the 
German becomes  something alien and repulsive, to be referred to only as  ‘it’ or 
the ‘thing’.  
Some academics see Mary’s response to the dying German as disturbingly 
sexual.38  Certainly, connections between barbarity and sexuality were frequently 
made, although, unsurprisingly, sexual perversion was generally the Germans’ 
domain.  A commonly held belief was a German proclivity for scatological 
depravity although the depiction of Germans as  perpetrators  of sado-sexual 
crimes  against women was, according to Robb, given the most publicity in 
propaganda.39  ‘Recruitment speakers shocked and titillated crowds by informing 
them that in the event of a German victory, thousands of British girls would be 
taken to stud-farms in Germany’.40   Edith Cavell, the Red Cross nurse executed 
for aiding the escape of Allied prisoners in 1915, and whose death was widely 
reported across  Britain, embodied the sense of violated womanhood.  She was 
the virtuous, helpless woman abused at the hands of the vile Hun.  Trevor Wilson 
argues that
the sudden extreme pressures of war, giving free rein to the generally suppressed 
urge to hate, created a frame of mind eager to seize on tales in which the 
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pathological and the mysterious figured prominently.  Members of the respectable 
classes found themselves free to verbalize sexual-sadistic fantasies under the guise 
of patriotic warnings.41  
But it was not just about ‘sexual-sadistic’ fantasies.  Such violations were 
symbolic.  They represented and evoked a bigger fear, that of violation of the 
nation by an uncivilised race.  In the immediate context, the Germans were the 
potential violator, but the potential for defilement by an ‘other’ was an ongoing 
preoccupation as will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Five.
1.3 British Perception of Self 
George Robb claims that it was  inevitable in a conflict that ‘pitted nation against 
nation and involved far-flung Empires’ that race would be an important concept 
during the war.42   However, fascination with race was not just a result of the use 
of imperial troops.  It was  also symptomatic of an underlying concern with the 
perceived racial degeneration of British stock which was seen by many as  due to 
large-scale migration of agricultural labourers to the cities, but in the immediate 
past was evidenced by Britain’s failures in the Boer War which contrasted 
unfavourably with earlier imperial conquests.  Whereas much of the nineteenth 
century had witnessed a widely held belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon 
male as a fighting machine, doubts had started to creep in.  As Robb points out, 
‘in popular discourse the British referred to the Germans as Huns, a negative 
designation to be sure, but one that also expressed fears that their rivals were a 
more vital, warrior race, capable of overwhelming the British Empire’.43   The 
threat of Prussianism bears comparison with fears regarding pan-Islamism.  Both 
were a response to the sense of vulnerability underlying the imperial project, as 
was the enthusiasm for labelling Germans, like Muslims, as ‘fanatics’.  German 
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fanaticism differed from the Islamic kind as it was  the result of excessive 
militarism as opposed to religious fervour, but whilst both were capable of 
generating contempt, the energy and passion associated with such epithets also 
had the potential to undermine British ideas of their own vigour and martial 
prowess  as  well as challenging the strong belief in the supremacy of rationality as 
the guiding principle of thought and behaviour. 
Unsurprisingly, considering such doubts, there was  an emphasis in Wellington 
House’s pamphlets on the strength, valour and gallantry of the British soldier, 
which was a mirror of their depiction of the nation as one characterised by 
honesty, fair play (epitomised by their willingness to go to war over a ‘scrap of 
paper’) and imperial might. Typical of this approach is the work of John 
Masefield, the poet and novelist (and attendee of the original meeting at 
Wellington House in September 1914), who had participated in the Dardanelles 
campaign as  part of an ambulance unit.  He was subsequently commissioned to 
produce a book about the campaign in which he sought to vindicate the actions of 
British leadership and the failure of the campaign largely by emphasising the 
bravery of the Allied troops against insurmountable odds.  In the words  of Philip 
Waller, he turned the campaign into a ‘tragic romance’ and his book sold like 
‘wildfire’.44   ‘No army in history has made a more heroic attack’, claimed 
Masefield, ‘no army in history has  been set such a task.  No other body of men in 
any modern war has  been called upon to land over mined and wired waters under 
the cross fire of machine guns’.45   It is instructive to compare this idealised 
version with the interpretation offered in the Final Report of the Dardanelles 
Commission, which stated baldly at paragraph 198, ‘These operations failed, 
partly because the Turks were too strong, partly because some of our troops and 
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their leaders were unequal to the task assigned them, partly through shortage of 
water, and partly because the plan was defective’.46
As Masefield’s Gallipoli illustrates, the gallantry and heroism of the Anglo-
Saxon soldiers, which included the white Dominion troops who participated in 
the campaign, was portrayed as being without equal.  That the non-white ‘martial 
races’ were good fighters was acknowledged, but they could not be considered as 
on a par: ‘Our men achieved a feat without parallel in war and no other troops in 
the world (not even Japanese or Gurkhas or Ghazis in the hope of heaven) would 
have made good those beaches ...’.47  He described how ‘on the body of a dead 
Turk officer was  a letter written the night before to his  wife, a tender letter, filled 
mostly with personal matters.  In it was the phrase, “These British are the finest 
fighters in the world.  We have chosen the wrong friends”’.48
Wellington House’s authors  also produced novels and short stories along a 
similar vein emphasising traditional English soldierly virtues and vilifying the 
Germans.  Buitenhuis claims the rationale behind this glorification of war was to 
distance and falsify ‘the sordid reality of trench warfare, the inept staff-work and 
poor leadership, and the wastage of men and material’.49   This is a simplistic 
analysis revealing the author’s failure to contextualise his primary sources in the 
contemporary belief system.  It is more apt to reiterate that value-laden accounts 
were the norm and were not necessarily part of a cynical and deliberate plot to 
mislead the public.  As Buitenhuis  observes elsewhere, Wellington House’s 
writers, figures like James, Wharton, Conrad, Bennett, Wells, Kipling, Conan 
Doyle and Hueffer, ‘genuinely believed that the cause of civilization itself was at 
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stake in this conflict, which thus justified their greatest and most passionate 
efforts to help’.50
The war also offered the opportunity to assuage the religious  doubts that beset 
many during the Edwardian era.  According to some historians, by the turn of the 
century confidence in the deeply felt religious purpose of English Protestantism 
had given way to doubt and confusion brought on by the convulsions  in society 
and the rise of materialism, technology and commercialism.51   The war added to 
the desire to find meaning in life itself.  ‘Messianic beliefs, hope, despair, the 
apocalypse, redemption, suffering, sacrifice, crusade, punishment – these were 
the words that contemporaries uttered, wrote, prayed, wept, and turned into 
images’.52   The propagandists aggressively articulated the strength of Britain’s 
religious certainty and righteousness as part of the construct of Britain as  the 
great civilising nation.  Accordingly, the view that there was an ‘evangelical 
fervour’ in many of Wellington House’s pamphlets is a fair one.53   Thus, British 
soldiers were frequently depicted as Christians, even as God’s chosen warriors, in 
a battle against barbarism.  Henry James drew on the religious symbolism when 
he claimed that England’s pastoral idyll had been transformed by war so that its 
opposition to the Prussian ‘fist’ was like ‘some great religious service, with 
prostrations and exaltations, the light of a thousand candles and the sound of 
soaring choirs’.54   Of course, the Church capitalised on these allusions: 
‘Ministers frequently compared Germany to Biblical aggressor nations like 
Babylon or Assyria, in which case Britain was linked to God’s chosen people, the 
52
50 Ibid., p.8.
51 See, for example, Satia, p.85.
52 Annette Becker, ‘Faith, Ideologies, and the “Cultures of War”’ in John Horne (ed.), A Companion to 
World War I (Chichester, 2012), p.234.
53 Buitenhuis, p.21.  The origins of the pamphlet as a means of distributing ideas and information lay in 
the religious documents of the sixteenth and seventeenth century when religious sects engaged in debate 
this way.
54 Henry James, Within the Rim and Other Essays, 1914-15 (London, 1918), p.30.  The essay was written 
in February 1915.
Israelites’.55  Indeed, according to Becker, sermons inviting respect for the enemy 
were extremely rare.  Rather, ‘hatred of the enemy became the strongest 
expression of a sacred love of God and the fatherland and was virtually 
obligatory once the war had been agreed to’.56
The idea of Allied soldiers as God’s chosen ones, capable of displaying Christ-
like sacrifices, is illustrated by the mythologising of Rupert Brooke following his 
death in April 1915 on the way to the Dardanelles.  Stories  such as  ‘The 
Bowmen’ by Arthur Machen also encouraged the notion of Allied soldiers as 
being divinely appointed.  Inspired by Kipling and Chesterton, Machen told of a 
soldier who during the battle of Mons  saw shining shapes  and a cloud of arrows 
fly through the air.57  Suddenly, thousands of Germans lay dead on the field with 
no evident injuries.  The soldier believed St George had brought the long 
bowmen of Agincourt to fight alongside the British.  The public took up and 
embellished the story, turning the ghostly bowmen into angels.  At least six 
further books were published on the topic, all supporting a belief that angels were 
at work on the Allied side.58  Christian imagery abounded in other forms too.  For 
example, popular novelist, Ian Hay, wrote of an Allied soldier being crucified by 
the Germans.59    In a subsequent novel, he adopted the motif of a sorrowful 
Christ figure on the cross, standing in a devastated village, body riddled with 
bullets but face miraculously untouched.60   
The British sought to promote themselves as a civilised, peace-loving nation with 
a God-given mandate to bring peace and prosperity to the world and an army 
endowed with the best martial material.  ‘We are the indispensable nation.  We 
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stand tall, and we see further into the future’.61   This was how Britain perceived 
her unique role although the words  come from Madeleine Albright, describing 
Britain’s imperial successor, the USA, in 1998. Less anachronistically, Cecil 
Rhodes expressed similar sentiments a century earlier when he contended, ‘we 
are the first race in the world’ and ‘the more of the world we inhabit, the better it 
is  for the human race’.62   However, concealed in this inflated and complacent 
world view of entitlement was a sense of tremulousness not only about the 
quality of her ‘stock’ but also her ability and, indeed her right, to maintain her 
position as an imperial power. 
1.4 The Ottoman Empire in Wellington House Pamphlets and Books
Between 1914 and 1916, Wellington House grappled with how best to 
communicate and legitimise Britain’s role as  a belligerent in the conflict.  The 
chief way in which it sought to do this was via anti-German propaganda in allied 
and neutral countries.  As the propagandists  themselves observed, the majority of 
the early pamphlets  were concerned with ‘counteracting the German 
propagandism in a kind of international competition to prove whether the Allies 
or the German Powers were right.  It was a fight over the true interpretation of 
the immediate and (to some extent) the remoter causes of the war’.63   By early 
1916, three principle purposes defined the object of their work: to provide 
commentary and information and to explain the incidents of the war as they arose 
and affected neutral rights  and interests; to overcome German propaganda, ‘still 
amazingly active’; and, to provide information to Britain’s allies illustrating 
British war efforts and their determination to carry out their efforts  until final 
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victory.64   Over and above these more practical objectives was the pursuit of an 
ideological battle.  The need to counter German Kultur and promote British 
values, in other words  to deal with ‘the interpretation, in theory and practice, of 
what German militarism stands for, and the emphasis of the ruin which would 
come upon all free countries, if the Germanic powers and their allies should 
prove victorious’.65
In early February 1916 Edward Long (a journalist with extensive experience in 
India, having been editor of the Rangoon Times and Indian Daily Telegraph and 
also acted as Indian correspondent for The Times, Standard and Express) was 
appointed to take charge of Muslim-related propaganda but until that point very 
little such work was undertaken.66   Between the start of the war and the Gallipoli 
campaign only two pamphlets  were issued directly concerned with Britain’s war 
with Turkey.67   One set out the documents that led to the breach, the other was 
E.T. Cook’s Great Britain and Turkey: The Causes of the Rupture (published in 
several European languages  and the only pamphlet to appear in Arabic and 
Turkish during the first half of the war).68   These pamphlets indicate an 
awareness from the outset of the war of a need to protect Muslim sensibilities, as 
does a notice to the press from December 1914 which warned that ‘the 
publication of any matter calculated to have a needlessly hostile effect upon 
Mohammedan opinion should be avoided’ and ‘discussion of the question of the 
Caliphate is to be deprecated’.69  
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Cook’s pamphlet appears to have been written with two primary considerations 
in mind.  The first was  to respond to a series of attacks upon Sir Edward Grey’s 
treatment of Anglo-Turkish relations  in The Times, in which the Foreign 
Secretary was accused of mishandling the Ottoman Empire both before and after 
they joined the war in November 1914.  It also addressed the special predicament 
Britain had been put in as  a result of her imperial position.  Thus, in the opening 
section Cook observed,
To the British Empire many of the questions involved in Turkey’s action are of 
special importance.  The Turkish Empire had been bound to Great  Britain, as His 
Majesty King George recently reminded the Sultan, “by a friendship of more than a 
century.”  Britain was in administrative occupation of lands which still 
acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan.  The realm of the King-Emperor is, 
politically, the greatest of Mohammedan States, and in the Mohammedan world the 
Sultan of Turkey occupies, religiously, an influential place.  From all these points 
of view it is of real importance that  the events leading to the rupture of relations 
between Great Britain and Turkey should be understood clearly and rightly; that 
every British subject, and if possible every Mohammedan community throughout 
the world, should know who strove to keep the peace and who, as principals or 
accessories, insisted upon making war.70
As the pamphlet progressed Cook chronicled the instances in the lead up to the 
declaration of war where Britain had made every effort ‘with great patience and 
forbearance’ to preserve the friendship despite repeated acts of aggression and 
deceit on Turkey’s  part.  In particular, he pointed to Turkey’s numerous efforts in 
conjunction with Germany to stir anti-British feeling in the British Empire.  For 
example, he described efforts to incite rebellion in Egypt, referring to a plot in 
which the British had discovered that German officers  had commissioned a tailor 
in Aleppo to ‘make a variety of Indian costumes and head-dresses’, possibly, 
suggested Cook, so that German agents could impersonate Indian soldiers.71 
Later, he told of how, ‘with the object of spreading the belief that Great Britain is 
the enemy of Islam, the German Embassy daily emits a stream of mendacity and 
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calumny, which is circulated throughout the country by the Turkish 
newspapers’.72   Cook identified the ‘masterpiece’ of German and Turkish 
activities as  the propagation of a belief that the ‘German Emperor has embraced 
Islamic faith, and that Germans are fighting for Islam against Russia’.73
Finally, Cook emphasised that Britain’s quarrel was with the Ottoman 
Government and not with Islam or the Turkish people and he stressed that under 
British rule ‘every race and creed enjoy liberty and protection’.74  Although Cook 
did not hesitate to criticise the Turkish government for its duplicity and 
opportunism, it is notable that he did not cast judgment on the nature of Ottoman 
rule in her dominions.  Whereas  the pamphlets  of 1917-18 focused on the long 
history of Ottoman oppression and tyranny and the inability of the Turkish race 
to govern other, alien races, the emphasis in 1914 was on British reluctance to go 
to war with an ‘old friend’.
Cook’s relatively benign stance towards the Turks  was widely held although not 
always for the same reasons.  For example, Parker, who was certainly not 
interested in protecting Muslim sensibilities, but was very interested in garnering 
American sympathies, described the Turks not as  aggressors but as the gullible 
acolytes  of the Germans.  He pointed out that nothing was expected of Turkey 
other than to exist, and he did not refer to the nature of Ottoman rule other than 
to comment on its  general weakness.75  Condescendingly, Turkey was to be pitied 
rather than hated.  In lurid, evocative language, Parker sent Turkey to her doom: 
‘inextricably involved in the intrigues of greater Powers, hounded on every side 
by guilty fears of attack and spoliation, deceived, bribed and threatened, the blind 
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dissolution’.76   The Germans were guilty of guile, cunning and deep dishonesty 
in their dealings with her and were, argued Parker, undoubtedly to blame for 
Turkey’s entry into the war: ‘as in the old Arabian tale, Turkey was bestridden 
and throttled by an incubus  from which she never could free herself’.77   By 
relying on stock assumptions about the ‘Oriental Mind’, Parker excused the 
Turks rather than condemned them.  Suffering from the typical shortcomings of 
an ‘Oriental’ race – vanity, greed, corruption and shallowness – the Turks fell 
victim to the more sophisticated influences of Prussianism.  
Once the Dardanelles campaign began, there was a call for a different sort of 
propaganda, but again, it was propaganda displaying a distinct lack of animus 
towards the Turks.    Lieutenant-Commander Josiah Wedgwood, who participated 
in the landings, wrote an account of his  experience for the Westminster Gazette in 
1915, and it was subsequently reproduced as a pamphlet entitled With Machine-
Guns in Gallipoli.  The emphasis was on the bravery and sacrifice of the British 
troops landing by boat on the beach in front of the castle and town of Seddel 
Bahr.  Wedgwood did not underplay the carnage that was taking place, nor did he 
display vitriol against the Turks.  His  first reference to them as soldiers was a 
comment on Islamic ideologies  of martyrdom.  ‘All these things I saw as in a 
dream as I moved from casemate to casemate, watching to see Turks, wearing an 
“Election smile,” and trying to pretend in an even voice to men who had never 
seen death that this was  the best of all possible worlds’.78   The implication was 
that the Turks  too were struggling to comprehend so much death and pain and 
that the prospect of eternal paradise in the event of suffering a jihadist’s death 
was hard to rationalise in the face of such an experience.  Wedgwood did not 
dismiss the Turks as  fanatics and, whilst their religion was referred to, it was the 
common humanity joining friend and foe that he emphasised.  This is further 
underlined in his description of Turkish compassion towards the stretcher-
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bearers: ‘The Turks could easily have killed all those who went to the wounded. 
They did not fire on them sometimes  for ten minutes, and then a burst of fire 
would come.  Then and afterwards I found them extraordinarily merciful as 
compared with the Germans in Flanders’.79   As night fell, and the battle 
progressed, it was then that Wedgwood 
first  learnt  the shout  of “Allah,” for the Turks charged.  All night long the battle 
raged.  On shore everyone was firing at they knew not what.  Our men went  up the 
hills through the Turks; and the Turks came down through ours to the beach.  Over 
and past  each other they went, sometimes not seeing, sometimes glad to pass on in 
the darkness.80  
Again, it was the commonalities rather than differences between the Allied troops 
and the Turks that were emphasised.
When Wedgwood and his men made it up to a village they found a scene of 
carnage:
Everywhere were our dead Munsters and Dublins, some horribly mutilated and 
burnt.  No wounded had survived.  Two German officers were found and killed. 
These fiends, it appears, had instigated the things done to those dying Irishmen; 
and we never afterwards found similar Turkish atrocities.  The Turks are the finest 
and best fighters in the world, save only the Canadians and Australians.81  
This extract shows how important it was in 1915 to bear witness  to the barbarism 
of the Germans and how the propagandists  had yet to see the merits of similarly 
defining the Turks.  A further Press Notice, dated 16 March 1915, reminding 
journalists of the importance of avoiding references  ‘which might be interpreted 
as implying that this is a war of Christian versus Moslem’, also sought to ensure 
the careful depiction of the Turks.82   And, of course, stressing Turkish military 
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ability was a means of ensuring that the nobility of the Allied troops’ sacrifice, 
and their own martial prowess, was not undermined.  Wedgwood compared 
Seddel Bahr with Sharpsburg, which he claimed was ‘for the numbers engaged, 
the bloodiest battle in history’ and ‘a joy ride compared with Seddel Bahr’.83
Masefield’s  Gallipoli provided a different style of account.  He had recently 
completed a lecture tour of America on behalf of Wellington House, where it had 
become clear that the Dardanelles  Campaign had made a negative impression, 
and, on his return, he was asked to write an account of the campaign which was 
subsequently published in the US as well as in England.  By the time he was 
commissioned to write Gallipoli the evacuation had taken place and so the failure 
of the enterprise was already apparent.  As a consequence, the thrust of the book 
is  a depiction of the valiant efforts of the Allied soldiers against insurmountable 
odds, as opposed to an accurate account of events.  The campaign had become 
one that was ‘about perception as well as  concrete outcomes’.84  No doubt in part 
to vindicate Allied failings, Masefield did not stint in treating the Turks as worthy 
opponents.  They may not have been able to match the Anglo-Saxons in valour 
but they were a tough enemy nevertheless: ‘The Turkish army was well supplied, 
well equipped, more numerous and in better positions  than our own.  There was 
neither talk nor thought among them at any time of surrender, nor could there 
have been, in an army so placed and so valiant’.85  Whilst he could relate to them 
physically, psychologically he found them baffling: ‘among their qualities of 
mind were some which greatly puzzled our commanders.  Their minds would 
sometimes  work in ways  very strange to Europeans’.86   But Masefield was not 
dismissive or derogatory.  He consistently treated the Turks with respect and 
admiration.  He assumed that a day would come when the war would be over and 
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the Turkish version of events  would be revealed and understood.  He was curious 
as opposed to angry and vengeful.
Wedgwood and Masefield’s work indicates  a benign and respectful approach 
towards Ottoman soldiery but this sat in tandem with assumptions regarding the 
superiority of Anglo-Saxon material.  The Ottoman army was much smaller than 
that of any of the other belligerents and this fact, together with a succession of 
Ottoman military failures in the early months of the war, notably at Sarıkamış  in 
the Caucasus, Shaiba in Mesopotamia and Suez, reinforced pre-existing 
assumptions regarding Oriental military inadequacies.  In the event, of course, as 
Darwin puts it, ‘the soft underbelly of the Central Powers proved as hard as 
nails’ in the Dardanelles, much to the disappointment and chagrin of those who 
had masterminded the campaign.87   In a letter to Kitchener, expedition 
commander, General Sir Ian Hamilton, revealed the racial bias that often 
underlined dismissive attitudes towards the Turks: 
Let me bring my lads face to face with Turks in the open field, we must beat them 
every time because British volunteer soldiers are superior individuals to 
Anatolians, Syrians or Arabs and are animated with a superior ideal and an equal 
joy in battle. Wire and machine guns prevent this hand to hand, or rifle to rifle, 
style of contest. Well, then the decent thing to do is to give us shells enough to 
clear a fair field. To attempt  to solve the problem by letting a single dirty Turk at 
the Maxim kill ten – twenty – fifty – of our fellows on the barbed wire, – ten – 
twenty – fifty – each of whom  is worth several dozen Turks, is a sin of the Holy 
Ghost category unless it can be justified by dire necessity.88
For Hamilton, ‘Tommy Atkins’ was not only racially superior to the ‘dirty Turk’ 
but inspired by superior ideals.  He recognised Islamic beliefs as  potent 
incentives  but assumed, like many of his  peers, that Western values, such as the 
rule of law, democracy, rationalism, unfailingly held the edge in terms of 
ideological motivation.  
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1.5 Maintaining British Prestige
By September 1916 various sub-departments  had been set up at Wellington 
House including one for ‘Eastern and Moslem Propaganda’ under the 
directorship of Edward Long, and it was acknowledged that anti-British 
propaganda conducted by the Germans and the Turks was an issue that required 
attention.  Section 12 of Wellington House’s Third Report is worth quoting from 
at length:
In those countries which are either within the Empire or under the influence of the 
Allies, it has not been an easy matter for the Germans to carry on work of a 
propagandist  nature.  But  early in the war German agents did, undoubtedly, carry 
on a certain amount of propagandist  work in India, mostly in a very subtle manner 
by disseminating false and misleading rumours in the native bazaars, by 
exaggerating German power and under-rating the power of the Allies.  In Egypt, 
also, a great deal was done in this way to weaken British influence, and both there, 
in India, and throughout all Allied countries containing a Moslem population, 
Germany endeavoured, by compelling the Turks to declare a Jehad, to inflame the 
Moslem mind against its Christian rulers and induce Moslems everywhere to rise 
in the supposed defence of their faith.
In those countries which are not  directly under British influence, German 
propaganda has of course been rife.  In Turkey, Persia, Arabia and Afghanistan the 
population is practically all Moslem, and Germany has endeavoured to make the 
most of her Jehad .... Germany is represented as being very great and powerful, all-
victorious, and the friend of Islam.  Photographs of British Moslem prisoners being 
treated kindly are shown, also the large mosque Germany has built  for their benefit. 
In Persia, too, the gendarmerie has been excited to revolt.  In Afghanistan we have 
been represented as waiting for an opportunity to crush small Moslem states, and 
the Afghans have been, counselled to rise, and promised help by way of Persia.
It  follows, therefore, that  there is abundant need for propaganda from our side in 
these countries.  There is a German-inspired Turkish hostile influence to counteract 
amongst all Moslems, and a profound ignorance of the strength and resources of 
the Allies to be dispelled, and in its place an impression created of the vast 
resources of the British Empire and its Allies, and of the hopelessness of the 
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German prospect of victory.  At  the present time in many of these lands, in India 
especially, the natives have an exaggerated idea of German power, and particularly 
of German cleverness.  The tale is that the British fight bravely, but  the Germans 
are too clever for them, and the results to date of the fighting in Europe are used 
with effect to illustrate this argument .... 89
A typical German pamphlet is Lest We Forget ... A Page from the History of the 
English in Egypt written in May 1915 by Dr M.M. Rifat.90  This pamphlet, aimed 
at an Egyptian audience, had Arabic pages accompanied by graphic photographs 
of a man being hanged and another being flogged.  In the English section it stated 
that the photos and Arabic text provide an example of the ‘savage brutality of the 
English race when under the influence of greed, revenge, or ambition’.91   The 
photographs make it a much cruder, more explicit form of propaganda than 
evident in any of the British pamphlets.
The pamphlet described a controversial incident that had taken place at 
Denshawaï in Egypt in 1906 when a hunting trip went wrong.  The English 
officers set fire to a farm and injured a woman while they were trying to pigeon-
shoot.  A fight broke out, and three English officers were wounded.  One 
subsequently died of heatstroke after he allegedly ran from the melee for more 
than three miles.  The pamphlet told how the British failed to give the villagers a 
fair trial and how within two weeks of the event a verdict was passed whereby 
‘four Egyptians were condemned to be hanged, two were sentenced to hard 
labour for life, one to fifteen years’ hard labour, another to seven years’, three to 
a year’s  imprisonment and to be publicly flogged, and five to a flogging only – 
each to receive fifty strokes of the lash, a lash with five tails’.92  The punishments 
took place in the village so the families  of the punished could bear witness.  Rifat 
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declared the date of the executions and floggings as ‘a fatal date in history.  It is 
worthy of figuring in the annals of the worst excesses of savagery’.93
Rifat produced a second pamphlet in 1915 making more general allegations 
against the British based on extracts  from English documents relating to Egypt 
dating from 1882 to 1914, which Rifat declared to be evidence of her perfidious 
political methods.  The frontispiece contained a photo of the Khedive of Egypt, 
Abbas Hilmi II, and the pamphlet was dedicated to him.    Implying that there 
was already much unrest, Rifat declared: 
We do not  wish to add fuel to the fire of hate burning fiercely enough already; but 
it  appears to us to be a timely and salutary undertaking to prove that England who 
professes to a respect  for the rights of other nations amounting almost to a religion 
has been the very one to inaugurate the breach of such principle.  It  would have 
been far more honest if England as her reason for siding with her present allies had 
referred to her previous engagements with them instead of trading upon the alleged 
violation by Germany of the Belgian neutrality.94 
Rifat went on to argue that ‘had England herself never outraged the neutrality of 
other countries  she would not stand at the head of a large colonial Empire now’.95 
He demonstrated, by reference to the documents, that in 1882 England professed 
her aim in Egypt as  being no more than the fostering of Egypt’s  prosperity and 
liberty, but by 1914 Egypt had been annexed to her empire.  
Wellington House’s records  indicate that they did not produce any pamphlets up 
to September 1916 directly countering these sorts of allegations.  It seems that an 
express response to Rifat’s allegations was only made in 1917 when J.S. 
Willmore produced a pamphlet called The Welfare of Egypt.  The contents of this 
pamphlet will be considered in Chapter Two.  What is  notable here is the absence 
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of an earlier rejoinder despite a keen awareness of widespread and persistent 
efforts  on the part of the Central Powers to mobilize religiously driven resistance. 
This accords with Wellington House’s own assessment of its priorities, outlined 
above.  What appears to have become a more pressing concern, at least by early 
1916, was to counter damage to British prestige resulting from German 
propaganda and the military failures in the Dardanelles  and in Mesopotamia 
(culminating in the fall of Kut on 29 April 1916).  Justifying their imperial past 
(with an eye to their imperial future) and denigrating their Turkish foe was less 
important than ensuring that the stability of the Empire was not threatened by 
any further loss of prestige.  
The Indo-Egyptian party in London and the governments in Cairo and Delhi 
were especially concerned about the potential outcome of a loss of prestige, as  is 
clear from Robertson’s (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) correspondence. 
Although himself a committed ‘Westerner’, he was frequently reminded of the 
potential risks by his many correspondents.  C.E. Callwell, for example, pointed 
out to Robertson in October 1915 that ‘we have to get the French to realise that if 
we abandon the Dardanelles we shall have a troublesome position in Egypt, 
Mesopotamia and Persia, because (quite apart from the question of prestige) it 
releases Turkish forces, fitted out with stuff from Krupp, to worry us’.96 
Meanwhile, Lord Curzon advocated advancing towards Baghdad as, if it were 
captured, the victory would ‘ring through the East and would cause such an 
impression that it would partially discount any failure at the Dardanelles’.97 
Negative reporting of both campaigns in the British press was also a cause for 
worry.  A Cabinet memorandum from November 1915 reveals  concern that the 
Germans were circulating ‘all over the Mohammedan world’ extracts  from The 
Times in which the Dardanelles campaign was described as a ‘complete failure’ 
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and a ‘great blunder’ and the Mesopotamian campaign as suffering from tough 
resistance by the Turks.98  
With the abandonment of the Dardanelles  and then the failed Mesopotamian 
campaign, the pressing need was seen to be to communicate across  the Islamic 
world ‘the vast resources of the British Empire and its  Allies, and ... the 
hopelessness of the German prospect of victory’.99   In other words, the 
propagandists needed to emphasise British prestige despite military failures in 
the East.  Furthermore, despite the conflict with the Ottomans, it was vital to 
show ‘Great Britain as  the friend of Mohammedanism’.100  Another Press  Notice 
was released in February 1916 emphasising for the third time the need for careful 
reporting.  The Notice stressed:
Above all things it  is necessary to avoid the publication of pictures or photographs 
which would offend Muhammadan sensibilities or appear to show that Germany 
and Austria are more concerned for the comfort, the feelings and the prejudices of 
Muhammadans than are the Allies.101
These two factors, the need to illustrate British power and to emphasise that the 
Allies, particularly Britain, and not the Central Powers, were Islam’s true friends, 
resulted in the implementation of a fortnightly illustrated newspaper called al-
Haqīqah (The Truth), initially published in Arabic, Turkish, Hindustani and 
Persian.  It became the chief propagandist vehicle for influencing Muslim 
opinion.  
Wellington House had first broached the idea of such a publication with the India 
Office in July 1915 but the suggestion was dismissed.102   When E.A. Gowers, 
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Wellington House’s Chief Executive, raised the prospect again in December 
1915, the changing military landscape prompted a different response.  This time 
the India Office was fully supportive and al-Haqīqah was very much a joint 
project between Wellington House, the Foreign Office and the India Office.103 
Arthur Hirtzel, Secretary of the Political and Secret Department of the India 
Office, stressed that although it was designed to show Britain’s friendship with 
Islam it was important not ‘to glorify the Turk, nor to represent him in an 
especially favourable light’.104   Whilst it would be distributed in India, and 
amongst Indian troops elsewhere, it was Hirtzel’s view that its primary function 
should be to ‘influence in favour of the allies actual or potential belligerents in 
the middle east.  These, from the nature of the case, will be mainly Arabs, 
Persians, possibly the Indian frontier tribes, and such Turks as there may be 
discontented with their Government’.105
Although there is some evidence that a small number of copies  were dropped 
from Allied airplanes  over Anatolia, most were sent to India, Afghanistan, Egypt 
and the Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia.106   A lesser number were sent to 
other destinations with Muslim populations including Persia, Abyssinia, Sudan, 
Nigeria, Java and China.107    As with the pamphlets, Wellington House sought to 
keep the government’s involvement secret.  When, in August 1916, The Daily 
Telegraph congratulated the government on the publication of al-Haqīqah, the 
Foreign Office was annoyed.108   An Indian distributor was  warned to be 
‘exceedingly careful at all times to give away nothing as regards  the actual origin 
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of the paper, its purpose from a propagandist point of view, and so forth ...’.109 
However, as  most of the 75,000 copies  were distributed free of charge (via a 
mixture of official bodies  such as the governments of India and Egypt, the War 
Office, the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office and informal bodies  such as 
steamship companies, the Over-Seas Club and private firms), passing them off as 
non-government funded publications was easier said than done.  
As the destinations indicate, the same propaganda was distributed amongst 
Muslims within the Empire, Muslims in neutral countries and Muslims in the 
Ottoman Empire.  Wellington House evidently believed in a universal ‘Oriental 
Mind’ which would respond uniformly to their propaganda.  A valuable insight 
into Western assumptions regarding this archetype is provided by Edward Long 
in his description of how the style of the paper was formulated: 
The native of the countries with which we are concerned is generally unable to 
read, and often, he mistrusts both the person who is reading to him and that which 
is written.  Pictures, however, awaken in his mind impressions which are not  easily 
effaced ... . We ordinarily use photographs in preference to drawings (the oriental 
has a firm belief in the veracity of the camera), and select  them with the object  both 
of making a special appeal to Moslem susceptibilities and also of giving as 
complete an illustration as possible of the power and resources of the British 
Empire and its Allies.  For instance, battleships, big guns, airships, masses of 
troops, stores of shells and shell factories, shipbuilding yards with vessels on the 
stocks, and aircraft  factories are shown, together with those curious contrivances of 
modern warfare which are calculated to impress the Oriental and African mind; 
British and Allied victories on land and sea and in the air are illustrated; 
photographs of German and Austrian prisoners, wrecked Zeppelins, and captured 
guns and seaplanes are used.  A special feature is made of the various types of 
Moslem soldiers who are fighting for us and our Allies, and the facilities granted 
for the special observance of their religious rites.  Photographs are shown of 
Oriental and African potentates who have contributed generously to war funds, 
together with suitable letterpress.  The importance is borne in mind of portraying in 
the most favourable light  the benevolent toleration of the Powers of the Entente 
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towards Islam.  Photographs of the King are also useful, and His Majesty has been 
good enough to give us special facilities for our work.110
Al-Haqīqah was printed in photogravure, in two colours  because it was viewed 
as essential for it to be imposing.  As Edward Long explained, ‘the size is double 
that of an ordinary illustrated paper, in order that a more spectacular effect may 
be obtained’.111   Pictorial content formed the bulk of the publication but the 
pictures were accompanied by explanatory captions  in each of the four 
languages.  
From the beginning Wellington House was beset with criticisms about the quality 
of the translations.  The Consul-General of Meshed complained to the Indian 
government that ‘the Persian is  very bad and the handwriting is execrable’.112 
The India Office received a complaint that ‘the language is  often so incorrect, so 
archaic and so full of solecisms as to offer a target for facetious criticism in the 
Indian Press’.113  Wellington House did their best to find competent translators 
but were, in any event, sanguine about the criticisms.  Gowers commented that 
‘experts in oriental languages seem to beat all other experts  in their inability to 
agree with one another’.114   Long pointed out that favourable comments  and 
demands for more indicated the success of the paper and he quoted from a 
number of letters received from around the Empire in praise of it.  One letter 
came from someone identified as being a ‘well-known business man in Calcutta’, 
who described al-Haqīqah as  ‘a great Imperial Educator’.115  Another letter from 
India explained that ‘in the north, and amongst the fighting races, [copies of al-
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Haqīqah] go like hot cakes, particularly among the old boys who can read them 
to the villagers’.116  
Although Delhi took copies of al-Haqīqah there was evidently little interest in 
acquiring material from Wellington House despite enthusiasm within the India 
Office in London. Hirtzel complained to Austen Chamberlain that he could not 
‘help thinking that the G. of I. undervalue propaganda, both at home & 
abroad’.117  Whereas China was taking 250,000 copies of Cheng Pao (a Chinese 
equivalent of al-Haqīqah), the Indian authorities were only asking for 19,000 
copies of al-Haqīqah for all of India.118  They were dubious about its value as 
propaganda and did not like being asked to pay for their copies by Whitehall.  As 
it was largely distributed without charge it was a loss-making enterprise with 
unproven benefits as far as Delhi was concerned.  In fact, local feedback 
indicated that it was held in higher esteem when it was bought rather than given 
away for free.  As a result the arrangements  for its distribution changed in 1917 
as Chapter Two will explain.    
Whilst it was met with ambivalence by the Delhi government, in Basra al-
Haqīqah was  considered a success.  Sir Percy Lake wrote that it had been ‘most 
favourably received.  There is a ready sale for it in towns and the proceeds pay 
the cost of the agency and distribution’.119   He requested a ‘separate Arabic 
literary supplement’ to go alongside it.  This  was the genesis of El Kowkab, 
another propagandist paper produced by British officials but this time from 
Cairo.  Whilst intended to complement al-Haqīqah, Cairo thought it best to keep 
the association secret as al-Haqīqah ‘is obviously produced by us’.120   El 
Kowkab was first issued on 21 November 1916 and continued in production for 
70
116 ‘100 Samples from Correspondence received at Wellington House’, TNA INF 4/5.
117 Hirtzel to Chamberlain, 29 August 1916, BL IO L/PS/10/581/353.
118 Hirtzel to Viceroy, 30 August 1916, BL IO L/PS/10/581/354.
119 Lake to Secretary of State for India, 25 July 1916, BL IO L/PS/11/110.
120 Clayton to Hogarth, 30 September 1916, BL IO L/PS/11/110.
the remainder of the war.  Its  policy was  ‘specially pro-Arab and anti-Turk’, 
emphasising, for example, Turkish oppression of Arabs in Syria and Turkey’s 
pan-Turanian ambitions.121    The Arab Bureau also produced other propaganda 
on an ad hoc basis including a pamphlet on the ‘Moshi document’ in Turkish and 
Arabic (regarding purported German efforts to suppress Islam in East Africa) and 
leaflets for ‘dropping from aeroplanes in Palestine, Syria, and the Hejaz’ 
conveying war news and appealing to Arab soldiers to desert.122  
El Kowkab was a local publication, edited and printed by British officials, but 
largely written by Arabs for Arabs.  Neither did it contain any pictorial content 
indicating that away from London the idea of the ‘Muslim mind’ expounded by 
Long and resulting in the simplistic propaganda found in al-Haqīqah, gave way 
to something more sophisticated.  In contrast, beyond Cook’s pamphlet, there is 
no evidence that London produced written material directed at educated 
Muslims.  To the extent that an approach existed in this  regard, it appears to have 
been to attempt to avoid negative comment in the press and in pamphlets aimed 
at allies and neutrals that could end up being repeated in the vernacular press or 
conveyed via enemy propaganda to a Muslim audience, counteracting the desired 
image of Britain as Islam’s friend and protector.  As will be seen in the next 
section, however, this approach was not consistently applied.
1.6 Armenia
Whereas the German atrocities committed in Belgium and France between 
August and October 1914 resulted in approximately 6,500 deaths, it is estimated 
that between 800,000 and 1.2 million Armenians died in the Ottoman Empire in 
1915 as  a result of an officially orchestrated Turkish policy of massacre and 
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deportation aimed at eradicating the Ottoman Armenian population.123   The 
massacres  began in early April, and by 27 April the Foreign Office was  aware of 
them and warily considering its response.124  The Russian Ambassadors in Rome 
and Washington had been instructed by their government to support the 
‘Armenian protest’ and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs sought a joint 
message from the Allied Powers condemning Ottoman activities.  Meanwhile, Sir 
Cecil Spring Rice, in Washington, reported that the ‘matter is receiving [the] 
attention of [the] United States Government’.125   The Foreign Office 
prevaricated.  Grey advised that ‘we do not possess  sufficiently trustworthy data 
on which to base such a message, and that it is  doubtful if the publication of a 
message would have the desired effect [of stopping them]’.126   Despite further 
evidence of what were already being referred to as  ‘massacres’, the Foreign 
Office had also received advice from Salonica and Cairo indicating that Turkish 
action was  a response to Armenian insurrection.  Sir Henry McMahon wrote that 
the Turks were ‘having considerable trouble with Armenians [with] the latter’s 
[sic.] having risen in several places’.127
Within a month, however, the Foreign Office found itself no longer able to 
equivocate.  It is likely that a number of factors were at play.  As well as pressure 
from the Russians and French, the fate of the Ottoman Armenians had garnered 
much attention and concern in the US where there had been widespread coverage 
of the massacres because of the continued presence within the Ottoman Empire 
of American missionaries and diplomats, for example, the American Ambassador, 
Henry Morgenthau, who sent home a number of reports.   Another potential 
reason, identified by some historians, was concern within the Foreign Office that 
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Allied favour in America was being undermined by Russian persecution of Jews 
in Poland and Lithuania, and a means of counteracting it was  to deflect attention 
onto atrocities being committed by the Central Powers.128   The government’s 
position may also have hardened because the events coincided with the launch of 
the Dardanelles campaign and a growing willingness to take a more aggressive 
stance towards their Turkish foe.  However, in the drafting of the joint statement, 
Whitehall remained consistent in its concern to ensure that the sensitivities of the 
Empire’s Muslims were not upset by their condemnation.  The original draft 
referred to ‘crimes committed by Turkey against Christianity and civilisation’.129 
The British ambassador to Paris, Francis Bertie, suggested that it would be ‘well, 
from a British point of view, to omit from the declaration ... the word 
“Christianity”’.130  Grey agreed, and the final wording, given to the press  on 23 
May for publication in the following day’s papers, excluded the entire phrase 
‘against Christianity and civilisation’.131     
 
Whitehall’s cautious approach was overtaken to some extent when Viscount 
James Bryce addressed a House of Lords debate on the subject on 6 October 
1915.  Bryce, an elder statesman of seventy-seven, had headed the committee of 
enquiry into German atrocities in Belgium and Northern France resulting in the 
eponymous report of May 1915.  As well as  the acclaim and respect he had 
garnered for the Bryce Report, his unimpeachable reputation had been forged 
during a long career as a scholar and respected professor of jurisprudence.  He 
was also widely regarded as an expert on the subject of Armenia having first 
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travelled there in the 1870s and subsequently taken an interest in the question of 
Armenian independence.  The fate of Armenians, Bulgarians and Macedonians 
had been the subject of popular agitation in Britain for a number of years. 
Interest had peaked and waned at various points during the previous fifty years or 
so.  The ‘Bulgarian horrors’ of 1876 and the Armenian massacres of 1894 marked 
periods of particular interest.  When the Young Turks came to power it was 
hoped that the situation would improve, but further massacres in 1909 had 
quashed these hopes.  
Bryce’s  appeal chimed with Masterman, himself a Liberal reformer, and a 
pamphlet, Armenian Atrocities: The Murder of a Nation, was published in late 
1915 reproducing Bryce’s speech and elaborated upon in a subsequent section by 
the young historian, Arnold Toynbee.  Toynbee had been employed by 
Wellington House since 1 May 1915 as an assistant to Gilbert Parker.  His brief 
was therefore intimately connected with disseminating information to America, 
as well as understanding the nature and form of topics likely to appeal to an 
American audience.  The choice of Toynbee as author of the pamphlet leaves 
little doubt as to whom the primary recipient was  intended to be, and his 
American-geared propaganda is evident from the distinctions that can be drawn 
between his section and Bryce’s.132  The latter’s section was  based on his House 
of Lords speech and, in line with Britain’s broader political interests, he was 
careful to assert that the massacres were a result of a ‘policy which, as  far as can 
be ascertained, has been entertained for some considerable time by the gang of 
unscrupulous adventurers who are now in possession of the Government of the 
Turkish Empire’.133   He blamed the massacres not on the inherent inability of 
Orientals  or Muslims to rule subject races, nor on their innate barbarity, but on 
the degenerate government of the Young Turks.  In this, his approach accorded 
with that of those more intimately associated with Britain’s  imperial strategy, 
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such as the Earl of Cromer, who also contributed to the 6 October House of 
Lords debate, and had observed privately the previous week to his colleague 
Lord Crewe that his motivation in doing so was to ensure that the massacres 
should be given the ‘utmost publicity’ as they let ‘the educated Mahommedans in 
India know what is the nature of the Turkish government, and so bring home to 
their minds that it would be a great mistake in any way to identify the cause of 
Islam with that of Turkey’.134 
Bryce referred to the earlier massacres undertaken during the reign of 
Abdülhamid II but stated that they were on a small scale compared to the current 
CUP instigated atrocities.  He reinforced his point by stating:
There was no Moslem passion against  the Armenian Christians.  All was done by 
the will of the Government, and done not from any religious fanaticism, but simply 
because they wished, for reasons purely political, to get  rid of a non-Moslem 
element  which impaired the homogeneity of the Empire, and constituted an 
element  that  might  not always submit to oppression .... So far as can be made out, 
though of course the baser natures have welcomed and used the opportunities for 
plunder which slaughter and deportations afford, these massacres have been 
viewed by the better sort of religious Moslems with horror rather than with 
sympathy. 135  
Bryce was attentive to Muslim sensibilities, reflecting official concern about 
retaining Muslim sympathies within the Empire.  In contrast, Toynbee was much 
more heavy handed.  He observed, for example, that the Armenians  were 
commercially minded and, hence, thrived in the midst of ‘a rather stupid, 
conservatively inclined Turkish population’.136   He repeatedly emphasised the 
virtues of the Armenian race and dismissed the Turk.  Thus, he wrote that ‘the 
Armenians were people of property, property well earned by intelligent industry, 
and the indigent Moslem of the slums had always resented the prosperity which 
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Allah had permitted to the subject infidel’.137   He was keen to emphasise that 
they were fellow-Christians and, therefore, unlike the Turks, had the same 
sensibilities as ‘the middle-class population of any town in England or 
France’.138   In a section examining the fate of academics from an Armenian 
college in Anatolia he observed that these colleges were ‘every bit as refined, as 
cultured, as civilised as the atmosphere of our schools and colleges in Western 
Europe.  Their humanising influence was one of the most beneficent factors in 
the Ottoman Empire’.139
Whereas the Armenians  were ‘like us’, the Turks were ‘orientals’ governed by 
lust and depravity, which explained, according to Toynbee, the treatment of 
Armenian women, who were either raped by their guards or sold into harems. 
The passages implied that the traits  shown by some barbaric Turks were shared 
by all.  For example, Toynbee wrote, 
Abundant news has come from Constantinople itself of [girls] being sold for a few 
shillings in the open markets of the capital ... These were Christian women, as 
civilised and refined as the women of Western Europe, and they were enslaved into 
degradation.140
As the march of exiles reached Aleppo the ‘victims  suffered a change of 
tormentors.  The Kurds lingered in the hills, and the Bedawin [sic.] Arabs took up 
the role’.141  Thus  more Muslims were held culpable for the atrocities.  The only 
help that was forthcoming was from other Christians, for example, in Aleppo the 
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The final chapter is called ‘The Attitude of Germany’.  Bryce had warned 
Toynbee to tread carefully regarding German culpability, advising him that the 
pamphlet should be ‘an impeachment of the Turks not ... a “campaign document” 
against the Germans.  We want to get the Germans to stop the massacres and to 
try to make them responsible is not the best way to do that’.143  In the pamphlet 
Toynbee argued that whilst the Germans might not have initiated the crimes, this 
was faint praise ‘for it is clear that, whoever commanded the atrocities, the 
Germans never made a motion to countermand them, when they could have been 
stopped at the start by a single word’.144   He went so far as  to suggest that the 
Germans might have endorsed the atrocities  on the basis that if the Armenian 
population was annihilated, the Turks would have been even more at Germany’s 
mercy as the Armenians were ‘the only native element in the Ottoman Empire 
with a European training and a European character’ and hence without them the 
commercial life of the Ottoman Empire would be left in ruin and more accessible 
to German exploitation.145  However, Toynbee invited the Germans to rebut such 
suspicions by acting immediately to save that element of the Armenian race still 
alive.
Toynbee’s section of the pamphlet stands out as exceptional in the context of the 
pamphlets from both the early half and the latter half of the war.  He was 
especially keen to emphasise differences between Muslims and Christians and 
depicted all Turks, not just the Young Turk administration, as culpable.  His 
stance may have been partly the result of an all-out effort to ensure by any 
means, however inflammatory, that the humanitarian scale of the disaster was 
brought home but it seems much more likely, bearing in mind Toynbee’s role 
within Wellington House, that his rhetoric was  permissible because the pamphlet 
was unequivocally directed towards  an American audience.  It is  also worth 
recalling that a substantive part of the evidence used by Toynbee came from 
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American missionary sources, whose natural inclination was to view events 
through a religious  prism, a conflict between their own Christian faith and that of 
the Turks.
Toynbee’s pamphlet was Wellington House’s only publication on the massacres 
until the following November when the ‘Blue Book’ was  produced.146  This was 
a monumental tome, amounting to over 700 pages of mostly eyewitness accounts 
of the atrocities.147   Toynbee and Bryce endorsed a fact-finding approach, 
believing that the evidence should, and could, speak for itself and that it was 
‘better to avoid any expression of moral censure at this stage’.148  This  fitted with 
the, all-important, American approach orchestrated by the American Missions 
Board, whose stated business was ‘not politics but philanthropy; not railing but 
relief’.149   Accordingly, Toynbee looked far and wide for independent (non-
Armenian) eyewitness  accounts, and although the substantive portion was 
obtained from American missionaries (as he himself conceded) he also obtained 
testimony from sources in Switzerland, France, Italy and Egypt, and was rigorous 
in his efforts to verify and cross-check the various accounts and to present them 
without embellishment.  Unsurprisingly, this was a time-consuming process and 
resulted in a lengthy document.  When Stephen Gaselee at the Foreign Office’s 
News Department was finally sent a proof in August, he was disconcerted by its 
size and observed that it would more likely serve as material for other 
publications, than be read widely in itself.150   He also noted that in some of the 
documents there ‘are phrases which would better be omitted’.151  It is likely that 
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he was referring to the expression of anti-Muslim sentiment.  However, he 
believed that the historical value consisted in the fact that they were largely 
verbatim accounts  and were therefore better left untouched.  Thereafter, on 18 
August Robert Cecil, Private Secretary to Lord Grey, confirmed that the Foreign 
Office approved the publication and that the best way to achieve this was to lay 
the document before Parliament.152   On 23 August, Cecil told the House of 
Commons that ‘a valuable Report, consisting chiefly of a collection of 
documentary evidence, has been prepared at the suggestion of Lord Bryce by Mr 
Arnold Toynbee, and will be laid before Parliament in due course’.153  
Since the war, the Blue Book has often been regarded as one of the most 
symbolic of Wellington House’s wartime propaganda publications.  However, 
contemporary documents indicate a lack of clarity regarding by whom, and why, 
it was commissioned.  David Miller has argued persuasively that there was a 
distinct lack of enthusiasm for the project within the Foreign Office, and he 
contends that it was likely Bryce who drove the project for humanitarian 
reasons.154   It is  plausible, however, that figures like Cromer, old-school 
imperialists, whose primary concern was India, were instrumental in instigating 
its production.  In the 6 October debate in the House of Lords, he and Lord 
Crewe suggested to Bryce that the Consular Reports on which he based his 
account of the atrocities should be ‘laid before Parliament or otherwise 
published’.155   This was a dangerous  strategy.  If the heavy-handed ‘clash of 
civilisations’ approach adopted by Arnold Toynbee in his 1915 pamphlet 
continued to be pursued, it was surely more likely to alienate India’s educated 
Muslims than endear them to the Allied cause.  In either case, by February 1916, 
Toynbee had been appointed as Bryce’s  assistant and was making contact with 
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potential witnesses  on ‘Lord Bryce’s  behalf’.156  Although he put himself forward 
as working for Bryce, his letters  emanated from Wellington House, for whom he 
remained a full time employee on a salary of £330 a year, suggesting that even if 
the Foreign Office was not the instigator, the project was condoned and 
supported by them from the outset.157
Toynbee’s status  as a Wellington House employee, tasked with American-related 
propaganda, strongly suggests  that, like his 1915 pamphlet, the primary purpose 
of the Blue Book, at least from the government’s  perspective, if not Bryce’s 
himself, was as war propaganda aimed at America.  In 1922, Toynbee himself 
acknowledged its propagandist, as opposed to humanitarian, purpose but held to 
the position that this did not undermine the good faith with which he and Bryce 
undertook the project, nor its  accuracy.158  Certainly, the Blue Book continues to 
be regarded today as  the largest single source of information on what happened. 
However, after the war, Toynbee recognised that he had done little to represent 
the Turkish side of events (however flimsy their justification may have been) and 
felt that he had betrayed ‘historical truth’ with the ‘lopsidedness’ of his 
account.159   Like much of Wellington House’s propaganda, Toynbee’s approach 
when it came to uncomfortable facts was  to ignore them.  For example, when the 
Turks published photographic evidence showing stockpiled weaponry in the 
hands of Armenian rebels, Toynbee dismissed it out of hand as ‘mostly fakes’.160 
Further, whilst Bryce’s humanitarian concerns were undoubtedly sincere, it is 
difficult not to also read into his motivation a racial hatred for the Turks.  In a 
private letter to Masterman, his  fellow Liberal, he referred to them as ‘despicable 
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wretches’.161   In another he expressed the hope that the Blue Book ‘may 
materially help to blow Turks and Turcophiles out of the water’.162  Such factors, 
together with the pejorative post-war attitude towards Wellington House’s 
activities, have cast a shadow over the Blue Book, such that its authenticity 
continues to be a matter of doubt.  For example, when the Armenian Centre 
commissioned an opinion from leading human rights barrister, Geoffrey 
Robertson Q.C., in 2009, he stated that he was unable to place any reliance on the 
Blue Book because of ‘Bryce’s record as a propagandist’.163 
Although the Blue Book continues to be a topic for discussion and debate, during 
the war it never achieved the status or the public recognition of the Bryce Report. 
But it must be emphasised that it was serving a different purpose.  Whereas the 
Bryce Report had been commissioned directly by Asquith, was widely circulated 
throughout the world, and played an important role in articulating the rationale 
for Britain’s belligerency, it is difficult not to conclude that official endorsement 
of the Blue Book was rather half-hearted, that it was produced because the 
Foreign Office thought they ‘ought’ to do it as a strand of their American 
diplomacy and/or because it might serve their Indian strategic concerns.  This is 
not to say that there were not many who were genuinely concerned for the 
Armenians’ plight, including within Whitehall.  However, the period of 1915 and 
1916 was one in which there remained a degree of tentativeness in British 
willingness to condemn the Turks and their actions.  The inclination was to look 
back towards their historic friendship rather than their current belligerency or 
post-war relationship although, as shall be seen in the subsequent chapters, by the 
summer of 1916, and certainly by the Blue Book’s publication in November, the 
Foreign Office’s interests were becoming increasingly aligned to Bryce’s 
humanitarian ones.  The prospect of the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire, 
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and Britain’s need to position herself in this  process, meant that condemning the 
Turks as murderers, and as unfit to govern the Armenians, was increasingly a 
position that sat comfortably with government objectives.
A final pamphlet, Syria During March, 1916: Her Miseries and Disasters, dating 
from the latter half of 1916, also requires consideration.164   It has been argued 
above that in the first half of the war Britain’s attitude towards the Ottoman 
Empire was relatively benign and its propaganda efforts in this  regard lacked 
direction.  As late as September 1916 (the date of the Third Report) very little 
was being produced in anticipation of Britain’s global positioning after the war. 
The Syria pamphlet, however, indicates that approaches were changing.  Written 
in the wake of the inception of the Arab Revolt, the anonymous  writer 
highlighted that the Turkish government was carrying out similar atrocities 
against Syria’s Arabs as had been conducted against the Armenians, thereby 
demonstrating the Young Turks’ cynical exploitation of Islam to conceal their 
real agenda, which was to consolidate the ‘ottomanisation’ of the Empire and 
strengthen Turkish nationalism:
“First we kill the Armenians,” said a Turkish gendarme to a Danish Sister serving 
with the German Red Cross, “then the Greeks, and then the Kurds.”  If this 
gendarme had been more intimately in the counsel of his superiors, he would not 
have failed to add: “And, last of all, the Arabs.”165  
The pamphlet was thus a rebuttal of the German and Turkish call to jihad, and 
argued instead that it was  a cover for a different agenda which put all Muslims 
who were not Turkish in opposition to the Turkish regime.  The pamphlet 
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The Young Turks bear deeper malice against the Arabs than against any other race 
in Turkey.  The Arabs are as good Moslems as the Turks themselves (we speak of 
the Turkish nation and not  of the Young Turk clique, whose contempt  for all 
religion is notorious); the Arabs were the original creators of Islamic culture and 
the leading race in the Islamic world, at a time when the Turks were (what they 
have always remained at  heart) a tribe of predatory barbarians in the Central 
Asiatic steppes.  In spite of their disastrous political subjection to the Turkish 
invaders, the Arabs have to this day retained their superiority in intellect  and 
civilisation; and, further (what  is a still more heinous crime in Young Turkish 
eyes), they are numerically the second strongest race in the Ottoman Empire.166
It also suggested a fraternity between Arabic peoples  from different areas and 
indicated that they should unite and rise up, as  Sherif Hussein had done in the 
Hejaz, in opposition to the Turkish regime.  ‘Mecca fighting for her life against 
the menace of “Ottomanisation”!’ declared the pamphlet.167   ‘Nothing could 
expose more glaringly the cynical fraudulency of the Young Turkish Djihad’.168
The remainder of the pamphlet summarised various articles from Cairo 
newspaper, Mokattam, and information from an unidentified eyewitness  who had 
recently visited Syria, setting out details  of the hardships endured by the Syrians 
as a consequence of Ottoman rule and Ottoman participation in the war.169   It 
depicted the Ottomans as poor administators and cruel and callous masters. 
Whereas Syrians living in Egypt were ‘enjoying comfort, peace and luxury’ 
under British control, those still in Syria were suffering extreme hardship 
including famine, poverty and lawlessness.170   Indeed, the famine in Syria in 
1915 and 1916, a result not only of the war but of a vast locust invasion, is 
estimated to have resulted in the deaths of up to 300,000 Syrians.171  
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※The dominant theme that emerges from Wellington House’s output between 1914 
and the end of 1916 is the depiction of the war as a battle for civilisation.  For 
Britain, that meant the promotion of the values they viewed as  their imperial 
heritage and, not surprisingly, it was a battle waged overwhelmingly against 
Germany.  Germany was the gross violator of Western civilisation, the aggressor 
and the perpetrator of atrocities.  The British were ready and willing to attach the 
same characteristics to the Germans as they had applied in the nineteenth century 
to Asians  and Africans.  They were barbarians, throwbacks, primitives. 
However, somewhat contradictorily, Germans warranted particular opprobrium 
because, as Parker put it, they had ‘sinned against the light’, in other words, they 
were Europeans who should have known better.172  
In contrast, the Turks, rather than being condemned, were to be pitied and 
despised for falling prey to Prussianism.  To an extent, this approach reflected the 
continued flourishing of assumptions regarding the inadequacies of ‘Oriental’ 
races.  These were assumptions that had waxed and waned for centuries, but 
which were most recently manifest in the context of late-Victorian imperialism, 
where non-white races had come to be viewed as both culturally and racially 
inferior to Europeans.  In this formulation the Turks, unlike the Germans, simply 
did not know any better.  However, British ambivalence was not just a reflection 
of static cultural assumptions.  It was also a reaction to fears of pan-Islamism and 
the destabilisation of the traditional balance of power in Europe.  Military events 
in the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia added further nuance, stimulating anxiety 
regarding the maintenance of prestige.  Always, India and the potential 
ramifications  of Islamic unrest within the Empire stemming from Britain’s 
hostile relationship with the Ottomans, lay at the heart of her concerns.  
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In 1916, a more concerted approach emerged, both in terms of Ottoman-related 
propaganda aimed at allies and neutrals, and propaganda aimed more widely at 
the ‘Muslim world’.  This greater focus and organisation was undoubtedly part of 
the natural evolution of Wellington House’s  functions, particularly in light of its 
close affiliation with the Foreign Office, as it settled into its stride as a 
propaganda machine.  The creation of al-Haqīqah, the publication of the Blue 
Book and the Syria pamphlet, are all evidence of a growing appreciation of what 
was required in the changing strategic climate.  Al-Haqīqah was a response to 
concerns about prestige and Anglo-Islamic relations, the Blue Book secured 
common ground with America and, like the Syria pamphlet, began to pave the 
way for a world order after the war where Ottoman Asia no longer existed. 
However, it was only in 1917, when the loyalty of the Empire’s Muslims seemed 
more assured, and the post-war carve-up of the Turkish Empire had become an 
inevitability, that Wellington House gave full rein to its anti-Ottoman 
propaganda, as shall be seen in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Two – Wellington House, 1917-1918
As the war progressed Wellington House’s activities  became increasingly varied. 
It prepared weekly summaries of American and other foreign newspapers, 
produced photographic propaganda for publication in neutral newspapers, 
arranged the production and exhibition of films, and produced weekly, 
fortnightly, and monthly illustrated papers in a number of foreign languages:
Among other ingenious by-products, Wellington House got  sets of lantern slides 
prepared, with a stock lecture for each set.  These were for use in the rural districts 
of various countries, such as Russia.  They also got out a great many picture 
postcards, principally for Russia and Italy.  Maps, diagrams, posters, gramophone 
records, cigarette cards, model tanks for ash-trays, calendars showing German 
crimes and British victories, bookmarkers and blotting slips too were turned out.1
Despite the variety of by-products, Wellington House’s  output was still perceived 
as primarily literary, and after Lloyd George, ‘a man convinced of the power of 
propaganda’, became Prime Minister in December 1916 steps were quickly taken 
to attempt to change this.2   Lloyd George asked an old friend, Robert Donald, 
editor of The Daily Chronicle, to prepare a report on existing propaganda 
arrangements, knowing very well that he was a proponent of change and disliked 
the literary emphasis at Wellington House (as well as its intimacy with the 
Foreign Office).  Like other newspaper men, Donald advocated a less  intellectual 
and more sensationalist approach and was, for example, a keen advocate of 
atrocity propaganda.  Nevertheless, his first review in January 1917 was mild, 
and he praised the work undertaken highly.  Accordingly, when the propaganda 
effort was restructured and Lloyd George set up the Department of Information 
in February, putting John Buchan in charge, the Foreign Office retained the 
greatest degree of control over overseas propaganda matters, much to the chagrin 
of newspaper bosses such as Lords Beaverbrook and Northcliffe, who ‘conceived 
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themselves to be better qualified than permanent officials who were unversed in 
the techniques of mass persuasion’.3  
Buchan left Masterman to his own devices and he continued much as before.  In 
fact, the procedures put into motion by Masterman in the first half of the war 
came to fruition in 1917 as Wellington House’s output reached its zenith. 
According to information gleaned from the Wellington House Schedule of 
Literature, 39% of its literary output was produced in 1917.4    An analysis 
produced after the war claimed that during ten months of 1917 over 40 million 
items of all sorts were issued.5  However, as 1917 progressed, Donald and other 
newspaper men, notably C.P. Scott (of the Manchester Guardian) and Lord 
Burnham (of The Daily Telegraph), as well as Northcliffe and Beaverbrook, 
became increasingly annoyed at their perceived exclusion from the Department’s 
activities.  This resulted in Donald being commissioned to undertake a second 
review in October 1917, a much more vitriolic affair, during which it became 
apparent that he and his backers would be satisfied with nothing less than a 
complete overhaul of the propaganda organisation.  Donald made it clear that as 
far as he was concerned ‘the most potent influence of all is the Press of each 
country, and this is a weapon of which [Wellington House] has not taken full 
advantage’.6  He proposed:
From now onward, we should reduce to a minimum all our publishing 
arrangements and article-writing, and concentrate on aggressive propaganda in the 
Press of every neutral country, by telegrams, etc., remove misunderstandings by 
similar means in Allied countries, and carry on penetrative propaganda into enemy 
countries on a huge scale.7  
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That Donald’s proposals  were taken up is evident not just from the establishment 
of the Ministry of Information under Beaverbrook in March 1918 (in which 
Donald himself was given charge of propaganda in neutral countries).8   A 
consideration of the Schedule of Literature also indicates  the declining emphasis 
on pamphlets and books.  In 1918 output of literary material amounted to 27% of 
the total war output, 12% less  than in 1917.9   The reduction would be much 
greater if the number of publications that consisted of American editions of pre-
existing Wellington House works were taken out of the 27% figure.  
The significant number of American editions reflected a belief that even though 
the US had now joined the Allies the need for British propaganda there was 
greater than ever in order to provide Americans with information about war 
events and also to ensure that the desired representations of Britain’s aims and 
objectives  were projected.  Professor Dixon, who was in charge of US 
propaganda at Wellington House from September 1916 and replaced Gilbert 
Parker, summarised the position in November 1917 when he observed, 
the need for propaganda [in the US] was never greater than at the present time and 
it is essential for the removal of misunderstandings between America and Britain – 
sources of friction which continually arise and also in answer to questions as to the 
true aims of Britain in the war, that is whether they are imperialistic or not, whether 
we are not out to secure more territory and so forth.10  
Conveying an impression of herself as  an imperial power without imperial 
ambitions, however paradoxical this may appear, had become one of the 
overriding preoccupations of the propagandists as shall be seen in this chapter.
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One of the reasons for Dixon’s appointment was that he had been a colleague of Wilson’s at Princeton.
Both Buchan and Masterman were deeply frustrated by the results  of Donald’s 
second review.  Complaining to Edward Carson (the Minister with responsibility 
for propaganda from September 1917 until the establishment of the Ministry in 
the following March) in December 1917, Buchan commented that Donald had 
criticised the Department’s work without having done a comprehensive 
investigation and had been indiscreet in circulating his  supposedly confidential 
findings  to his friends in the press without having given the Department a chance 
to put forward its own reply.  ‘He has investigated a few branches, giving an hour 
or two to each; but he has passed judgment on all branches, including those 
which he did not visit.  Such a method could scarcely be productive of accurate 
criticism or valuable suggestions’.11  Masterman believed that Donald had failed 
to understand the nature of his  work or to acknowledge its success.  Whereas 
Donald viewed the organisation as equivalent to a profligate and badly organised 
business, Masterman explained that a comparison with an election campaign was 
more apt.  ‘I would ask you to judge the work, not as  a business proposition but 
rather on the line of an international election campaign, carried on by the two 
parties.  In such a campaign there must be a large amount of waste.  This occurs 
on both sides’.12  The fact that activities  had largely been covert made it difficult 
to show tangible results  and this too compromised Buchan and Masterman’s 
position.  Masterman implored Donald to look at the countless letters, expressing 
appreciation for his work and demanding more, as evidence of the success of the 
organisation:
The whole justification of this [Wellington House’s work] is that we appear to be 
giving what the people do want.  There is a continual demand for it, a continual 
demand for more, continual statements of the effect of this on public opinion in the 
different  parts where it goes, especially in the United States, continuous evidence 
of the use of it  in preparation of speeches, sermons, leaders in newspaper offices 
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and of converts made by it  and of the necessity of the work and of the desire for 
more.13
    
Donald responded by proffering counterfactual scenarios to illustrate what would 
have happened if Wellington House’s propaganda had been more effective, for 
example, that America would have entered the war earlier and Russia would not 
have deserted the Allies.14  There was evidently little common ground.
That the newspaper men won the battle to control British propaganda in late 1917 
is  indisputable.  For the remainder of the war the overriding policy was to use the 
press  to convey information to everyone, not just decision makers but the masses, 
educated or otherwise.  It was  no longer simply the articulation of values and 
beliefs  held dear to the author for transmission to like-minded elites  but a 
deliberate attempt to direct the thoughts of large swathes of the world’s 
population with the primary aim of preserving and promoting Britain’s  position 
in the peace talks to come.  As one post-war commentator explained, the 
Ministry’s function was  to provide the mortar by which the bricks of peace were 
to be constructed: 
The peace and security of the world do not  depend on armaments and diplomatic 
combinations, but  on the friendliness and goodwill of the peoples of the world. 
National prejudices can be removed only if one nation is told in detail what has 
been done, is being done and will be done in the future by another nation.15  
The most ‘direct and straightforward means that could be found’ were to be used 
‘for conveying a fact or the summary of an argument to immense masses, 
educated and uneducated’.16   Pictures, both static and moving, were believed to 
be most effective.  As the same post-war commentator observed, the power of 
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cinema was seen to be in its mass appeal: ‘it speaks to the hearts  of the duskiest 
aborigines and the smallest school-children’.17
Thus, with the establishment of the Ministry and the ascension of the newspaper 
men, Masterman and his team’s subtle, indirect approach became increasingly 
obsolete.  Writing about the position in 1918, Ivor Nicholson, who had been at 
Wellington House in the pictorial department from the early days (and assisted 
Edward E. Long with al-Haqīqah), observed that with the changes  brought about 
by the appointment of Max Aitken, 
[T]hose who had started at  Wellington House clung together and went on with the 
work and endeavoured to hold up the hands of the chief whom we had grown to 
like and respect.  We all felt, I think, that  Masterman had been unfairly treated by 
the late Government and the new Government and by some sections of the Press.18  
Despite the creation of the Enemy Propaganda Department, Ottoman-related 
propaganda remained within the Ministry’s remit until the end of the war and, 
indeed, it is evident from the Schedule of Literature that pamphlets  and books in 
typical Wellington House style continued in production in 1918, as did al-
Haqīqah which remained under the control of Edward Long.  This  chapter will 
consider these publications and will be divided largely as Chapter One.  It will 
start with a section on the continued focus on Germany as the ‘other’ against 
which Britain was to be understood and judged.  As can be seen from the Table 
on page 93, rather than diminishing as other issues came to the fore, the 
obsession with German barbarity continued and, indeed, reached a peak in 1917. 
As the Allies  achieved military victory in the East, and fears of a global jihad 
receded, the next section will consider how Wellington House addressed growing 
British confidence in the security of her Empire and prepared for post-war peace 
negotiations.    In this regard, the ongoing importance of al-Haqīqah will be 
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considered and it will be argued that whilst Wellington House’s pamphlets and 
books came to be viewed as increasingly unnecessary, their pictorial propaganda 
was very much in keeping with the Ministry’s new approach.  Section 2.3 will 
turn to changing depictions of the Turks, as strategic exigencies dictated a 
dramatically different agenda to that of the early years.  Finally, section 2.4 will 
consider Armenia and the development of propaganda in relation to Turkish 
atrocities there.
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Table produced from an examination of Wellington House’s 
Schedule of Literature19
Wellington House Publications: Subject Matter 1914/
1915
1916 1917 1918 Total %
Outbreak/Causes/Justification 55 12 22 12 101 8.70
German ‘Kultur’ and History 28 13 27 18 86 7.40
Belgian/French Atrocities (inc. initial atrocities, 
subsequent occupation, forced labour etc.)
14 21 37 7 79 6.80
Other Central Power Atrocities within Europe (i.e., 
exc. Armenia and Africa, e.g., Poland, corpse 
conversion, Edith Cavell)
8 5 8 3 24 2.10
Armenia 2※ 1 3 5 11 0.90
Treatment of Prisoners of War 8 17 14 8 47 4.00
United States (only those publications specifically 
addressing aspects of US role in war)
6 3 12 3 24 2.10
Russia 5 - 3 1 9 0.70
France/Italy 4 7 8 8 27 2.30
Eastern Europe/Balkans 3 2 10 3 18 1.50
Turkey 2 - 8 5 15 1.30
Gallipoli 1 1 - - 2 0.20
African Campaigns - - 2 3 5 0.40
India 3 5 2 4 14 1.20
Ireland 3 8 8 1 20 1.70
Dominions 1 3 8 2 14 1.20
Jews/Zionism - - 3 11 14 1.20
Middle East - 1 7 13 21 1.80
Ethics of War 4 - 1 - 5 0.40
British Ideals and Principles - 6 13 12 31 2.70
British Imperialism (its strength and resources) 1 1 7 - 9 0.70
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exhaustive and there are a number of reasons why it can only be taken as a rough guide. For example,  the 
documents are uncategorised in the Schedule and the categories in the Table and allocation of pamphlets 
to these categories has been a subjective exercise and one that ignores the overlap in some pamphlets 
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※ Two editions of the same pamphlet.
Wellington House Publications: Subject Matter 1914/
1915
1916 1917 1918 Total %
German Imperialism (in Europe and particularly in 
Africa)
2 1 5 10 18 1.50
War at Sea (e.g., justification of blockades, 
achievements of Navy, submarines)
10 17 30 17 74 6.40
Air - 1 7 1 9 0.70
Tanks - - 1 1 2 0.20
Economics and Trade (e.g., armaments production) 5 11 14 6 36 3.00
British Progress and Performance 8 11 31 19 69 6.00
German Performance - 2 1 - 3 0.30
The Human Face/Soldiers at the Front 1 3 20 13 37 3.00
British Morale (e.g., how Britons are doing their bit, 
important speeches)
2 4 40 20 66 5.70
Belligerents Relationship with Catholics/Catholic 
Countries
1 6 19 1 27 2.30
Peace Terms/League of Nations - 7 27 24 58 5.00
Cardinal Mercier (Archbishop of Malines) Letters 
and Sermons
1 4 3 - 8 0.70
Reality Magazine (4 page topical magazine) - - 25 42 67 5.80
Miscellaneous 11 31 32 39 113 9.70
Total 188 204 458 312 1162 100
Percentage of Total Over Entire War 16% 18% 39% 27% 100%
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2.1 Attitudes towards Germany
Wellington House continued to focus on Germany as a country whose people 
were the antithesis  of honest, civilised Britons, by portraying their Kultur and 
history as one oriented around war, barbarity and the destruction of civilisation. 
Wellington House took this approach to new extremes in 1917 with the 
production of two pamphlets: Microbe Culture in Bukarest and The Corpse 
Conversion Factory: A Peep Behind Enemy Lines.20   In the former the Germans 
were accused of ‘dastardly and devilish’ conduct involving the smuggling 
through diplomatic channels  of high explosives and cultures of anthrax and 
glanders bacilli with the object of damaging Romanian property and spreading 
disease among her livestock.21   The latter pamphlet was produced on the back of 
reports in the Daily Mail and The Times based on an article in a Berlin paper, 
Lokal-Anzeiger, on 10 April 1917.  The Lokal-Anzeiger’s correspondent 
described a journey in which he passed a German factory:
[T]he great Army Group works for the utilisation of corpses.  The fat that  is 
obtained here is converted into lubricating oils, and everything else ground down in 
the bone mill to a powder that is used for mixing with pigs’ fodder and as 
manure.22
It was  the German word for corpses, ‘kadaver’, capable in translation of meaning 
either human or animal remains, that captured the imagination of the British 
press, who chose to interpret it as referring to humans and cited the story as one 
more example of German depravity.  Wellington House was aware of the 
possible misconstruction of ‘kadaver’ but they produced a pamphlet in any event 
and when they later acknowledged that they had made a mistake and the factory 
was indeed using only animal corpses, their reputation as ‘truth-tellers’ was 
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21 Anon., Microbe Culture, p.3.
22 Translation of extract from Lokal-Anzeiger, TNA FO 395/147/79731.
tarnished.23   Whilst Wellington House’s decision to publish this pamphlet is 
generally attributed to pressure from a belligerent press, this does not tell the full 
story as Foreign Office records indicate that the reason this story particularly 
appealed was because of its potential to influence Muslim opinion.  Indeed, 
Edward Long wrote to the Foreign Office almost immediately after the story 
appeared, highlighting the potential value of the story and asking, ‘do you not 
think it would be rather a good thing to use this  for purposes of Oriental 
propaganda?’24  In Long’s opinion,
[A]mongst  most Oriental races a feeling of horror would be induced against the 
Germans by the dissemination of such information concerning them, but  if it  could 
be proved that they have actually used the bodies of fallen Turkish soldiers in this 
ghastly manner, we should have in our hands a most valuable weapon for use 
against the Germans with all Moslem peoples.25
The critical factor was  the use of the corpses specifically for pig-fodder in light 
of Muslim beliefs.  As one of the Foreign Office’s correspondents suggested, 
‘Remember how a less reason than this, caused the Indian Mutiny!’26  
The Foreign Office was entirely amenable to Long’s suggestion.  Whilst he had 
sought to establish the truth of the matter before proceeding, the Foreign Office 
replied that although they could not ascertain if the story was true, as the 
pamphlet would have no outward sign of official endorsement (in customary 
Wellington House style), its  veracity was not something which need delay 
publication: ‘we see no reason why the proposed pamphlets should not be 
proceeded with, as they would in no case have the appearance of official 
publications’.27   Far from being the victims of pressure from the press, the 
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25 Ibid.
26 Arbuthnot to FO, 18 April 1917, TNA FO 395/147.
27 MWK (?) on behalf of Montgomery to Willson, 21 April 1917, TNA FO 395/147.
propagandists had their own reasons for producing the pamphlet and capitalised 
on the perceived ambiguity despite the potential, and in the event actual, damage 
to their reputation.28
The exploitation of falsehoods epitomised by the Corpse Conversion story was, 
as has been seen in the preceding chapter, not Wellington House’s usual 
approach.  Rather they attributed such methods specifically to German 
propagandists and took pride in their own honesty.  A more typical example of a 
publication from the second half of the war is  Sidelights on Germany.29   Written 
in 1918 and published in London and New York, the author appraised German 
wartime writing with the intention of throwing light on their war psychology, 
morals and culture (and thereby ‘damning them from their own mouths’). 
Although the basic premise was the same, this  was a more muted, nuanced 
examination of Kultur, lacking the cruder stereotyping found in much of the 
earlier writing and drawn from contemporaneous material rather than broad 
historical analogy.  It is notable that whilst there were no individual chapters 
addressing Germany’s European aspirations, the book included distinct chapters 
on Germany’s colonial aspirations and on their attitude towards the Middle East.  
In the chapter on German imperialism an extract from the Hamburger 
Fremdenblatt was cited as evidence of German attitudes towards British 
colonialism and of how they viewed their own style of imperialism in 
comparison:
Among the attributes of the nation who are called Huns by the hypocritical 
English, and Boches by the degenerate French, is a remarkable idealism, 
incomprehensible to our enemies, which irradiates the entire German people, from 
the palace to the workshop.  This is why we do not merely regard the German 
colonies as trading settlements, as places where money may be made, or where the 
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native races may be sucked dry.  This is the Briton’s way with his foreign 
possessions.  For the German his colonies are lands of fable, shimmering in the 
magic of marvellous sunlight, virgin territory exercising a potent attraction for our 
youth, and in which we have unfurled the banner of Kultur and humanity.30
    
For the Germans ‘empire’ was a creature of romance and spirituality, whereas 
British imperialism was a more prosaic beast founded on trade and exploitation. 
No comment was made by the pamphlet’s author on these assertions.  It was left 
to the reader to make up his or her own mind.  The chapter went on to give 
evidence of German plans  for further imperial growth should they win the war, 
and this theme was elaborated upon in the chapter on Germany’s planned 
‘oriental dominion’ which Morrison claimed had been one of her chief aims since 
long before the war.  For Germany, the Drang nach Osten was, again, the stuff of 
legend and romance, of ‘towers  and minarets and palm groves’, serving to give 
fortitude to German soldiers.31  
Morrison made frequent reference to Germany’s ambition for ‘world supremacy’, 
for the domination of the Nietzschian ‘blonde-haired Northern race’, with the 
intention of ensuring that the Allies did not falter in their determination to 
continue with the war until they achieved success.  A tinge of derision frequently 
crept into the author’s comments reflecting a certainty in the strengths of the 
British imperial model: 
Herr Hauser [author of Race and Race Questions in Germany] casts his gaze into 
the future and finds the Germanic blonde race marching from conquest to conquest, 
until the whole world, with all its varieties of hair, is at its feet .... The German 
variant of the Blonde Man, rendered proud and assured by conquest, will rule the 
universe.32  
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The perceived absurdity of German race theory was further emphasised in the 
sections on German attitudes towards Turks and Kurds.  Morrison pointed out 
German hypocrisy in their newfound ‘brotherhood’ with the Turks, a nation 
Morrison himself dismissed as ‘retrograde and impossible’, and ridiculed their 
efforts  to identify racial similarities between Teutons, Turks and Kurds, a notion 
he nevertheless considered few in Britain would be disposed to quarrel with.33  
 
The emphasis on German imperialism apparent in Morrison’s  book reflects a 
wider trend in 1917-18.  Whereas in 1914-16 only three pamphlets were 
produced on this topic, at least a further fifteen were published in 1917-18.34 
Most of these concerned Africa and excoriated Germany’s colonial record there. 
In pamphlets such as Towards Extermination: Germany’s Treatment of the 
African Native, Germany’s Colonial Failure and The Black Slaves of Prussia (all 
published in 1918) Wellington House took the themes they had developed in the 
first half of the war and applied them to German behaviour in her colonies.35 
Germany’s treatment of her colonial subjects provided fruitful ground not only in 
support of assertions of German cruelty and barbarism, but also as  evidence of 
their unfitness  to colonise.  ‘The German’, wrote the author of The Black Slaves 
of Prussia, ‘does not understand the elementary principles  of humane 
Government.  He is efficient, he is  polite, he is  correct in his behaviour and in his 
official attitude, but he is a German.  And being a German he sees a native as a 
tool; he is cruel and inhuman, and under him the African must become a slave or 
die’.36
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A different attitude was taken towards  German exploitation of Turkey, in relation 
to which British commentators appear to have experienced both jealousy and 
awe.  ‘Her diplomacy’, wrote novelist, E.F. Benson, ‘was not less  than brilliant 
simply from the fact that on the one hand it soothed Turkey instead of irritating, 
and, on the other, that it went absolutely unnoticed for a long time.  Nobody 
knew that it was  going on’.37   Indignantly, he went on to describe some of the 
ways in which the Germans, with ‘tentacles and suckers on every branch of 
Turkish industry’,38 had exploited and controlled aspects of Turkish life:
A saltpetre factory is established at  Konia by Herr Toepfer, whose enterprise is 
rewarded with an Iron Cross and a Turkish decoration.  The afforestation near 
Constantinople, ordered by the Ministry of Agriculture, is put  into German hands, 
and in the vilayet of Aidin (April 1916) ninety concessions were granted to German 
capitalists to undertake the exploitation of metallic ores.39
German exploitation of Turkey had to end, argued Benson, not for humanitarian 
reasons but because Turkey, if left in German hands, would continue to be 
exploited by Germany and pose a risk to British territory in the surrounding 
areas.  In addition, the resources of the Ottoman Empire were plentiful and 
varied, including, for example, minerals, cotton and beet-sugar, and German use 
of them had to be stopped as they enabled Germany to prolong her war effort and 
precluded their use by the Allies.40
One of the most common means of making a comparison between British and 
German standards was to compare their respective treatment of prisoners of war. 
As can be seen from the Table around forty-seven pamphlets dealt with this 
subject over the course of the war.  As early as mid-1915 tales were recounted of 
German cruelty towards British POWs and contrasted with Britain’s approach 
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which had ‘in every case shown [itself] ready and willing to treat German 
prisoners  of war in accordance with the provisions of International Conventions 
and the recognised principles of humanity’.41  The depiction of German treatment 
of prisoners frequently conformed with representations of German soldiers as 
cruel and barbaric.  In My German Prisons, the author, Captain Gilliland, stated 
that his aim was to reveal the ‘infamous, relentless  and savage character of the 
Hun’.42  Describing German treatment of an injured Irish soldier in Wounded and 
a Prisoner of War, Malcolm Hay observed how a group of German soldiers 
pulled the Irishman out of a group of sleeping prisoners to point
with their fingers at the poor mutilated face with coarse jeering laughter.  The 
young Irish soldier sat  patiently through it  all – his blind eye was a running sore, 
the torn cheek in healing had left  a hideously scarred hollow, and the mouth and 
nose were twisted to one side.  His condition would have stirred pity in the heart of 
a savage, and yet these Germans laughed and jeered.43 
The Germans were, according to Hay, a ‘treacherous  race, coarse in pleasure, 
bestial in drunkenness, viciously brutal in war’ but he also emphasised their 
bravery, discipline and patriotism, thereby appealing to allies and neutrals for 
their continued commitment to the war effort.44 
The British illustrated their more civilised and humane approach towards POWs 
in publications such as Turkish Prisoners in Egypt, a pamphlet which set out the 
(edited) conclusions  of a Red Cross enquiry into the conditions  of Turkish 
prisoners  of war.45  The extracts indicate a thorough review of all aspects of camp 
life including food, medical care, accommodation, clothing and morale at a 
101
41 Anon., The Treatment of Prisoners of War in England and Germany during the First Eight Months of 
the War (London, 1915), p.31.
42 Captain H.G. Gilliland, My German Prisons: Being the Experiences of an Officer During Two and a 
Half Years as a Prisoner of War (London, 1918), p.10.
43 Malcolm Hay, Wounded and A Prisoner of War (Edinburgh, 1916), p.227.
44 Ibid., p.295.
45 Anon., Turkish Prisoners in Egypt: A Report by the Delegates of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (London, 1917).  See also, British Prison-Camps in India and Burma (London, 1917).  
number of camps and the cited conclusions stated that ‘the inspectors, 
commandants and officers  of the camps treat the prisoners with humanity and do 
all in their power to soften their lot’.46   Special attention was given to the 
prisoners’ religious  sensibilities and the respect accorded to them by the camp 
authorities.  Most of the prisoners were Muslims and the report found that 
‘Imaums [sic.] take religious  charge, and the prisoners have full liberty to carry 
out their daily worship’.47   This pamphlet served the dual purpose of illustrating 
the superior nature of British treatment of POWs and of non-Europeans, in other 
words, it enunciated their greater capacity for imperial rule as  well as  their 
greater humanity.  A similar approach was taken in British Civilian Prisoners in 
East Africa which described German treatment of ‘the British, the Indians [and] 
the natives’ as a story of ‘undisguised brutality .... It was the treatment of 
bullies’.48
2.2 Growing Confidence in British Prestige
In Chapter One British insecurity regarding the quality of Anglo-Saxon ‘stock’ 
and the consequent reaction to Prussianism was considered.  Such tremulousness 
was similar to British fears of a pan-Islamic threat to the Empire.  By late 1916 it 
had become apparent that despite the pitting of imperial subjects against fellow 
Muslims in the Ottoman armies, and notwithstanding the feared loss of prestige 
resulting from military defeats in the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia, there was 
little evidence that the Empire’s Muslim subjects were fomenting revolt.49 
Against this backdrop, Wellington House’s output reveals a growing willingness 
to articulate both German efforts  to stoke a jihad and the failure of such efforts. 




48 Anon., British Civilian Prisoners in East Africa (London, 1918), p.30.
49 There were a few minor incidents, notably amongst Indian troops in Singapore in February 1915 which 
was attributed to a lack of visible British prestige. 
clergyman based in Jerusalem and popular Wellington House contributor despite 
being described as ‘rather a tub-thumper’ by the Foreign Office,50  described 
German machinations:
The audacity of Germany’s ambitions ... led her to aim at something more than a 
Pan-German Empire from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf; she conceived a plot 
to hasten the overthrow of Great Britain and her Allies by the re-establishment, 
under the Kaiser’s protectorate, of a great  Pan-Islamic Power, with Cairo as its 
capital.  The Sultan of Turkey, as the religious head of the followers of the 
Mahomet, was designed to be Germany’s tool for this diabolical task.51
For Parfit, the success  of this scheme would have been more catastrophic to 
Christendom than Prussian victory in Europe.  Its success would also have been 
parlous for the Empire: 
The British Empire was [sic.] never before been confronted by a greater peril than 
that which arose when the Sultan of Turkey proclaimed at  the instigation of 
Germany, a religious war to the two hundred millions of his followers.  It  is not in 
the least realized by the average Britisher what a miraculous deliverance we have 
had.52  
Instead of rebelling the Empire’s imperial subjects  had remained faithful.  Parfit 
claimed the ‘world was astounded at the wonderful response of loyalty that came 
from India’ which he ascribed to the essentially Christian nature of Britain’s 
Empire.53 
In The Welfare of Egypt, J.S. Willmore also expounded in depth upon German 
efforts  to stoke a global jihad, for example, by: inciting strikes amongst Muslim 
stokers and engineers on the Khedivial steamers; commissioning the making of 
Indian costumes so that spies could infiltrate the Indian Army and provoke 
103
50 See TNA FO 395/139/67053.
51 Canon J.T. Parfit, German Plots and British Triumphs in the Bible Lands (London, undated but likely 
1916 or 1917), p. 5. 
52 Ibid., p.5-6.
53 Ibid., p.7.
trouble; spreading false rumours about Muslim uprisings in India and 
Afghanistan and of the conversion of the Kaiser to Islam.54   Speaking as a long-
time resident of Egypt, Willmore claimed German efforts to stir dissent had 
failed because the vast majority of the Muslims  in Egypt were content with 
British rule or, at least, viewed it as preferable to German or Turkish rule.  
Parfit and Willmore’s emphasis  on the virtues of British imperialism reflects a 
common theme in a number of pamphlets  from 1917 and 1918.  Whilst earlier 
pamphlets tended to focus on Western civilisation and contrast it with German 
Kultur, the later pamphlets  reveal a greater propensity to focus on the merits  of 
British imperialism (and, in other contexts, as indicated in the previous section, 
Germany’s poor track record in relation to the same).  As Winter points out, war 
aims became central to propaganda in the second half of the war, ‘What kind of 
peace, indeed what kind of post-war world, were questions at the heart of the 
appeal’, and articulating the merits of British imperialism was  a means of 
legitimising its existence and paving the way for its  expansion.55   Historian 
Charles  Maier argues ‘if there is  to be a “hegemon” who relies on more than 
force alone, the nation playing the role must be perceived as providing a public 
good’.56   Going forward, the British wanted to preserve and extend their 
influence but they needed to offer something viable in return.  Historically, as 
discussed in the Introduction, Britain had justified her imperial expansion on a 
number of grounds, not least the ostensibly noble and self-sacrificing mission to 
civilise the colonised.  But, in the context of war between the great powers, the 
advantages of Western civilisation were harder to discern.  As John Darwin 
explains, ‘the most vital prop of Europe’s primacy in Eurasia, and of the 
powerful position of the great European states  in the Outer World beyond, had 
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been their collective determination not to fight one another’.57   The absence of 
that prop made necessary a re-formulation of the imperial vision.  It was all very 
well to refer in general terms, as Gilbert Parker did in 1915 in The World in the 
Crucible, to the greatness of British civilisation and the attributes of Britain’s 
form of imperialism, but as  the war progressed it became increasingly necessary 
to elucidate substantively what the benefits were.  As  Europe imploded, as ‘in a 
grotesque reversal of Joseph Conrad’s novelistic vision, hundreds of thousands of 
non-white men were voyaging to the heart of whiteness, as  it were, to witness 
“The horror! The horror!” of Western warfare’, what gave the British the right to 
continue to claim as superior their own race and civilisation and hence justify 
their entitlement to rule?58   By going beyond generalisations and assumptions 
and providing particulars of the merits of British rule, the propagandists found a 
means not only of differentiating Britain from the Germans and the Turks, but 
also of consolidating British entitlement to the territory currently under her 
control as well as that which she aspired to acquire.   
Legitimising her colonial activities was crucial not only at home and in the 
colonies but also, especially, in America.  Wilson’s wartime rhetoric had become 
overwhelmingly popular at both a political and popular level.  Not only were his 
ideas  fashionable, but, as Manela writes, they were coming from ‘a man widely 
viewed at the time as  the most powerful leader in the world arena, whose 
influence on the shape of the post-war international order, it was assumed, would 
be decisive’. 59   Gaining American endorsement was therefore perceived as 
critical to the post-war success of Britain’s global ambitions.    By elucidating the 
advantages of British rule in the territory under her control, the propagandists 
sought to assure readers  that there was no incompatibility between Wilsonian 
ideals and British imperialism.  Indeed, by extending her influence into Ottoman 
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territory, Britain would be facilitating the ability of those subject races to help 
themselves. 
As the war became attritional, and national cohesion the only means of winning 
it, there are historians who argue that the emphasis  on influencing American 
opinion diminished as propaganda on the home front became increasingly 
important.  John Horne, for example, writes  that ‘in the second half of the war 
the focus of state propaganda was no longer neutral countries, which had less 
importance once Italy and the United States entered the fray, but rather domestic 
opinion (civilian and military) and also the enemy’.60   However, a reading of 
documentation emanating from Wellington House indicates that whilst there may 
have been less need to justify their cause, a dialogue with the United States 
remained essential as  a means of paving the way towards acceptable peace terms. 
As Robert Donald argued in March 1918, it was vital for Britain to ‘advertise’ the 
Empire to her allies and show ‘what it stands for, what our system of self-
government means; to explain the vastness of our resources, our commanding 
control over a great many raw materials, our success in governing alien races and 
the way we have built up a free commonwealth of nations by freedom instead of 
by force’.61   Pamphlets such as Parfit’s and Willmore’s were designed less for 
domestic opinion, for the enemy or the colonised, than to ensure that 
international opinion viewed British imperialism as a benign force for good that 
could be used after the war as a role model towards the achievement of a free and 
equal world of nations as opposed to a structure at odds with Wilsonian ideals 
warranting dismantlement, as did the German colonial enterprise.
Accordingly, Parfit and Willmore, amongst many others, strove earnestly to show 
why Britain remained fit to rule.  In Parfit’s words, ‘we have acquired throughout 
the East a reputation for fairness, we have vastly improved the countries we have 
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occupied, and we have always benefited to a remarkable degree the nations that 
have come under our sway’.62  A vivid example of the improvements Britons  had 
wrought was given in Turkey: A Past and A Future, in which the anonymous 
author quoted Sir William Willcocks, who undertook surveys in Africa for the 
Ottoman Ministry, and wrote in 1911:
The last  voyage I made before coming to this country was up the Nile from 
Khartûm to the great equatorial lakes.  In this most desperate and forbidden region 
I was filled with pride to think that  I belonged to a race whose sons, even in this 
inhospitable waste of waters, were struggling in the face of a thousand 
discouragements to introduce new forest  trees and new agricultural products and 
ameliorate in some degree the conditions of life of the naked and miserable 
inhabitants.63
The strength, courage and virtue of British imperialists was amply demonstrated 
and then contrasted with the situation in Southern Mesopotamia, once one of the 
most abundant places on earth, and now a wasteland under Turkish rule.  Thus, 
the writer concluded, ‘Turkey is an obstruction of the future’.64
Willmore extolled British rule in Egypt and provided detailed information on the 
improvements wrought under their administration despite innumerable obstacles. 
A number of aspects of Egyptian life were considered including government, 
finance, trade, agriculture, the legal system, education, the army, public health 
and prisons.  For example, in relation to public health, he quoted Sir Guy Hunter, 
reporting on Egyptian hospitals in 1883: ‘“The hospitals,” he said, “are in a more 
or less tumble-down, dirty condition, impregnated with foul odours and 
containing beds filthy in the extreme.  They are, in fact, noisome places  utterly 
unfit for the reception of human beings”’.65   Willmore then referred to the 
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improvements which had been made including the free treatment of the poor and 
especial efforts  to cure ophthalmia due in part to the generous patronage of 
British individuals.66   He conceded that Britain pursued her own interests but, he 
argued, she had aligned them with those of Egypt.  One of the concluding 
comments referred to the improvements made for the country’s  Muslims.  Britain 
‘has  increased the facilities  for the pilgrimage to Mecca of the Mussulman 
population and added to the comforts of the devout who undertake it’.67  
Willmore also directly addressed the points raised in the German pamphlets of 
1915 referred to in Chapter One.  He sought to rebut specifically some of the 
allegations about Denshawaï but he acknowledged that ‘the sentence was unduly 
severe.  Lord Cromer, who was absent from Egypt at the time, was  of that 
opinion, but fair play demands that the full facts should be stated, and not only 
those which are calculated to bring odium on the English administration’.68   The 
Denshawaï incident was an aberration in Britain’s  otherwise unimpeachable 
record, whereas German imperialism embraced such brutality as a matter of 
course: ‘We know ... that Germany shrinks from no methods by which she may 
gain her objects’.69
British confidence in her imperial position was bolstered by military victories in 
the East in 1917, most significantly the fall of Baghdad in March and Jerusalem 
in December.  As Basil Liddell Hart later observed, ‘for the prestige of Britain 
and the morale of all the Allies  the capture [of Baghdad] was an invaluable 
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an event which impressed the imagination of the whole world, both because of the 
romantic appeal of the famed city of the Arabian Nights, and because it  symbolized 
the first streaks of dawn coming to illumine the darkness which had lain like a pall 
over the Allied cause throughout 1916.71  
Liddell Hart did not use the medieval Crusades as a reference point against which 
the victories could be compared, and yet this was a subject with obvious 
resonance.  In his work on the war and culture, Robb argues that the upper 
classes were heavily influenced by chivalric traditions.  Here was a chance to 
show the country that they were not the ‘redundant reactionaries of radical 
propaganda, but the patriotic class of knightly crusaders and chivalric heroes’.72 
According to Robb, aristocratic soldiers showed ‘a tendency to adopt medieval 
language and conceits  in their diaries, letters, and descriptions of the war’.73  Bar-
Yosef also argues  that the upper classes associated the campaigns in 
Mesopotamia and Palestine with the Crusades but points out that for most 
Britons the obvious association was a biblical one, where Christianity was seen 
to be once more asserting its rightful place in the Holy Land.74  Both biblical and 
medieval references were considered potentially harmful to Muslim sensibilities 
by the Foreign Office and consequently by Wellington House.  A fourth Press 
Notice relating to Muslim opinion was  released on 15 November 1917.  It 
contained the following instructions:
The attention of the Press is drawn to the undesirability of publishing any 
article, paragraph or picture suggesting that military operations against 
Turkey are in any sense a Holy War, a modern Crusade, or have anything 
whatsoever to do with religious questions.  The British Empire is said to 
contain a hundred million Mohammedan subjects of the King and it  is 
obviously mischievous to suggest that  our quarrel with Turkey is one 
between Christianity and Islam.75
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Meanwhile, the War Cabinet advised Allenby in his carefully choreographed, and 
filmed, entry into Jerusalem, that ‘in view of the unique character of the city and 
of the many difficult political and diplomatic questions that were raised in 
connection with it .... no flags should be hoisted in the event of the occupation of 
the city by Allied troops’.76   The protection of Muslim sensibilities was  to be 
achieved not only by maintaining religious neutrality but also by depicting 
Allenby’s entry into Jerusalem as one motivated by peace rather than conquest.  
The strictures on religious neutrality are evident in a souvenir pamphlet produced 
after Jerusalem’s fall consisting of photographs and factual descriptions of sites 
of importance to Christians, Jews and Muslims.77  It was neutral in its  description 
of matters specific to different religions and equally generous in depicting the 
beauty and grandness of the various religious sites.  In another pamphlet, the 
author emphasised how Allenby entered Jerusalem humbly on foot (again, by 
order, and as a contrast to the Kaiser’s ‘uncouth and tactless condescension’78 
when he entered the city on horseback), and read a proclamation in ‘many 
languages promising equal and traditional rights  to all Churches and Religions, 
and the protection of all sacred spots’.79   To the extent that religious symbolism 
was drawn from Allenby’s entry it was to emphasise the similarities  between his 
entry, ‘with neither military display nor the symbols  of victory, unheralded by 
bugle or gun’, and that of Christ, the ‘divine Peasant’ who also sought peace and 
tolerance (and who is, of course, viewed as a prophet in the Islamic faith as  well 
as in Christianity).80   The only reference to the Crusades in Mathews’ pamphlet 
was as  a means of contrasting Allenby’s peaceful entrance with that of the 
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Crusaders when the street of Jerusalem ‘ran with blood’.81   In other words, his 
entry was to be viewed neither as a conquest nor as  a victory for Christianity or 
the West but as a victory for peace and religious tolerance with Britain assuming 
the role of arbiter.
Whilst seeking to downplay the religious significance, the government 
nevertheless sought to use the opportunity provided by Allenby’s success to 
enhance their prestige.  Lord Curzon told the War Cabinet that the news of 
Jerusalem’s  capture should ‘be made known in a way calculated favourably to 
impress India and the Mohammedan world’.82   Meanwhile, Wellington House 
emphasised the historical resonances of the Allied occupation of Jerusalem.  In 
The Deliverance of Jerusalem, the author observed grandiosely that 
[T]he same historical highway which brought to the Gates of Gaza Thothmes, 
Rameses, Sennacherib, Cambyses, Alexander, Pompey, Titus, Saladin, Napoleon 
and many generals, has now yielded to the advance of the mixed Army under 
General Allenby of British, Irish, Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, Indians, 
and, in small contingents, French and Italians.83  
As well as  downplaying the role of the other Entente Powers, the author 
emphasised British prestige by listing those great military leaders of times past 
with whom Allenby now shared a pedigree.  
The prestige regained by military success and the Central Powers’ failure to stoke 
a global jihad arguably meant that the need for illustrated publications  such as al-
Haqīqah diminished in 1917.  Certainly, the changing political and military 
climate was reflected in the content of the magazine such that the earlier focus  on 
ammunition piles, factories and parades (illustrating the greatness, power and 
reach of the British Empire) lessened and military action in the Middle East and 
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Western Europe was  awarded greater coverage.84  The victories of 1917 and 1918 
were sufficient proof of restored British prestige and there was no longer such a 
pressing need to assert the might of the Empire in ways other than militarily. 
However, far from discontinuing al-Haqīqah, Wellington House continued to 
produce it and implemented several additional publications  including an 
illustrated paper targeting Muslims in the Malay States called Warta Yang Tulus 
and two new papers in India.  A version in Bengali, Gujerati and Tamil (for the 
West, North-East and South) named Satya Vani was introduced in late 1916.  Al-
Haqīqah continued to be used to reach Indian Muslims via the Urdu (Hindustani) 
translation until mid-1917.  Edward Long proposed that a better approach would 
be to create an Indian version of al-Haqīqah, Jangi Akbar, printed in Urdu, Hindi 
and Gurumukhi (for the North and North-West of India).    Al-Haqīqah would 
continue to be published in Arabic, Persian and Turkish but would drop the Urdu 
and be aimed primarily at the Middle East.85 
The need to reorganise the production of al-Haqīqah was driven by the India 
Office’s  reluctance to continue assisting with the financing of the papers.  Until 
mid-1917 most copies were distributed free of charge via a variety of channels 
although some were sold commercially.  The consensus had become that giving 
them away was not only expensive but devalued the publications because the 
‘Oriental mind’ disregarded anything it did not have to pay for and because it 
created suspicion as  to their purpose.  In the words of Gilbert Clayton, Cairo’s 
influential Director of Intelligence:
The Egyptian does not understand that it  is possible to give away something for 
nothing.  On the other hand, if the paper is bought  and sold like any other, even 
though it be at a very low price, the more ignorant  will not  realise that  the British 
Authorities have any close connection with it.86
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In India, the government’s  commercial distributor, Messrs. Wheeler and Co., 
asked ‘What on earth is the good of this free distribution to anybody?  The public 
simply treat the whole thing with contempt’.87   Long believed ‘it was  essential 
that propaganda should be continued in India, and [thought it was] far more 
effective in pictorial, than in any other form’.88  Wheelers convinced him that if 
they were sold rather than given away they would be held in much greater esteem 
and hence would be more successful as propaganda.  Accordingly, Long 
proposed that Wellington House assume the costs of funding the papers and sell 
them predominantly through commercial channels in exchange for a significant 
share of the proceeds.  This would reduce expenditure and, hopefully, increase 
their perceived value in India.  The India Office had no objections to the 
provision of propaganda, only with paying for it, and therefore sought to ‘clinch 
this  arrangement’ as  soon as  they could.89   In fact, the revised scheme proved 
both successful and profitable.90
Wellington House continued to take a flexible and innovative approach towards 
the distribution of the papers, always seeking to allay suspicions regarding their 
origins.  In October 1917, for example, Wheelers  drew Long’s attention to an 
inordinately large request for 100,000 copies  of al-Haqīqah in Afghanistan and 
cautioned that it may have been the work of enemy agents seeking to remove the 
paper from circulation.91   It then transpired that the increased demand was 
because waste paper was more expensive in Afghanistan than al-Haqīqah and so 
the paper was being bought as the former (waste paper cost 25-30 rupees a 
maund, whereas al-Haqīqah cost about 16).92   The initial response was one of 
113
87 Comments of Lisle Wheeler contained in a letter from Long to Shuckburgh, 1 June 1917, BL IO L/PS/
10/581/190.
88 Long to Shuckburgh, 12 April 1917, BL IO L/PS/10/581/217.
89 Minute by Shuckburgh, 12 May 1917, BL IO L/PS/10/581/197.
90 Report by E.E.Long on propaganda in India, 22 October 1920, BL IO L/PS/10/12.
91 Rudge to Long, 29 October 1917, BL IO L/PS/10/581/154.
92 Viceroy to IO, 17 December 1917, BL IO L/PS/10/581/117.
outrage until it became evident that the paper was not being pulped but was being 
used to package goods, in other words, it could still be read.  This, of course, was 
a very effective means of distribution, bearing no official stamp and incurring no 
official cost, whilst insinuating the paper from Afghanistan into Central Asia, 
remoter Afghanistan and northern Persia.  As Lisle Wheeler put it, ‘I can 
certainly imagine [the ‘native’] spend[ing] a considerable portion of his time 
when packing and unpacking the goods wrapped in copies of Al Haqiqat by 
reading contents’.93   ‘Gad – it is a splendid scheme,’ he wrote jubilantly in 
another letter,  ‘and I’m jolly glad Wellington House has tumbled to it  .... [S]hort 
of dropping these papers into Afghanistan and Persia by means of aeroplanes, 
nothing better ... could be adopted’.94   Unsurprisingly, the extra 100,000 copies 
were sent after all!95
In their reports of 1917 Robert Donald and his fellow newspaper men completely 
discarded the value of the ‘Oriental papers’.  Arthur Spurgeon, Donald’s 
assistant, who produced a report for him in December 1917 on the operation of 
Wellington House, made no mention of its work on the Muslim world apart from 
a reference to the ‘very heavy cost’ of the illustrated papers which he suggested 
should be ‘dispensed with’ (presumably for that reason).96   With a monthly 
circulation of approximately 50,000 copies each,97  these papers certainly 
represented a significant outlay, however, Charles Masterman took great 
umbrage to Spurgeon’s dismissal of Wellington House’s  work on these papers 
and his response warrants quoting at length:
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He [Spurgeon] made no kind of inquiry in regard to these papers.  He never 
interviewed the editor of Oriental publications [Long].  He expressed no desire for 
evidence as to why they were started, who was supporting them, how and where 
they circulated, what  was, if any, the demand from the East  for them, whether they 
were welcomed by those who were supporting British prestige, or what  German 
propaganda they were supposed to counteract  and how far they had been successful 
in the work.  Criticism under such conditions is worthless.  These papers have been 
requested by, or issued with the approval of, the Foreign Office, the Colonial 
Office, the War Office, and the India Office.  No inquiry was made of any of these. 
I could have furnished him, if he had asked for it, with evidence of the great 
demand for such work in order to maintain British prestige in the East  both now 
and after the war.  I could have provided samples of the German propaganda papers 
which, in the opinion of critics, were turning the minds of native populations away 
from the British Empire and towards Germany.  I could have furnished expressions 
of approval and requests for development from Colonial Governments, 
Ambassadors, Consuls, local propaganda committees, and an enormous volume of 
testimony and appreciation as to the influence of these papers upon the Eastern 
mind.  I could have shown him one paper selling widely in India, another started 
and maintained at the express desire of the Government  of the Malay States, a third 
scattered by aeroplanes over the Turkish lines, others penetrating into Morocco, 
Central Africa, Afghanistan, Western Turkestan, with testimonials as to their value 
and their influence in these remote regions.  These facts should have been 
examined before any such verdict was pronounced.98
Masterman’s comments illuminate the rationale behind the papers as well as  his 
opinion on their effectiveness.  They were produced to enhance British prestige 
and counter German propaganda, not only within the Empire but throughout the 
Muslim world.  That they achieved this  target was evident, according to 
Masterman, from the ongoing demand for more and the fact that widespread 
dissent in the East had not been forthcoming.  The fact that Donald and Spurgeon 
attributed no value to them may have been due to their ignorance of certain 
political objectives or their preoccupation with other vehicles for propaganda.  It 
was certainly not because prestige had ceased to be a vital concern to Whitehall 
as, despite Donald’s dismissal, al-Haqīqah continued to be viewed as an 
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important part of Wellington House’s  output; so much so that whereas a number 
of the other illustrated papers, such as America Latina, O Espelho and Hesperia, 
were cut in June 1918, and War Pictorial was  much reduced, al-Haqīqah 
continued to be produced even after the war had ended.99
Of all Wellington House’s publications these magazines  arguably best represent 
the way in which the work of the propagandists  did extend beyond the dry and 
scholarly pamphlet towards material for the masses.  If the aim of the Ministry 
from March 1918 was to reach ‘the hearts  of the duskiest aborigines and the 
smallest school-children’ then al-Haqīqah, in its  effort to reach the illiterate 
Muslim populations of the furthest reaches of the globe, was ahead of the 
curve.100  Its photographs and simple captions were already telling the messages 
that Northcliffe and Donald subsequently sought to convey with all the power of 
the press.  The Empire was winning the war, it was a force for good, and it 
championed the interests of the oppressed and benighted.
2.3 The Turks in Wellington House Pamphlets and Books
In Chapter One it was argued that Wellington House reserved its vitriol for the 
Germans and took a relatively benign stance towards the Turks.  As Cook put it 
in 1914, ‘The Turkish Empire had been bound to Great Britain, as His  Majesty 
King George recently reminded the Sultan, “by a friendship of more than a 
century”’.101   The maintenance of amicable relations  was viewed by many, 
including Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary from 1905 to 1916, as  an essential 
aspect of British foreign policy, although others  disagreed.  Lord Cromer argued 
that Britain could not be expected to support the Ottomans simply because they 
were Muslims even though this  might alienate Muslims in India.  Indians had to 
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understand that Turkey had brought about her own downfall by consistently 
rejecting the well-intentioned advice of Britain.102    As Cromer’s  comments 
reveal, the proffered friendship was one caveated by a strong streak of 
paternalism.  The Ottoman Empire was perceived as weak and easily led, 
requiring strong Western leadership.  
Europeans found ‘Oriental’ government inferior to their own and there were, of 
course, many who also believed Oriental races  similarly inadequate.  However, 
Eastern civilisation was perceived in some quarters as more wholesome than 
Western.  One was ‘bound to like’ the average Anatolian peasant for his ‘courage 
and his  simplicity, and his blind fidelity and his loyalty’.103  It was possible even 
to feel an affinity with the Turks; after all ‘the vices of the worst Moslem ruffian 
[were] at least those of a conquering race’.104   For Turcophiles, the corrupting 
influence was perceived as being European greed and viciousness. 
Contemporary use of the term ‘Levantine’ illustrates the point.  Originally it had 
been used to describe Europeans living in the Levant but it came to mean a 
derogatory term for anyone born in the Levant and not a Muslim.   Levantines 
were perceived as  immoral traders who exploited any situation to make a profit. 
Accordingly, the hypothetical Levantine, after the fall of Khartoum in 1885, 
‘calmly awaited the coming of the Mahdi at Khartoum, sure, sooner or later, to 
spoil the spoiler’.105  Whereas Muslims and Islam were frequently viewed with 
respect, the term Levantine ‘became a symbol of a moral and intellectual 
condition, carrying with it an almost theological odium’.106   Such degenerate 
Western influences  were blamed for the shortcomings of the Young Turk 
administration.  As T.E. Lawrence put it, 
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The shallow and half-polished Committee of the Young Turks were descendants of 
Greeks, Albanians, Circassians, Bulgars, Armenians, Jews – anything but  Seljuks 
or Ottomans.  The commons ceased to feel in tune with their governors, whose 
culture was Levantine, and whose political theory was French.107  
Writing in 1904, Rudyard Kipling opined that, provided they were 
‘uncontaminated’, the Turks were ‘at least as  good as many Christian gentlemen 
that one knows’.108   The idea of the negative effects  of cultural or racial 
‘contamination’ may have reflected the domestic concerns of Britain’s elite as  the 
status  quo was  challenged by a rising, enfranchised, middle class, women’s 
suffrage and the encroachment of foreign elements on their territory.  Dilution of 
stock was  a threat not only to the aristocracy seeking to retain its position in the 
face of the uncertainties of a changing society and to Anglo-Saxon martial 
material, it also challenged Britain’s  imperial entitlement.  Any kind of 
miscegenation or contamination had the potential to undermine the separateness, 
and hence the innate superiority, that underscored British entitlement to control 
other races.109
Whilst it was  acceptable to admire Turkish purity, piety and chivalry between 
1914 and 1916, and indeed this accorded with efforts  not to offend the Empire’s 
Muslim population, from the onset of the Lloyd George administration tolerant 
attitudes towards  the Ottomans, or more specifically the Turks, could no longer 
be left unchecked.  The Foreign Office had come to the view that Britain’s 
commercial and political interests were no longer best protected by the 
preservation of the Ottoman Empire and now sought the ejection of Turkey from 
Europe altogether and the securing of European control over Constantinople, the 
Bosphorous and Dardanelles.110   Not only were the Turks to be ejected from 
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Europe but their empire was to be dismantled as  Lloyd George saw a British 
presence in the Middle East as vital to the future of the Empire.  Simultaneously, 
the government was being advised that opinion in the United States had turned 
against the Ottoman Empire, for example, at the end of December, Sir Cecil 
Spring-Rice (British Ambassador to Washington) informed the Foreign Office 
that ‘public opinion is extremely hostile to Turkey ... There is great interest in 
Palestine and Syria ...’.111  Wilson’s enquiry to the belligerents of 20 December 
1916, in which he asked them to state their peace terms, proved to be the catalyst 
for Britain to crystallise and articulate her new position on the Ottoman Empire, 
and thereafter it provided a frame of reference as is  evident from a number of 
pamphlets that refer to it explicitly.112   
The response to Wilson described the Ottoman State as ‘radically alien to 
Western Civilisations’ and its methods of government as a ‘murderous 
tyranny’.113   Thereafter it was  incumbent upon Wellington House to take a 
consistent line and seek to ensure the Turks  were perceived unequivocally as the 
enemy.  One of the earliest pamphlets of 1917 took up the task with verve and 
was distributed extensively.114  Taken from an article published in The Times on 
20 February 1917, by an anonymous author who was nevertheless stated as  being 
‘a distinguished authority on Oriental affairs’ with ‘exceptional experience of the 
ways of the Turk’, the pamphlet was entitled The Clean Fighting Turk: A 
Spurious Claim, Apt Pupils of Prussianism.  It began by listing Turkish crimes 
which were described as ‘the most devilish policy that even this  war has seen’ 
and included the massacre of Armenians, famine in Lebanon, exploitation of the 
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Muslims of Syria and of Jewish colonists, and abuse of British prisoners of 
war.115   The purpose of the article was then stated to be to understand why, 
against a backdrop of such atrocities, some writers  believed in the 
‘sportsmanship and chivalry of the Turks’ which was described as a ‘favourite 
theme of some writers’.116  The Turks had hoodwinked the West, explained the 
author, into believing them to be fine and upstanding whereas the reality was that 
the Turk was amoral and hypocritical: 
His spurious reputation as a clean fighter he is glad enough to keep as a war asset. 
In defeat he knows the noble pose, just as in massacre he knows how to shuffle 
responsibility; when it is worth while he can assume the airs of a good fellow.  He 
will give a truce to bury the dead just as readily as he will set fire to an Armenian 
prison, and spare a bandage for a wounded English prisoner left behind in a retreat 
just as deliberately as he will stick a knife into a pregnant Christian woman.117
Whilst these characteristics applied to all Turks, the Young Turk administration 
was especially odious because it had adopted the worst traits  of German Kultur. 
Echoing earlier pamphlets  on the barbarism of the Hun, the author claimed that 
embracing German Kultur had taken the Ottoman Empire ‘back to the forest, 
back to the tent, back to the palaeolithic state of mind’.118  The Turks were also to 
be differentiated from other Muslims  in the Empire.  Whereas the Turks  were 
little different from their ‘plundering Turanian ancestors’ they had absorbed a 
degree of intellectual sophistication from the Islamic peoples they had 
conquered.  ‘Persians made it possible for Turks to express, if not understand, 
abstract ideas, Arabs influenced Turks with the thought of a Creator who was 
something more than a tribal mumbo-jumbo’.119  Whilst the Turks had benefited 
from other Muslim cultures they had done nothing to nurture the peoples  they 
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had conquered and the author claimed that one of the aims of the Young Turk 
administration was to ensure the ‘Arabs are ... robbed of tongue and leading’.120
The author of this pamphlet was Sir Mark Sykes who had written The Times 
article as  part of an official effort to undermine the Turks and quash the legend of 
the ‘clean fighting Turk’ whilst simultaneously bolstering the reputation of the 
Arabs.  In January Sykes had penned a confidential report in which he explained 
that portraying the Turks as ‘good, honest, fond of children’ and the Arabs as 
‘bad, black-hearted, rogue [sic.]’ was  counterproductive just as ‘if on the Western 
front every fault of the French or Belgian peasants was magnified, and the 
courage, discipline, and resistance of the Germans was extolled, the situation 
would not be improved’.121  A change in tack was also necessary to ensure the 
US could not view the British as inconsistent and hypocritical: a benevolent 
approach to the Turks ran contrary to their expression of ‘horror and indignation 
[at the] Turkish treatment of Armenians and Arabs’.122  Accordingly, henceforth 
efforts  were to be made to ensure the press depicted the Turks in a similar light to 
the Germans.  In contrast, the Arabs were to be distinguished from their 
overlords and portrayed favorably.  
Sykes’s  report gave examples of the kind of press  comment that was to be 
avoided.  Attributed to G. Ward Price, the Daily Mail’s correspondent at 
Salonika, the article stated, ‘Here [Salonika] as in Gallipoli our men have formed 
a high opinion of the sportsmanlike qualities of the Turks as a soldier.  Their 
treatment of any wounded who fall into their hands after an encounter seems to 
be as good as their more primitive organisation permits’.123  Sykes also offered 
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an example of the anti-Arab comment that was no longer acceptable.  Again, in 
the Daily Mail, Edmund Chandler was reported to have written of the Marsh 
Arabs on 19 January, as follows: ‘The ‘mashoof’ [a type of canoe manoeuvred 
using a pole] is dear to the heart of that enemy of all men the Marsh Arab ... As 
no one trusts  the Marsh Arab, and those not born in ‘mashoofs’ cannot keep them 
from capsizing its value for transport is nil’.124   Elsewhere, Stephen Gaselee of 
the Foreign Office’s News Desk blamed ‘the illusion of the “Clean Fighting 
Turk”’ on ‘careless and exaggerated stories  brought home from Gallipoli, and by 
foolish praise of Turkish treatment of General Townsend’.125  
Sykes’s  report stated that current public perceptions were contrary to ‘fact and 
policy’ and it was on the back of his  observations that Hubert Montgomery of the 
Foreign Office wrote to Gowers at Wellington House instructing him to 
implement appropriate propaganda regarding the reputation of the Turk as a 
‘clean fighter’.126   The newness of this approach is reflected in Gowers’ 
confusion on receiving Montgomery’s letter. ‘I do not quite understand the 
suggestion of getting out something on “The Turk as  a Clean Fighter,”’ he 
replied.
Is it  meant to show that the Turk is a clean fighter, or that  he is not  a clean fighter? 
The obvious meaning is the former, but if this is so, how can we reconcile such an 
attitude with our efforts to hold him up to execration as the murderer of the 
Armenian nation, and with our official declaration that he is altogether so 
loathsome that he has got to be kicked out of Europe?127  
Lloyd George himself clarified the new policy in a memo to Buchan dated 24 
February 1917.  ‘When you take in hand the question of Allied and Neutral 
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propaganda, I am anxious you should pay special attention to the futility and 
iniquity of the Turk,’ he instructed.  ‘His  incapacity for good Government; his 
mis-rule, and above all, his  massacres of all the industrious  populations’ were to 
be emphasised, as was that fact that far from being a homogenous  land, the 
Ottoman Empire was made up of disparate peoples.128   This was a propaganda 
campaign for allied and neutral nations, not the oppressed peoples of the Turkish 
Empire.  It anticipated the carve up of the Empire and the positioning of Britain 
in relation thereto.  
Ironically, Sykes, who was undoubtedly a key player in the institution of the new 
propaganda policy, was also an ‘Eastern expert’ guilty in the past of perpetuating 
the very impression of the Turks that he and the government now sought to 
dispel.  In Dar-ul-Islam, published in  1904, he had expounded at length on the 
negative impact of the West on Eastern tradition and had praised Ottoman 
imperialism.129   For example, he claimed that Syria was in a ‘wonderfully 
flourishing condition’ which he argued proved wrong those who believed the 
Turks were nothing more than ‘greedy Pashas and incompetent officials’.130 
Although he respected desert Arabs, those who had corrupted themselves by 
living in towns warranted the deepest repugnance, hence the Arabs of Mosul 
were ‘one of the most deplorable pictures one can see in the East’ and the Turks 
were ‘their immeasurable superiors’.131   Sykes’ bigotry was not limited to Arabs. 
Writing elsewhere, he described the Armenians as an ‘abominable race’ whom, 
he claimed, inspire even the most unprejudiced to feelings  of ‘contempt and 
hatred’:
His cowardice, his senseless untruthfulness, the depth of his intrigue, even in the 
most trivial matters, his habit  of hoarding, his lack of one manly virtue, his 
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helplessness in danger, his natural and instinctive treachery, together form so vile a 
character that pity is stifled and judgment unbalanced .... Even Jews have their 
good points but Armenians have none ...132
Sykes’s  volte face from Turcophile to champion of the Arabs, Armenians and 
Jews, provides  a suitable illustration of the cynical manipulation of information 
for public consumption to further political ends.  It also reveals the ease with 
which the stereotypes applied to one non-Western culture could be applied to 
another.  Depending on prevailing policy, the Arabs, Turks, even the Armenians 
were effectively interchangeable as an Eastern ‘other’ against whom Britons 
could compare themselves: each and any of them could display attributes of 
duplicity, debauchery, cowardice, avarice and cruelty as the need arose.
Sykes’s  article kickstarted the campaign but Buchan understood what was 
required and a number of pamphlets  and books were produced in 1917 and 1918 
reinforcing and elaborating upon the position set out by Sykes.  As will be seen, 
these pamphlets are wartime propaganda but they are also, emphatically, imperial 
texts in which the ‘colonial gaze’, as postcolonial theorists  sometimes call it, is 
cast upon Ottoman Asia.  The writers  ‘know’ the East, and they ‘know’ Muslims. 
They have investigated, scrutinised and classified and, in so doing, established 
their authority, their entitlement to opine and to pass judgment on the future of 
the Ottoman peoples.  
The stated aim of The Ottoman Domination was to introduce, to those unfamiliar 
with it, the history of the Ottoman Empire.  The anonymous author asserted that 
it was an empire based on military domination and exploitation and that was why 
the Allies sought its dissolution.  Unlike empires based on co-operation and 
tolerance, the Ottomans had failed to nurture their subject peoples:
A good Government would have arrested dissolution by making life worth living 
for the subject  peoples within the Ottoman frontiers, and so giving them a positive 
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interest in the preservation of the Ottoman State.  It  would have granted fuller self-
government to the “millets” [different communities within the Empire], more 
unrestricted freedom to the islanders and bedouin and mountaineers.  It would have 
enlisted the warlike qualities of the Albanians, the seamanship of the Greeks, the 
horsemanship of the Arabs, the business ability of the Syrians, Armenians and 
Jews, the industry of the Bulgarian and Anatolian peasantry, and would have drawn 
all these elements together into a national State.133
Far from encouraging the attributes particular to different peoples  within the 
Empire, the Young Turks had sought to ‘Ottomanise’ the Empire or destroy those 
whom it could not.  Novelist, E.F. Benson, son of an Archbishop of Canterbury, 
declared in Crescent and Iron Cross that it was no surprise that the Germans 
found an ally in the Turks, a power that ‘adopted the same methods of absorption 
and extermination centuries before the Hohenzollerns ever started on their career 
of highway robbery’.134   It was a ‘cancerous and devouring nation’.135 
Unsurprisingly, Arnold Toynbee went even further in The Murderous Tyranny of 
the Turks and denounced Turkey as a ‘Vampire-State’ that ‘literally drained its 
victims’.136  
In Turkey: A Past and a Future, the anonymous author elegantly expounded on 
the different cultures and civilisations that the territories now claimed by the 
Empire had born witness  to in the past but which under Turkish administration 
had been left to decay.  ‘Turkey, the Ottoman State, is  not a unity, climatic, 
geographical, racial or economic; it is a pretension, enforced by bloodshed and 
violence whenever and wherever the Osmanli government has  power’.137  Such 
assertions accorded precisely with Lloyd George’s instructions, reinforcing the 
claim that rather than seeking the dismantlement of an integrated body the Allies 
simply sought liberation for the Empire’s subject peoples as one ‘cannot 
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dismember limbs that never belonged to the real trunk’.138  Similarly, a number 
of the pamphlets emphasised that only forty per cent of the Empire were actually 
Turkish (around eight million out of a total population of around twenty million). 
Of the rest, seven million were Arabs, two million were Armenians (or were 
before the massacres) and the remainder were made up of mountain people such 
as the Kurds, Druses, Maronites and Nestorians.139
  
Canon Parfit ventured from the macro to the micro in Mesopotamia: The Key to 
the Future where he evocatively described the desolation wrought by the 
Ottomans in his  parish along the banks of the Tigris  where ‘most of the children 
were brilliantly clad in nothing more than olive oil and a smile’.140   Due to 
neglect of the river banks there was a profusion of bugs and frogs.  ‘[The frogs] 
literally swarmed by the million in the swamps and pools.  They were possessed 
of an astonishing variety of voices, so that you could hear their squeaking, 
squealing, singing, and croaking long before you came in sight of the reeds or 
could smell the odours of their watery home’.141   According to Parfit, Turkish 
officials exploited the flooding of the river and encouraged the neglect and 
mismanagement of the region.  He illustrated his point by explaining how, in 
pilgrimage season, the Turks  would flood the pilgrim road by breaching the river 
banks and then charge exorbitant taxes to finance a pontoon bridge.  If pilgrims 
were looted by robbers on the way to the bridge the Turkish officials would share 
the proceeds.142  
The Ottoman provinces would fare much better, claimed a number of Wellington 
House’s publications, including Parfit’s, under the guiding hand of a ‘protecting’ 
Allied power.  Hinting at the terms of the Inter-Allied (Sykes-Picot) Agreement 
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in relation to the Middle East, some of the pamphlets identified who the 
appropriate protecting power would be: Armenia would be Russia’s, Syria and 
Palestine would be under French protection, England would take Mesopotamia 
because only England could restore the region to its  former glory before the 
Turks rendered the territory which had once been so abundant into ‘parched and 
weary lands’.143  They had the resources, especially manpower, which would be 
supplied from Egypt and India, to restore Mesopotamia.  
As in the Syria pamphlet of 1916, the later pamphlets continued to condemn the 
CUP as ‘a set of clever knaves  who, having seized the government, seemed to 
have no interest in anything but political adventures at Constantinople or their 
personal advantage’.144   The disingenuous use of religion to support their war 
effort and their attempts to ‘ottomanise’ the Empire meant that the Turks could 
no longer claim leadership of the world’s Muslim population.  ‘They forfeited the 
Caliphate when they proclaimed the Holy War against the Allied Powers  – 
inciting Moslems to join one Christian coalition against another, not in defence 
of their religion, but for Ottoman political aggrandisement’.145  Turkish failure to 
incite a global jihad was  ascribed not just to the fact that Muslims in the British 
Empire appeared to prefer British rule, but also because they themselves 
deployed the call to Holy War without ever authentically believing in it.  Their 
true political ideal was a nationalist one, which Harry Stuermer (a German 
journalist and Entente sympathiser) called ‘race-fanaticism’ – a policy which 
alienated all the other races  in their Empire, not just the Armenians.146   In 
Stuermer’s opinion: 
In little-informed circles in Europe people are still under the false impression that 
the Young Turks of to-day, the intellectual and political leaders of Turkey in this 
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war, are authentic, zealous, and even fanatical Mohammedans, and superficial 
observers explain all unpleasant occurrences and outbreaks of Young Turkish 
jingoism on Pan-Islamic ground, especially as Turkey has not been slow in 
proclaiming her “Holy War.”  But this conception is entirely wrong ... The truth is 
that the present political regime is the complete denial of the Pan-Islamic idea and 
the substitution of the Pan-Turkish idea of race.147
Stuermer may have benefited from an in-depth paper commissioned by the 
Department of Information from Arnold Toynbee (who, on the back of his work 
with Bryce, appears to have become one of Wellington House’s ‘go to’ 
authorities on Turkey).  The paper was extremely scholarly, even by Wellington 
House’s standards, and Buchan decided it would be better used as background for 
propagandist material rather than circulated as propaganda in its own right.  Pan-
Turanianism was a reaction to Turkish failures  in the Balkans, argued Toynbee, 
and the consequent abandonment of the ‘tradition of being a dominant race in 
Europe’ in favour of the development of its own ‘latent possibilities in 
Anatolia’.148   Unable to rely on this movement outside of Anatolia, the CUP 
hypocritically exploited Pan-Islamism.  Toynbee drew attention to the 
propagandist potential of the ideological conflict between Pan-Turanianism and 
Pan-Islam for the Allies in terms of the anti-Islamic and anti-Arab elements of 
the former, enabling writers such as Stuermer to pick up these themes in a more 
accessible form than Toynbee’s writing.149  
Whilst the focus was undoubtedly upon Turkey’s poor record as an imperial 
power and on the recent shortcomings of the Unionists, the pamphlets  that 
followed Sykes’s also found opportunities to identify other Turkish failings.  The 
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Turks were written off as stolid and unintellectual, ‘brave but stupid’.150 
According to Dr Niepage, a German who taught in Aleppo, ‘[w]e teachers, who 
have been teaching Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, Turks, and Jews in German 
schools in Turkey for years, can only declare that the pure Turks are the most 
unwilling and incapable of all our pupils’.151   Echoing Hamilton’s  dismissal of 
the Turks on racial and ideological grounds (see Chapter One), Stuermer 
considered the ‘value of the human material sacrificed’ at Gallipoli by 
contrasting the dead Anatolians, ‘accustomed to dirt and misery’, with those 
‘cultured and highly civilised men ... [fighting] for the cause of civilisation’.152 
Frequently, Turkish military virtues continued to be ascribed solely to German 
influence.  Accordingly, they only ‘staved off their extinction by becoming ready 
pupils  of those who have surpassed them in the military art’.153   After the war 
Turkey would not pose a threat because she would be surrounded by allied 
nations and, in any event, by nature the peasantry of Anatolia were ‘quiet, rather 
indolent folk’.154 
Despite Wellington House’s best efforts, the idea of the ‘clean fighting Turk’ 
never disappeared and a concurrent opinion remained that favoured them for 
their bravery, resilience, chivalry and piety.  Stuermer, who had been present at 
Gallipoli, observed how he:
got to know the Turkish soldier with his stoical heroism in defence, and the 
brilliant  attacking powers and courage of the Anatolians with their blind belief in 
their Padishah, as they were rushed to the defence of Stamboul and hurled 
themselves in a bayonet  charge against the British machine-guns under a hail of 
shells from the sea.  I gained a high opinion of Turkish valour and powers of 
resistance.  I had no reason to stint my praise or withhold my judgment.  In mess-
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tents and at various observation-posts I made the personal acquaintance of crowds 
of thoroughly sympathetic and likeable Turkish officers.155 
Whilst not perceived as having the efficiency or technological sophistication of 
the Germans they showed a ‘“sportsmanlike” spirit’ worthy of respect.156 
Similarly, the Turks were capable of showing more compassion to their prisoners 
than were the Germans: ‘the Turk, when he does take prisoners, treats them 
kindly and chivalrously; but he takes few prisoners, for he knows only too well 
how to wield his bayonet in those murderous charges he makes’.157  
Together with these conflicting notions  there remained an enduring fear of 
Islamic fanaticism, a spectre that cut across all Muslim races and continued to 
appear in a variety of guises.  For example, in Crescent and Iron Cross, Benson 
blamed the Armenian massacres on religious fanaticism despite the fact that the 
standard Wellington House approach was to blame it on CUP policy. 
Accordingly, he wrote, ‘Moslem fanaticism, ever smouldering and ready to burst 
into flames, blazed high, and a fury of massacres broke forth against all 
Armenians, east and west, north and south’.158  In Mesopotamia: The Key to the 
Future, Canon Parfit claimed that over the course of history ‘untold atrocities 
have been committed in the name of the Prophet, and vast civilisations in 
Europe, North Africa, India, and the Near East have been laid desolate at 
different times  by Moslem fanaticism’.159    In German Plots and British 
Triumphs in the Bible Lands, Parfit describes Islam as being ‘a religion that has 
always fostered a fanatical hatred of Christianity’.160   In the preface to The 
Murderous Tyranny of the Turks, Viscount Bryce conceded that the ‘Muslim 
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fanaticism’.161   It would seem that underlying efforts  to distinguish the barbaric 
Turks from other Muslims, and to indicate only respect for the Islamic faith, 
there remained a deeply entrenched fear and mistrust of Islamic fanaticism and 
its potential effect on Christianity and the Empire.  As Eugene Rogan comments, 
in the context of his study of military events in the Middle East during the war, 
there is an irony in the fact that whilst colonial Muslims remained largely 
unreceptive to the Turkish call for jihad, the British lived in fear of Islamic 
fanaticism, illustrating that they, rather than the world’s Muslim population, were 
the responsive ones.162
Finally, it is  worth reiterating here that al-Haqīqah was, and remained, the only 
substantive propagandist vehicle produced by Wellington House targeting 
Muslims including, to a limited extent, Turks.  Writing in February 1918, 
Toynbee asserted that he believed ‘Wellington House has done no propaganda in 
Turkey hitherto’.163   This  omission was revisited in the spring of 1918 and 
Toynbee and Gowers produced notes suggesting possible propaganda aimed 
directly at Turkey.  They considered the most effective means would be to 
condemn Germany and expound on how it was  to blame for Turkish woes, 
suggesting instead, of course, that the Entente powers would have been better 
friends and could be again in the future.  In Toynbee’s  opinion it was ‘no use 
criticising Pan-Turanianism or commending King Hussein’ and ‘attacks on 
Germany have much more chance than attacks on the CUP’.164   He suggested 
that E.F. Benson produce something ‘in the style of his “Crescent and Iron 
Cross”’.165   Gowers, whose note concerned propaganda among the ‘lower 
classes’, employed an al-Haqīqah style vernacular when he suggested something 
along the following lines:
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How much longer, O foolish Turks, are you going to continue being deceived by 
these wily Germans, whose only object  is to exploit  your country and make 
themselves rich by developing it?  Do you think that  they will let  you have any of 
your own riches?  Of course not – it is all for themselves.166
The India Office were unconvinced, Shuckburgh remarking that ‘whether any 
propaganda in Turkey wd. be likely to have much practical effect is  a point on 
which the Dept. feels doubtful’.167   There is no indication in the Schedule of 
Literature that Benson or anyone else did produce any such work.
2.4 Armenia and Other Turkish Atrocities
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Blue Book was completed in November 
1916.  It was released with considerably less fanfare than the White Book of the 
previous year, in which German atrocities against the French and Belgians had 
been recounted.  In contrast to the White Book which was published in eleven 
different languages, it was only produced in English and only around four 
thousand five hundred copies  were distributed to the United States.168  Although 
its testimony was extensive, and graphic, exhausting the reader with its 
‘repetitious instances  of brutality and bloodshed’, Toynbee and Bryce had 
endeavored to present the evidence without any ‘spin’.169   By 1917, however, 
once the new coalition’s position on the Ottoman Empire’s  future had become 
unequivocal, the nature of Armenian-related propaganda became more 
vituperative.   In the Preface to The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks, Viscount 
Bryce started with the premise, much expressed in Wellington House’s later 
pamphlets, that ‘the Turk was  hopelessly unfit to govern, with any approach to 
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justice, subject races of a different religion’.170   In fact, wrote Bryce, ‘the Turk 
has never been of any use for any purpose except fighting’.171   Whereas in 
Autumn 1915 Bryce had attributed the massacres to ‘the gang of unscrupulous 
adventurers  who are now in possession of the Government of the Turkish 
Empire’ and claimed they were carried out for purely political reasons and 
without the approval of the Turkish population, by 1917 Bryce was ready to 
condemn the entire Turkish race.172  In the body of the pamphlet Toynbee sought 
to explain why the stated Allied War Aims of 11 January 1917, in so far as they 
related to Turkey, were apt.  In considering what was meant by the Turks’ 
‘murderous tyranny’, he used the material he had gathered for the Blue Book to 
describe in more emotive detail the 1915 atrocities and claimed that two-thirds  of 
the Armenian population had been killed.  The remaining third had survived by 
either converting to Islam or fleeing to Russia.  For women, conversion meant a 
‘living death of marriage to a Turk and inclusion in his harem’.173  Details  were 
given of the suffering encountered by the Armenians on forced marches and in 
the inhospitable regions to which they were deported.  Very brief mention was 
also made of the same campaign of extermination being waged by the Turks 
against the Nestorian Christians on the Persian frontier and also against the Arabs 
of Syria.
Like Toynbee’s  1915 pamphlet, there is no trace of the bigoted attitudes towards 
Armenians evident in much pre-war writing.  They were a ‘peaceful and 
progressive nation’ within a nest of vipers for the purposes of Wellington House’s 
propaganda or else they were described as fellow Christians.174   Conscious 
efforts  were made to draw out physical similarities  with Europeans, for example, 
by drawing attention to fair-complexioned Armenians, in order to elicit sympathy 
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and compassion for their fate and to distinguish them from the Turks.  One 
pamphlet described an Armenian child whom the author and his companions 
found abandoned in a wasteland, as having ‘a fair complexion, blue eyes, and 
golden hair’.175  On another occasion, the same writer witnessed:
one of the servants of the khân carrying a little infant with hair as yellow as gold, 
who he threw behind the house.  We asked him about  it, and he said that there were 
three sick Armenian women in the house, who had lagged behind their 
companions, that  one of them had given birth to this infant, but could not  nourish 
it, owing to her illness.  So it had died and been thrown out, as one might  throw out 
a mouse.176
Accounts of gross abuse and torture were endless  in the later pamphlets.  In 
Chapter Three of Crescent and Iron Cross, Benson described some of the sexual 
atrocities  committed by Muslims against Armenians.  Notably, he did not 
attribute responsibility solely to the Turks but allowed for the committal of 
similar atrocities by the Kurds whom he did not hesitate to point out were fellow 
Muslims guilty of similar ‘horror and cruelty and bestial lust’.177  He wrote, ‘in 
certain villages [around Mush] the girls  and young women were given to the 
Kurd soldiery, who raped them publicly in the presence of their families, not 
sparing girls of eight and ten years of age, who then, bleeding and violated, were 
shot in company with the old women, for whom the Kurds (inspired by Allah, the 
God of Love) had no use’.178   An epistolary account of an Armenian family’s 
misfortunes was provided in From Turkish Toils: The Narrative of an Armenian 
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Family’s Escape by Mrs Esther Mugerditchian.  It contains one of the most 
graphic and grotesque of all the tales of abuse.  Amidst a range of other tortures, 
[Professor Tenekedjian]’s moustache and beard were so pitilessly plucked out that 
when he was shown to [Professor Soghigian] he could not recognise him, 
notwithstanding his friendship of over thirty years.  There was no limit to the 
flogging he endured.  They crushed his hands and feet  in the press, and pulled out 
his nails with pincers; they pierced his face with needles, and put  salt on the 
wounds; they forced him to take eggs out of boiling water and put them under his 
armpits until they cooled.179  
Mugerditchian was explicit in her condemnation of the Germans whom she 
claimed had behaved equally cruelly towards the Armenians.  ‘It was rumoured 
that the German Consul in Erzeroum was the first to kidnap a beautiful Armenian 
girl.  The Germans  behaved everywhere as cruelly as the Turks towards us 
Armenians’.180   
As the war progressed opinions crystallised regarding who was responsible for 
the atrocities.  The commonly held position was that central government in 
Constantinople initiated the policy but the Turks  and Kurds were easily incited to 
carry it out.  Thus, in Turkey: A Past and a Future, the anonymous  author 
claimed ‘the Armenians were not massacred spontaneously by the local 
Moslems; the initiative came entirely from the Central Government at 
Constantinople’.181  As discussed in the previous section, Wellington House was 
generally keen to claim that neither the CUP nor the Turkish population were 
motivated by religion.  Ascribing CUP policy to extreme nationalism or ‘race-
fanaticism’, and dismissing their call for Holy War as cynical exploitation, served 
to downplay the threat of pan-Islamism, but, more importantly, it was a means of 
distinguishing the caliphate, the highest Islamic authority, from secular 
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government in Constantinople thereby undermining CUP prestige and protecting 
the sensibilities of the British Empire’s Muslims.  Indeed, argued El-Ghusein, in 
Martyred Armenia, CUP actions were such that good Muslims should no longer 
consider the Ottoman government as rightful heir to the caliphate.  In committing 
atrocities  against the Armenians, the Unionists had acted in contravention of 
Islamic law and therefore could not claim to be more than a nationalist 
government:
Is it  right that these imposters, who pretend to be the supporters of Islam and the 
Khilâfat, the protectors of the Moslems, should transgress the command of God, 
transgress the Koran, the Traditions of the Prophet, and humanity?  Truly, they 
have committed an act at  which Islam is revolted, as well as all Moslems and all 
the peoples of the earth, be they Moslems, Christians, Jews, or idolaters.182
Whilst policy was dictated by the CUP, the co-operation of the populace was 
blamed less on religious or ethnic hatred than on avarice and depravity.  This 
served to differentiate the perpetrators from ‘good Muslims’ who understood that 
the Armenian atrocities were at odds with the precepts of Islam.183  
Although few viewed the Germans as  having participated directly in either CUP 
policy-making or in committing the atrocities, their acquiescence to CUP policy 
meant that they too were seen as culpable.  Harry Stuermer’s view that ‘the 
German Government was equally responsible with the Turks for the atrocities 
they allowed them to commit’ was generally held.184   Their willingness to 
intervene only when self-interest dictated was seen as evident from their 
approach toward anti-Jewish activities in Palestine.  It was argued that they 
intervened there not for humanitarian reasons but because there were a large 
number of German-speaking Jews in Palestine.  ‘The Jews were potential 
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Armenians were led to torture and death, put up a warning finger, and, for the 
present, saved them’.185 
※
We British are fighting for our Empire.  I do not  speak in the Imperialistic sense 
when I use the word “Empire.”  We are fighting for those free peoples of European 
stock, our Colonies beyond the seas who live in democratic communities, and we 
are fighting so that we may carry democracy, civilisation, and progress into Asia in 
the years to come.186
This extract from Sykes’s August 1917 speech in the House of Commons aptly 
illustrates the way in which Britain attempted to reshape her imperial mission 
during the war, a process reflected in the changing nature of Wellington House’s 
pamphlets and books.  Empire-building was to be dissociated from aggression, 
acquisition and exploitation, which was to be exclusively and emphatically the 
domain of the Central Powers.  Although British writers conceded that ‘at first 
sight’ the British Empire seemed to be ‘the greatest example of that spirit of 
conquest and of military dominion against which we are striving’ it had become 
imperative to convince allies  and neutrals that, on the contrary, British 
imperialism was entirely in tune with the causes for which the Allied Powers 
were allegedly fighting.187   Stemming from her historical antecedent as ‘the 
inventor of political liberty on the scale of the great nation-state’, and her 
avowedly altruistic imperial track record, Britain sought to establish her claim to 
the role of chief proponent of, and stimulant for, the ‘growth of vigorous  free 
communities’.188   Ensuring ‘imperialism’ was understood as an ideology whose 
essence was benevolent, nurturing and self-sacrificing, had become the 
propagandists’ task.  
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The civilisation/barbarian dichotomy of the early years of the war, was given, in 
1917 and 1918, a specifically imperial context.  Both German and Turkish 
imperialism were identified as the antithesis of the causes Britain now espoused. 
Empire, as a positive construction, was recreated as a ‘global cultural system’189: 
a means  of achieving ‘a common freedom, in which every race and nationality 
may participate with complete self respect, playing its  part, according to its  own 
character, in one great world community’.190   In the short-term this offered 
Britain a ‘crucial breathing-space’, the opportunity to retain her territory and 
extend it into the lands of the dismantled Ottoman Empire: the lexicon of 
imperialism had been shaped to accord with that of self-determination and 
nationalism but in reality it provided a smokescreen for more traditional 
aggrandizement.191   Longer term, however, the new vision sowed the seeds for 
the decline of imperial Britain.  The sweepingly universal terms in which Wilson, 
and consequently the other Allied powers, expressed the principles of self-
determination inevitably became powerful tools ‘for undermining the legitimacy 
and therefore the viability of the arrangements of empire’.192
Britain’s changing approach to the Turks in 1917 and 1918 was triggered by the 
need to account to Wilson but also reflected revised objectives in terms of 
military and diplomatic policy as well as confidence in the diminution of the pan-
Islamic threat.  The consequence was greater license for the propagandists to 
criticise the Turks whether on the grounds of their imperial record, their war 
record or otherwise.  What is evident from the publications is that the tendency to 
depict the Turkish population as incompetent, immoral and greedy, and the CUP 
leadership as  cynical and secular, largely overrode their depiction as  fanatical 
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Mohammedans.  Even in the context of the Armenian massacres, Wellington 
House sought to avoid defining the Turks by their religion.  Donald Bloxham 
complains that scholarship on the genocide tends to consign it ‘to the realms of 
murky interplay between barbarous  orientals’.193   What the government’s 
propaganda reveals is  that contemporary writing was more nuanced, not 
necessarily because contemporary observers  possessed a more astute 
understanding of the geopolitical situation, or were less prejudiced, but because 
matters of policy demanded commentary that was more than just a reliance on 
stock caricatures regarding less-civilised Orientals.  Whilst the perceived pan-
Islamic threat had diminished, an underlying fear of Islamic fanaticism remained, 
as did an awareness of the ongoing need to keep the British Empire’s Muslim 
subjects on side.  Both factors demanded sophisticated handling, epitomised, for 
example, in efforts to excise the caliphate from condemnation of the Ottoman 
government, ascription of the Armenian massacres to pan-Turanianism rather 
than pan-Islam, and efforts  to avoid biblical and crusading references in accounts 
of the fall of Jerusalem.  
The maintenance of prestige also remained of paramount concern as evidenced 
by the ongoing support for al-Haqīqah and the other Muslim papers despite 
Robert Donald’s objections.  As well as acting as a recruiting device, they were a 
simple and effective means of conveying not only the might and reach of the 
Empire and its war effort, but also its tolerant and embracing attitude towards 
other peoples  and religions.  Ironically, considering the attitude of Donald and his 
cohort, these papers possibly best represent the means by which Wellington 
House did indeed address the need, so ardently championed by the press barons, 
to provide effective propaganda in pictorial form for the masses.  The emphasis 
on British tolerance and enlightenment in al-Haqīqah was also a common feature 
of books and pamphlets which highlighted, for example, the sensitive treatment 
of Muslim prisoners of war and the respect awarded sacred Islamic sites. 
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However, whilst the British portrayed themselves as the ‘friend’ of Islam, when it 
came to the Ottomans it had become necessary to distinguish the Turks from 
their fellow Muslims, the Arabs.  Depicting the Arabs as an oppressed minority 
awaiting liberation from their tyrannical and impious, even atheistic, Ottoman 
overlords became a cornerstone of Wellington House’s Eastern propaganda as 
Chapter Three will demonstrate.
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Chapter Three – Mark Sykes and Middle Eastern Propaganda
‘It is the day for the man with a “line”.  And the man who has made a speciality of Turkey 
should be in his element at the present moment’.1
In Chapter Two some of the propagandist writing of Sir Mark Sykes was 
analysed and proffered as evidence of the cynical way in which Wellington 
House sought to manipulate public opinion towards the Turks.  It would be easy 
to leave his role at that, to present him as a typical British imperialist who 
cynically exploited the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian atrocities, 
and the war, to further extend the power and reach of the British Empire.  To 
further add to Sykes’s odiousness, it was he who, in 1916, imperiously ‘drew the 
line in the sand’ with which the Middle East was carved up for consumption by 
the Entente Powers, resulting in the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement which is 
still cited as a cause of the region’s current strife, not least in relation to Syria’s 
civil war, and mention of the Agreement continues to meet with anger and 
hostility against the West, and particularly the British and Americans, from the 
region’s Arabs in political centres  such as  Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo.2   In 
this  context too, Sykes is frequently depicted as  an arrogant, overweening 
imperialist, representative of all that was culpable and reprehensible about the 
British imperial project.3  This  chapter will endeavor to illustrate that to dismiss 
Sykes in this way is to miss the many ways  in which his  actions and his writing 
can inform and enlighten on contemporary thinking regarding the East, the 
Empire and British society.  Sykes is uniquely placed in this regard.  Not only 
was he arguably the defining player in determining British policy in the Middle 
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East (a term which gained currency during the war due in part to Sykes himself), 
but more importantly for the purposes of this research, he was also the key figure 
in shaping public perceptions of the region and its people, and Britain’s 
relationship with it.  Indeed, if one accepts that ‘how states see—or don’t see— 
is  ... a matter intricately bound up with cultural history’ Sykes was doubly 
influential, shaping policy not only as government adviser but also through the 
effect on policy makers of the cultural construction of ideas about the Middle 
East.4
Whilst Sykes may not have been the only writer or politician to express  views on 
these subjects, his position as a politician of repute, a baronet with all the social 
connections that entailed, an established writer, and a soldier, gave him unrivaled 
exposure and opportunity.  Engaged by various government departments from 
early 1915 until the end of the war as an expert on the region, his influence, both 
politically and publicly, had official endorsement.  Prolific, and seemingly 
inexhaustible, his output included books, journal and newspaper articles, 
advisory papers  for the government, parliamentary speeches, and a large volume 
of personal letters to important wartime figures.  Most significantly for the 
purposes of this thesis, it was Sykes who galvanised the ‘Eastern propaganda’ 
section of Wellington House into action in 1916 and who, aside from ‘The Clean 
Fighting Turk’ article referred to in Chapter Two, was instrumental in the 
creation of al-Haqīqah and produced or was  involved in the publication of a 
number of other important propaganda pieces.  With a fluent and energetic style, 
he was  adept at picking up the fashionable vernacular of the time and hence his 
output also reflected the broader trends in wartime writing relating to the Empire 
and Islam and identified in the preceding chapters.  
As this chapter will elucidate, Sykes’s influence at a political and diplomatic 
level reached a peak in 1916 and then waned in the final stages of the war.  He 
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became a passionate advocate of the region’s  minority causes, namely Arab and 
Armenian independence, as well as Zionism.  As many of his  contemporaries 
observed, the obsessive, single-mindedness with which he pursued the causes he 
espoused inevitably resulted in a parting of ways with those who viewed the 
problems of the region through a more pragmatic lens.5   However, despite an 
increasing lack of synergy between his personal views and those of the 
government, his voice remained a cogent and powerful vehicle for the 
transmission of official policy for popular consumption until the end of the war.  
All the multifarious forms of Sykes’s writings will be considered, including his 
parliamentary speeches  recorded in Hansard.  Beginning with Sykes’s prewar, 
pro-Turkish stance, this chapter will attempt to offer further insights  into 
Edwardian Britain’s  complex relationship with the East before turning to the war 
years.  As in preceding chapters, the period 1914-18 will be split into two 
sections.  The first concerns the period up to the signing of the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement in May 1916, a period when Sykes’s writing reflected a continued 
lack of animus towards the Ottoman Empire, even as attitudes against its  survival 
were hardening, as  well as an ongoing lack of self-consciousness in relation to 
his bullish, old-school approach towards British imperialism.  In the second 
wartime section Sykes’s  writing reflected the shift in Ottoman-related policy and 
the re-shaping of British imperialism, in line with Wilsonian ideals, whereby 
Britain retained power and influence by becoming a facilitator in the path of the 
region’s oppressed minorities to freedom and self-determination.  In the process, 
it also endeavours, without seeking to exculpate, to put the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement into its cultural context, identifying Sykes less as an immoral 
imperialist, and more as  a protagonist who, in keeping with the times, saw his 
primary responsibility as  furthering British interests, but who soon grasped that 
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the terms of the agreement he had negotiated were out of step with the changing 
imperatives of British imperialism. 
3.1 Sykes Before the War
At first glance Sykes appears an archetypal Establishment figure of the 
Edwardian era.  Educated at public school and Cambridge, he became an MP in 
his early thirties and was heir to a large Yorkshire estate.  There were, however, 
two aspects of his life that set him apart from his peers.  He was a Catholic and 
hence of a minority faith, and as a youth he experienced the stigma and trauma of 
being the son, and only child, of Lady Jessica Sykes, notorious for committing 
adultery, gambling and falling into debt, and a woman who scandalized London 
when she sued her husband, Sykes’s  father, in a highly-publicised court case. 
The young Sykes was painfully aware of the notoriety attached to his  name and 
determined to rise above it.  He had travelled with his father in the Near East and 
it captured his imagination and became an abiding passion and means of escape. 
Writing to a friend in 1900, when he was twenty-one, he observed: 
I can see that it is absolutely necessary to prove that  I am an individual of fairly 
balanced mind, owing to all the rows and scandals which have taken place in the 
last few years ... I wish to be known as a person fairly versed in Eastern affairs, 
which I shall try to be, but even if I am not, I may contrive to make people think I 
am, which is half the battle.6  
He wanted to be respected and taken seriously and saw expertise in Eastern 
affairs as a means  of doing this  but he never became an Orientalist in the 
traditional sense.  He did not learn Arabic, Turkish or Persian, nor did he study 
Islamic religion, history or civilisation.  He did not have a background in the 
diplomacy or the politics of the region either.  He put himself forward as an 
authority solely on account of his personal experience as a traveller in the 
Ottoman Empire – experience founded on ‘innumerable conversations with 
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policemen, muleteers, mullahs, chieftains, sheep drovers, horse dealers, carriers 
and other people capable of giving one first hand information [via a translator...]’ 
– and so, whilst he certainly had knowledge of a sort, much of his reputation was 
indeed contrived and convinced the layman but rarely serious scholars or 
professional diplomats  with experience of the East.7  That he established a name 
for himself before the war can be credited in large part to the quality of his 
writing.  Always highly subjective, it was  never dull.  Indeed, it was lively, 
evocative, imaginative and sensuous, summoning for the reader all the flavours 
of the Orient.8   Writing to Sykes on the publication of his first travel book, 
Through Five Turkish Provinces, Rudyard Kipling commented that he had been 
unable to go to bed until he had finished it and that ‘it had enabled him to see and 
smell the Ottoman Empire as never before’.9    
As noted in Chapter Two, Sykes was a Turcophile, who admired the simplicity 
and piety of the archetypal Anatolian peasant.  Like others, he saw Western 
influences as potentially corrupting and was particularly critical of the insidious 
influence of European financiers  on the Ottoman Empire which was not only 
exploitative but paved the way for European territorial expansion and control of 
Ottoman territory.  In parliament he warned, 
[O]ne can see what  inevitably must happen: the spheres of interest are staked out, 
then the concessionaires begin their work, the taxes are engulfed by concessions, 
and then someone is killed, and something goes wrong, and the moment  is ripe, 
and the spheres of interest must inevitably become territory.10
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Sykes also challenged those who took the superiority of Western civilisation as a 
given.11   Writing on the newspaper coverage of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, 
he observed to a friend, ‘I have never been able to see why sleeping on a soft 
bed, travelling at great rates  of speed, eating good food, or wearing ugly clothes 
should make a man more or less civilized’.12  A sardonic list produced by Sykes 
(seemingly for his own amusement) and entitled ‘Things that are lacking in the 
East owing to absence of European ideals of civilization’ illuminates exactly 
what he liked about the East and thought was wanting in the West.  The list 
included:  
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Hordes of discontented labourers and workmen



















Reviews of Reviews of Reviews
Socialists13
It reveals that, like many of his peers, Sykes was misogynistic, anti-semitic, 
snobbish and reactionary.  He believed in traditional values  and society and, from 
the luxury of his privileged position, was contemptuous of materialism, jingoism, 
and modernity.  As landlord to a large number of tenants  on his Yorkshire estate, 
he espoused an almost feudal relationship between employer and employee, a 
relationship that remained palpable in the East but which had given way in the 
West to progress and hence, in his view, to a discontented labour force.  As Elie 
Kedourie observed, for Sykes the East preserved an enviable social order and 
religious ethic that had been lost in the West: 
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A social order compounded of small, intimate communities; authority hallowed by 
mercy, descending by small visible degrees from governor to governed; lord and 
serf, rich man and poor man rooted in the dignities and obligations of their station, 
owing respect to each other, and moved neither by fear nor contempt; all doing 
homage in their lives and thoughts to the divine eternal order of which their society 
on earth was but the mirror.  This was what the West once had been and what the 
East still was.14
However, Sykes was not naïve enough to think that progress could be avoided in 
the East any more than it could in the West, and he pondered at length over how 
matters could be improved.  In 1913, for example, he formulated a scheme for 
the education of young Turks in England.15   Foreign control was useless, he 
argued, because, as soon as it was removed, there would be an immediate 
relapse, ‘just as would [occur in] Egypt or India if the handful of British officials 
were removed’.16   Instead it was necessary to improve homegrown material.  The 
problem with the ruling class in Turkey was that it ‘has been reared in infancy in 
a home where there is neither order, cleanliness, punctuality nor discipline’.17 
Distinguishing the ‘virtuous peasantry’ from the effete ruling class, he argued 
that the latter needed to be removed from their environment and instilled with 
‘health, character, probity and energy’.  In other words, they needed to be 
masculinized.  This could best be achieved ‘in the most bracing part of the North 
of England’ where a training college could be established with the object of 
producing a regenerated civil service that would in turn lead to a regenerated 
Ottoman Empire.  He proposed that ‘English public school lines should be 
followed as much as possible, with the exception that fagging should not be 
allowed’.18   The latter proviso was possibly to prevent any ‘secret or unnatural 
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vice’ which Sykes was particularly concerned to avoid because of the correlation 
he saw between that and subsequent licentious and immoral behaviour.19
Despite Sykes’s faith in the English public school system, he did not propose that 
the Turkish pupils should simply be given a Western education.  Contrary to 
those ‘jingos, little Englanders, officials  and journalists and a host of worthy 
folk’ who promoted schemes for a Western education, he advocated that English 
methods should be applied to Turkish cultural and religious practices.20  Not only 
would this foster self-improvement but it would preclude hostility between East 
and West:
I feel that it is very necessary that someone should draw attention to the fact that 
neither the wearing of tweeds, the smoking of briars, nor the possession of 
diplomas and degrees obtained competitively at American mission schools do in 
the slightest degree produce a love of English men or indeed any sort of European 
in Asiatic or African Breasts.  A man whom you have deliberately robbed of his 
good manners, good taste, philosophy, art, poetry, self-respect and religion does not 
easily forgive, and strange as it may appear is never grateful to you for your good 
offices.21
Sykes remained certain of the importance of a united Ottoman Empire and 
essentially optimistic about her future up to and including 1914.  Her significance 
to Britain was emphasised in his well-received maiden speech as an MP in 
November 1911 when he stated that ‘Turkey is going downhill, she is bound in 
debt, and yet I am certain that a strong and united Turkish Empire is  as important 
to English commerce and strategy now as it was in the time of Lord 
Beaconsfield, and, perhaps, even more so’.22   Writing after the Balkan War of 
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1912 he observed that ‘Turkey has still energies and resources, human and 
material, capable of making her a first class power in 25 years and in fifty a 
power of greater importance than Germany is to-day’.23  All that was needed was 
‘guidance’ from an appropriate Western power.
Sykes’ passion for (elements of) the East has been dismissed by some historians 
as little more than the whim of an aristocratic Edwardian traveller who enjoyed 
the novelty of ‘slumming it’ in a medieval world during his holidays and relished 
the romance and poetry of a mythical Orient.24   It is suggested here that his pre-
war writings reveal a deeper, more tenacious interest than the superficial 
enthusiasm of a tourist briefly passing through.  His  experience of Turkish 
society struck a chord with the values he held most dear, values explored in 
Chapter One and which were common to his peer group, such as chivalry, duty 
and piety.  Like many others, he viewed modern Western influence as  a 
corrupting presence in the East rather than a cause for celebration, reflecting his 
own disenchantment with Edwardian Britain.  However, whilst he disapproved of 
those who mistook modernity for civilisation, he was unquestioningly patriotic 
and an unequivocal supporter of those values that he considered integral to the 
idea of British civilisation which were not the fripperies of twentieth-century 
living but core values, such as  justice, freedom and, of course, the imperial 
project.  
He approved most heartily of those British imperialists who sought to penetrate 
the East without seeking to Westernize it. ‘Personally,’ he wrote, to his 
Cambridge tutor, celebrated Orientalist E.G. Browne, 
the only English Imperialists in the East I admire are men like Clive, Nicholson, 
Burton, Napier and Gordon, because they can manage the East  without worrying it. 
It  is an extraordinary fact  that the consuls in Turkey who keep order are the few 
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military consuls because they can ride, shoot and give an order and never bother 
natives about cant and nonsense such as rights of man.25  
It was only men such as these who could really understand or govern the East:
Strange as it may appear, these qualities of the ordinary English country gentleman, 
help a man to describe and understand the Ottoman Empire and its inhabitants 
better than the most complete mastership of Turkish and Arabic grammar coupled 
with a profound knowledge of Oriental Mysticism.26
Perhaps it is  this  quotation that best illuminates Sykes’s pre-war stance.  Not only 
does it make allowance for his  personal lack of expertise, but it depicts the 
Ottoman Empire as a place of adventure and one that satisfied a nostalgic craving 
for aspects of Western society sacrificed in the interests of modernity.
The importance of commanding respect, or the maintenance of prestige, was not 
lost on Sykes and he saw similarities  in this regard between Turkish and British 
imperial methods.  In contrast, after a visit to North Africa in 1911, he noted that 
‘the French are incapable of commanding respect, they are not sahibs, they have 
no gentlemen, the officers have no horses or guns or dogs, they do not appeal to 
the sense of reverence of the people and yet they do not amalgamate’.27  In other 
words, the French neither safeguarded their perceived superiority, and hence their 
entitlement to rule, nor assimilated. Consequently, their imperial project was 
doomed to failure.  Another key to success, namely, tolerance towards local 
religious and cultural traditions, was a further trait Ottoman and British 
imperialism shared.  As  Sykes noted in relation to India, ‘if the Moslem world is 
against us we are done.  We only rule by favour of Moslems because we play the 
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game nine times out of ten’.28  Whilst the Turks and the British may have shared 
characteristics, the Turks were ‘Orientals’ and Sykes  was keen to underline the 
fact that only an authentic traveller like himself was able to really understand 
them and guide the uninitiated.  As he wrote in Dar-Ul-Islam, ‘few Europeans 
who have lived among them all their lives  would admit that they had fathomed 
more than their own ignorance’.29  In any event, he cautioned that to get to know 
them too well could lead to the horror of all horrors, assimilation: ‘it is not a 
good thing to know too much of orientals; if you do, perhaps you may wake up 
one morning and find you have become one’.30  
It was acceptable to admire and understand but, in keeping with the Victorian 
imperial tradition, not to assimilate and Sykes  was, at heart, an unquestioning 
supporter of ‘old-school’ British imperialism.  For example, in February 1914, he 
contributed to a debate on a failed military engagement in 1913 between a 
British-backed force, led by a British officer, Captain Corfield, and the ‘Mad 
Mullah’ of Somaliland.  Corfield died in the engagement and was censured 
posthumously for exceeding orders when he attacked the Mullah.  Sykes (and 
many others in Parliament) defended Corfield and observed that criticising him 
was like ‘censuring Wolfe, or Clive, or Nicholson, or Gordon, or anyone who has 
not only been prepared to give his life but also his reputation for his nation’.31 
Soldierly initiative and aggression were key to British imperial success: ‘It seems 
to me that as things stand at present, that we hold Egypt, Cyprus and India only 
because people in the past have done just the sort of thing that Mr Corfield did, 
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and we shall only go on holding them because we have got men prepared to do 
what Mr Corfield did’.32
Anglo-Saxons were a fighting race, and away from the effete Constantinople 
intellectuals, the Turks  were too.  Sykes  drew explicit parallels  between the 
English Tommy and the stolid Turkish soldier who, in his  opinion, shared 
astoundingly similar character traits.  If anything, Little Mehmet held the upper 
hand as ‘the Turk has not that capacity for grumbling at trifles, that unfrugality, 
or that love of swilling beer which are our own soldiers worst points, nor again 
has our soldier that ferocity which lies at the bottom of every Turk’s heart’.33 
Sykes was awe-struck by the fatalism of Islamic soldiers  and the way in which it 
made them careless of their own lives.  During a speech in Parliament, he 
recounted an anecdote from a journey he had made in 1905 when he observed a 
Turkish general ‘smoking cigarettes in the [powder] magazine while the men 
were digging out the shells with steel-pointed picks. The people are fatalists. 
They do not take the same view as scientific people who are not fatalists’.34
To conclude, Sykes had an astute understanding of what made the British 
imperial project successful.  He recognised the importance of maintaining 
prestige, of ‘playing the game’ and of the utility of lethal militarism when called 
for and, like the vast majority of his peers, he held an absolute conviction in 
Britain’s imperial entitlement.  Although an unabashed advocate of the ‘old-
school’ imperialism pursued by men like Clive and Gordon, Sykes did not 
envisage the Ottoman Empire as a site for conquest.  Rather he saw it as a region 
where Britain could extend her influence informally by guiding the Turks 
towards modernisation.  Although he disliked the ruling system (both Sultanate 
and Young Turk) and the ruling class, he admired the Anatolians  who, like the 
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Anglo-Saxons, were a martial race sharing many common values  and traditions. 
The preservation of the Ottoman Empire felt instinctively right to Sykes and 
accorded with prevailing British policy, not only the bolstering of the Empire as a 
buffer state between Russia and India, but also because, by taking the Muslim’s 
cause, Britain was keeping Indian Muslims on side as well as forestalling trouble 
in Asiatic Turkey.  Writing after the Second Balkan War, he criticised those who 
unthinkingly accepted Christian atrocities against Muslims but reacted oppositely 
in the event of Turkish atrocities  against Christians: ‘When Turkish irregulars 
ravage, burn, rape, or slay, no words are sufficient to reprobate the criminals  or 
those responsible for their control, which is perfectly right and just; when 
Bulgarian irregulars do precisely the same thing we are only told to wonder that 
they do no more’.35   It was vital, argued Sykes, that European powers act 
evenhandedly otherwise tales  would soon spread to Asiatic Turkey of atrocities 
committed by Christians  against Muslims under the eyes of the great powers and 
a belief would arise that ‘the extermination of Islam is the avowed policy of 
Christendom’.36   This in turn would lead to a revival of that deepest of British 
fears, the scourge of fanaticism, and hence a fresh crisis for the West.
3.2 War: 1914 - May 1916
Initially, Sykes joined his regiment but in early 1915 Kitchener asked him to be 
his personal representative on an inter-departmental committee set up to consider 
the future of Asiatic Turkey.37  Sykes then became an officer of the General Staff 
of the War Office.  Besides its Chairman, Maurice De Bunsen, the Committee 
consisted of various representatives  from governmental departments with an 
interest in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire, such as the Foreign Office 
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and the India Office.  The Committee was briefed with considering what 
Britain’s objectives should be in the Middle East and with determining a strategy 
for achieving them.  It concluded in ‘vague and idealistic’ terms that the optimal 
outcome for Britain, bearing in mind the need to take into account the interests  of 
France and Russia, would be the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in its 
Anatolian heartland but the devolution of its non-Turkish provinces – Armenia, 
Syria, Palestine and Iraq.38   Outside of Anatolia, the remaining provinces would 
become more autonomous and benefit from Western influence (but not control) 
without referral to Constantinople.  Before pursuing such a policy, the 
government tasked Sykes with making an informal visit to the Dardanelles, 
Egypt and Mesopotamia to gauge reactions to the Committee’s findings and to 
gather intelligence on the military situation.  During his travels he was to report 
back regularly to Charles Callwell at the War Office.  This period, June 1915 to 
December 1915, arguably marked the high point of Sykes’s career as  an Eastern 
expert.  He had become the government’s representative in the field, with 
authority to go to all outposts of the British Empire in the East to discuss and 
develop policy.  It was  he, and he alone, who was tasked with ascertaining what 
was best for the Empire in relation to the Middle East, and bringing back the 
information he deemed most relevant to the War Cabinet.  Even before he left, he 
was advising the War Office and the Foreign Office on aspects of Islam and the 
Ottoman Empire better left to specialists.  Reflecting the fact that King Hussein, 
Sherif of Mecca and second in his religious authority only to the sultan in his role 
as caliph, was already being mooted as a spiritual alternative,39  he produced a 
note in May 1915 for the Foreign Office, advising them on the historical and 
theological meaning and significance of the caliphate in which, for example, he 
sweepingly asserted that for ‘Sunnis the Caliphate is only a detail and not an 
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essential of Islam’, a statement that would surely have surprised (and appalled) 
the Delhi administration.40  
Cairo was also considering the Sherif’s position.  As Donald Bloxham has put it, 
promotion of the Arab cause was conceivably ‘a mirror image of the German-
Ottoman sponsorship of jihad in British and Russian dominions’, and, just as the 
Central Powers  sought to undermine Britain by stimulating anti-imperial 
insurgency, so the British saw an opportunity to undermine Ottoman prestige and 
pan-Islamism by playing on ethnic Arab nationalism.41   When Sykes arrived 
there in August, Bertie Clayton was quick to give him a note from a ‘reliable 
informant’ which described Hussein as ‘well-educated’ and ‘of exceptional 
ability in religious matters and Mohammedan literature’ as well as ‘very 
generous, kind-hearted and liberal’.42  According to the informant the Sherif had 
the support and respect of Arabs in the region.  He knew the British to be ‘just 
and highly civilized. And he likes them.  No doubt he has come in contact with 
them during his stay in Constantinople and learnt a good deal from them about 
modern civilization and justice’.43  Whilst little, if anything, was expected of the 
Sherif and his supporters militarily, it was hoped that Arab support of the Allied 
cause would prevent them taking Turkey’s side and preclude ‘all possibility of 
[the Central Powers] being able to raise against [Britain], and against the French 
and Italians, a genuine Jehad, engineered from the Holy Places of Islam’.44 
Those in Cairo knew there would need to be a carrot to gain Sherifian support but 
were pragmatic about giving Hussein vague assurances of Arab independence. 
Dissension amidst the Arab tribes meant, in the view of most with experience of 
the region, that the future establishment of a strong united Arab state was not 
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merely unlikely, but an ‘absurdity’.45   As Clayton cynically put it, a ‘native 
governed state’ would ‘ensure what would practically be complete control’ so 
why hold out for ‘complete annexation’?46 
No longer advocating the Turkish cause, Sykes was taken with the idea of 
helping the Arabs and the other minority groups of Asiatic Turkey which he 
could see had strategic and propagandist potential.  Another attraction to a man 
like Sykes was the promise of romance and adventure in a region that was one of 
the few untamed places left in the world.  Brought up on a fictional diet that 
included biblical and classical allusions, the Crusades and juvenile adventure 
fiction, Sykes and his peers were drawn to the imperial heroes of Britain’s past 
and ‘Arabia offered a reassuring continuation of the glories  of nineteenth-century 
imperial exploitation’.47   Whereas pursuing the Arab cause gave Sykes an 
opportunity to indulge his  yen for Eastern romance and adventure, when he 
continued his journey to India he found it just too alien, and its imperial life too 
bureaucratic.   Constantinople was, in his opinion, much more developed than 
Delhi and even allowing for India being ‘poor, overpopulated and understaffed’ 
Sykes could see why Indian Muslims who had been to Constantinople were so 
impressed for there they saw ‘something externally more efficient than they see 
at home’.48   In his opinion, it would be wrong to impose Indian rule upon the 
Middle East as it shared much greater affinity with Egypt and he warned that it 
would be a great ‘mishap’ if ‘any action of ours should do anything to impose 
artificially an alien and lower grade of civilisation upon a people who have a 
natural tendency to a higher and more progressive social state’.49
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The problem with India, argued Sykes, was not only the ‘lower grade 
civilisation’ but the failings of the Indian administration.  Despite his almost 
absolute lack of knowledge about the political situation in India, he penned a 
memo to the War Cabinet informing them that the administration’s attitude was 
one of ‘apology, of fear, of nervous consideration’ towards the country’s Muslim 
population and revealed a lack of education regarding the realities of Islamic 
theological doctrine and of the political situation in Constantinople.50   According 
to Sykes, Indian Muslims only supported the caliphate out of ignorance. For 
example, some believed that ‘Constantinople is the ancient capital of Islam – [an 
idea] which not the rudest Anatolian peasant would entertain’.51   If British civil 
servants and officers were properly educated they would know that Muslims in 
India were merely ‘the unwitting dupes of cosmopolitan knaves of the CUP who 
believe neither in Allah nor the Koran’, and ‘they would be heartened and 
stiffened by a sense of right which is at present lacking’.52  
In Sykes’s view, the Indian government’s concerns about Islamic fanaticism in 
India amounted to nothing more than scaremongering.   Credit should be given to 
Indian Muslims, that they would, if informed properly, understand the realities of 
the political situation and CUP efforts to exploit Islam for political ends.  Instead, 
it was Indians with a European education who posed a threat:
An ‘Intellectual’ with an imitation European training, with envy of the European 
surging in his heart, who is agnostic and has no belief whatever in religion, but sees 
in Islam a political engine whereby immense masses of men can be moved to riot 






In other words, Sykes argued that it was cynical exploiters of Islam, in Turkey 
and India, not honest Muslims, who were to be feared.  His advice was to counter 
the ‘Intellectuals’ and thereby prevent fanatical uprisings.
As part of his journey Sykes visited Kut where British and Indian troops had 
recently secured a victory (and before their ignominious surrender in April 1916). 
He reported back to Callwell and also wrote a lengthy article for The Observer, 
published on 21 November 1915, extracts of which were subsequently cited in 
other papers including The Times and The Daily News.  Sykes’s article was long 
and evocative.  It set out in detail the terrain of southern Mesopotamia, the 
people he encountered, the nature of the troops, the effect of British victory.  It 
was an excellent propagandist piece, not only in support of the British war effort 
but also in support of British imperialism.  In accordance with the themes of the 
early years of the war he emphasised how Britain, unlike Germany, was fighting 
for peace and civilisation: 
Let it be said in days to come that even as in the west so in the middle East our 
soldiers British and Indian fought watched and suffered in the cause of peace and 
civilization while our enemies sought to ferment mutiny and religious hate in a 
neutral land, not to fulfil or achieve a reasonable purpose to ensure victory or 
facilitate their operations, but merely to wreak vengeance and to satisfy their spite 
[sic].54
He emphasised the scale of the victory and the bravery of the troops.  Whilst the 
Indian soldiers had fought valiantly beside the British, there was no question as 
to who was master and who servant:
If the British soldier leads the sepoy has not been slow to follow, and to see the 
wounded Indian soldier stiffen himself on his stretcher and sit up to salute an 
unknown British officer gives one glimpse of that spirit of loyalty, pride and glory 
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in the profession of arms that no intrigues can dispel and years of patient justice 
and devotion of forgotten generations of Englishmen has evoked.55
The British soldier, ‘the first gentleman in Europe or Asia’, had conducted 
himself valiantly but Sykes also praised the Turkish soldiers.  As with Gallipoli, 
British success was measured on one level by comparison with the quality of the 
opposition, and the Turks had ‘fought as stubbornly as men could’.56   Sykes 
listed the endearing qualities of the Anatolians who were loved for ‘their 
patience, good nature, gentle humour, affection for children and animals’, and 
‘no one who has fought them regards them with ought but respect’.  Whilst the 
local Arabs were ‘cruel, treacherous and rascally’, Sykes claimed that underneath 
the moral decay brought on by centuries of ill-treatment, ‘the Arab fires of 
intellect, poetry and wit survive’.57  Finally, he highlighted the benefits of British 
occupation and drew upon all the stock elements of successful British 
imperialism, in particular, efficient government, justice and free trade. 
Describing how law and order were established within an hour of the British 
moving into Kut he noted that ‘Policemen were patrolling the dirty little streets – 
a governor was established in an office – tired troops were standing in the sun 
while billets were sought for them’.58  Meanwhile, ‘the bazaar does not close, the 
coffee shop is thronged, the women do not pause in their work by the 
waterside ...’.59   It is  instructive to compare this  article with the Baghdad 
Proclamation he drafted in 1917 (considered in the next section) and to note that 
there is no mention of liberation or self-determination for the oppressed 
inhabitants of Kut.  Rather, Sykes  congratulated the British troops on stepping 







and efficient administration, the British motto being ‘Carry on’ rather than the 
destructiveness of Kultur.60 
At around the same time as Sykes was writing for The Observer, his book, The 
Caliphs’ Last Heritage, an ‘acknowledged publishing sensation’, was published 
by Macmillan.61   The book was split into two sections.  The first was a short 
history of Ottoman Asia, and the second contained diary observations gleaned 
during his various journeys through the Ottoman Empire.  The topicality and 
contemporary significance of the book is evidenced by the intense attention it 
received from the press.  Sykes and his publishers collected over fifty reviews of 
the book from a variety of publications ranging from Country Life, to The 
Spectator, to regional newspapers such as  the Yorkshire Post and The Manchester 
Guardian, and scholarly journals such as the Asiatic Review and the Near East.62 
Some were critical of the book but virtually all comment (some cynically 
perhaps) on its timely and opportune publishing.  There can be no doubt that 
serious academics continued to take his writing with a pinch of salt.  The 
Athenæum wryly observed that ‘Sir Mark’s way is not to mince his words or hide 
his opinions, which are always unmitigated, and often rather violently expressed’ 
and noted that the historical section of the book did not require ‘serious 
criticism’ because it was simply a ‘sketch of the history of the lands’ bearing ‘no 
signs of a study of any but the ordinary popular sources’.63   Similarly, The 
Guardian started its review by commenting that ‘the author, we are informed, is 
now on active service, and this must be accepted as an explanation and apology 
for the marked ill-construction of the published work’.64   The Times Literary 
Supplement was also scathing of the historical section which it considered neither 
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original nor up to date with current scholarship.  ‘In itself, it possesses no 
authority, and therefore forms a somewhat incongruous contrast to the evidence 
of the diaries, which have all the authority of a direct witness’.65  As this latter 
comment indicates, whereas the first section was viewed more as a potted history 
than a serious work of scholarship, even academics struggled to quibble with the 
force of Sykes’s first-hand accounts contained in the diarized section. 
Accordingly, the Saturday Review stated ‘few living Englishmen can have had 
such varied first-hand experience of the Turkish Empire as the author of this 
book, and few can be better qualified to answer that endlessly repeated question: 
“What is to become of the Turk?”’ and the Contemporary Review earnestly 
commended ‘these important accounts of lands so far off from current knowledge 
as Mesopotamia and the wilds of Kurdistan.  The work is one of real value’.66 
The less scholarly reviews tended to praise both sections of Sykes’s book, and 
the popular consensus was that it was a ‘valuable contribution to our knowledge 
of the history of Turkey’ and a book that in years to come was ‘certain to take its 
place as a standard and monumental work’.67
The sheer number of reviews indicates the extent to which Sykes was already 
considered a leading authority on the subject and also the scope of public interest 
in the region.  The most frequently cited extract was Sykes’s exhortation, in his 
customary florid and sweeping style, to ‘wipe John Stuart Mill, Omar Khayyam, 
Burke, Ruskin, Carlyle and Bernard Shaw out of your mind; learn the book of 
Job by heart for philosophy, the book of Judges for politics, the “Arabian 
Nights”  (Burton’s translation) for ethics; ride by balance, not by grip, keep your 
girths loose’.  Sykes was arguing, self-interestedly, that the constrained, regulated 
and narrow empiricism of the modern Western epistemological system was no 
good when it came to the East and only a freer, more intuitive approach would 
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enable insight and understanding.  For the reviewers, this extract was no doubt 
attractive not only because it emphasised the profound differences between East 
and West, but also because it characterised the romantic and imaginary potential 
of the region as elucidated in Sykes’s book.  
Another frequently cited extract was Sykes’s assertion that ‘there is nothing in 
our daily private or public life to-day which is not directly or indirectly 
influenced by some human movement that took place in this zone’ and the critics 
and journalists readily agreed about the region’s historic significance.  They were 
also interested in Sykes’s descriptions of the diversity of the Empire and his 
assertion that there was no such place as Turkey and no such people as the Turks. 
Instead there was a Turkish ruling dynasty and a Turkish language that was the 
official language of a land mass made up of Muslims, Christians, Jews and 
Pagans, where languages included Kurdish, Armenian, Greek, Chaldean and 
Arabic.  This perceived lack of homogeneity was to prove useful as the war 
progressed as a ground for justifying the breakup of the Empire, but in late 1915 
it was relayed in more neutral terms as a means of illuminating Germany’s ally in 
the war.  Indeed, there remained a startling lack of vitriol towards the Turks.  It 
was still acceptable for Sykes to be described as a ‘candid and warm-hearted 
Turcophile’ and his evenhandedness towards the Islamic faith was met with 
approval.68   As the Birmingham Daily Post’s critic noted, Sykes’s account of 
Mohammed and Mohammedanism was ‘fair’ and ‘showed true insight’.69  Some 
even commended Muslims at the expense of Europeans reflecting Sykes’s 
concerns regarding the degeneration of Western civilisation and the relative 
merits of traditional Islamic society:
Faults in the Mohammedan body are not difficult to find; but this at least may be 
said, that in no part of the world does there exist a large Mohammedan society in 
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which men are cruel to those whom they employ, indifferent to their parents, 
systematically dishonest to one another, or socially oppressive to the poor – all of 
which odious vices are practised as common customs in the land whence come 
those persons who sally forth to regenerate the East.70
The future of the Ottoman Empire was evidently not a fait accompli.  The lack of 
anything more than cursory criticism of Turkish imperial rule reflected a 
continued receptiveness towards the Ottomans although a number of reviewers 
highlighted Sykes’s dismissal of the CUP and cited his eminently quoteworthy 
description of them as ‘addle-pated robbers and blundering cranks’.  No doubt 
with an element of patriotic morale boosting in mind – taking into account 
ongoing failures in the Dardanelles – several reviews highlighted Sykes’s 
observation that since the onset of the CUP’s administration, there was a lack of 
‘hope and vitality’ in Constantinople.  Notably, only marginal coverage was 
given to his strongly worded views on the Armenian population despite the 
events of the preceding summer.  Whilst not condoning the massacres, a number 
of critics commented favourably on how Sykes’s prejudice against Armenians 
could assist the public in understanding why the Turks had committed the 
atrocities.  Accordingly, an article in The Globe considered that Sykes’s views on 
the Armenians could ‘help to explain the ferocity with which the Turks are now 
endeavouring to exterminate the race’.71  The Birmingham Daily Post posed the 
question, ‘What is it in the Armenian which revolts Turk and Western European 
alike?’ and concluded that although he was a fellow Christian, the Armenian was 
nevertheless ‘a degenerate of the human race’.72  
As mentioned above, Sykes is sometimes dismissed in the historiography of the 
Middle East as a lightweight, a romantic, who, as one prescient contemporary 
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critic observed, valued what he saw in the East for ‘its strangeness or antiquity’.73 
Irrespective of whether this was the lens through which he viewed the East, the 
fact remains that, by the time he returned from his War Office mission in 
December 1915, the general consensus at home was that ‘few living men can 
have seen more of the Ottoman Empire than Sir Mark, or could surpass him in 
clarity of view and phrase.’74   Whilst he may not have been a scholar, his first 
hand experience – elucidated emphatically in both book and reviews – was 
considered to be of greater importance.  His value as a mouthpiece for the 
communication of the Egyptian administration’s military and strategic objectives 
had also been appreciated during his visit with the effect that, for Cairo too, he 
was an essential figure.  As Clayton recognized, he was someone with ‘a 
commanding personality whose views will carry weight with the Government’.75 
The combination of his role on the De Bunsen Committee, together with his War 
Office commissioned tour of the region, and the opportune publication of The 
Caliphs’ Last Heritage, had resulted in Sykes becoming the foremost British 
authority on the Ottoman Empire and ‘the only one with anything like a 
comprehensive picture’ of  current developments in the Empire’s Asiatic 
provinces.76    Accordingly, on 16 December he was called before the War 
Committee to give evidence on the Arab question and determine future British 
policy on it.  
The transcript of the meeting indicates that Sykes answered questions from 
Asquith, Kitchener, Balfour and Lloyd George authoritatively and unequivocally, 
and not only on strategy but also on theological subjects such as Wahhabism and 
Shiism.  He made the case for supporting the Sherif of Mecca (negotiations 
towards an alliance between the Sherif and Henry McMahon were already well 
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underway) and stated that there was a strong desire in the region for an 
independent Arab state.  He warned that failure to support the Sherif would likely 
lead to his death at the hands of the Turks as well as those of potentially pro-
Allied Arab intellectuals and Arab army officers.  To reinforce his case he raised 
the spectre of pan-Islamism, and played to the Committee’s fears regarding 
India’s safety, warning that without the Sherif ‘we shall live to see Islam pretty 
solid; then we shall be confronted with the danger of a real Jehad’.77  He advised 
the Committee not to worry about the effect on Indian Muslims of British support 
of the Arabs.   The Indians would stay on side, he claimed, as long as the British 
did not become involved in ‘religious squabbles which have to do with the 
Khalifate’.78  And it would be wrong not to support the Arabs simply because the 
Indians had been influenced by CUP Propaganda: ‘with regards to any 
Mohammedans who are our friends, as the Arabs wish to be, I think that we 
should back our friends.  It is no use not backing our friends because people who 
have been influenced by our enemies dislike them’.79  At the end of the meeting it 
was agreed that before the military situation could be progressed it was necessary 
to resolve the diplomatic position with the French.  Sykes, a diplomatic 
neophyte, was given charge of this task and the eponymous Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of 1916 was the result.
Sykes had also given the Committee a Memorandum dated 28 October 1915 
which set out his detailed plan on strategy and propaganda in the Middle East.  In 
it he explained that the Germans and Turks had sought to mobilise Islam against 
Great Britain and Russia by fomenting ‘discontent and fanaticism’ in India, 
Persia, Egypt and Arabia ‘using highly efficient agents on a well co-ordinated 
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plan’.80   It was necessary for Britain to respond by forming her own definite 
policy and co-ordinated plan.  This would involve supporting the Arabs and anti-
CUP elements in the Empire and propagandising ‘Islam in a definite and 
offensive manner, not making apology for our acts, but attacking the enemy on 
the score of injustice, crime, unorthodoxy, and hypocrisy, in our own Press, in the 
native Press, and by means of leaflets’.81   Again, Sykes was arguing that 
worrying about the sensitivities of Indian Muslims was foolish and a more 
aggressive, unapologetic policy was called for.  To organise the propaganda 
effort, he proposed setting up an Arab Bureau based in Cairo whose general 
purpose would be to produce an atmosphere ‘favourable to us among Moslems 
generally, and to combat the propaganda, direct and indirect, of our enemies’.82 
Sykes envisaged assuming the role of head of the Arab Bureau himself but over 
Christmas 1915 it was decided that the archeologist and academic, David 
Hogarth, would take the role and Sykes would continue to lead diplomatic 
negotiations with the French.
In 1916 Sykes was occupied negotiating the division of the Middle East with his 
French counterpart François Georges-Picot whilst simultaneously working on the 
propaganda effort.  As has been seen in Chapter Two, it was in early 1916 that 
Wellington House turned its attention to propaganda concerning Islamic 
countries, and Sykes’s emphasis on the importance of this in his memoranda of 
late 1915 was undoubtedly a critical part of the galvanizing process.  The 
evidence in Sykes’s papers of direct communication with Wellington House 
illustrates the respect and authority he commanded.  For example, the newly 
appointed Edward Long deferred to him in relation to matters such as the 
publication and effective distribution of al-Haqīqah, the nature and distribution 
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of information to Indian troops and the publication of pamphlets such as that 
containing the Sherif’s proclamation of independence.83   Indeed, when the India 
Office was mooting the possibility of developing al-Haqīqah with Wellington 
House in December 1915, it was to Sykes that Arthur Hirtzel immediately turned 
for advice.  Sykes encouraged Hirtzel to proceed, telling him that ‘I certainly 
think that this  is a long felt want’ but warning that it would require ‘very careful 
handling and an expert staff’.84   Similarly, when El Kowkab was implemented, 
Sykes was intimately involved, endorsing its publication and instructing Austen 
Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India, that ‘instead of including it in the 
HAKIKAT it should circulate separately in accordance with Clayton’s wish’.85
As highlighted in Chapter Two, one of the main target recipients of al-Haqīqah 
was ‘actual or potential belligerents in the middle east’, in other words, the 
Arabs.  As  spring 1916 passed, and Kut fell to the Turks, the importance of 
maintaining British prestige became ever more pressing.  One of Sykes’s 
collaborators in the production of propagandist material was his interpreter and 
‘Oriental Clerk’, A.P. Albina.  In April Albina produced an account of the fall of 
Kut and observed that whereas ‘the withdrawal from the Dardanelles did not 
strike such a heavy blow to England’s prestige in the East’ the Arabs were shaken 
and bewildered by the British failure:
[T]o the Arab it is inconceivable that, powerful England with her supremacy on the 
sea, her wealth, her guns and armaments, the means of transport at her disposal, her 
numberless troops, not only should not be able to defeat the Turkish army in 
Mesopotamia but that an English General should be humiliated by an unconditional 
surrender of himself and his army to the Turks.86  
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This led Sykes to declare, dramatically, that as a consequence of being 
‘humiliated and defeated by Asiatics as we have been in this war, prestige is a 
thing of the past, the last name has gone in Lord Kitchener’ thereby reinforcing 
his case for unapologetic propaganda.87  
As well as using propaganda to keep the Arabs pro-Entente, Sykes saw a 
burgeoning need to correct the negative stereotyping of Arabs in Britain and in 
neutral countries and to ensure the world saw them as a people who wanted, and 
deserved, Western help.  An article, ostensibly by Albina, dated June 1916 (the 
month in which the Arab Revolt was launched), entitled ‘The Future of the Arab 
Race’, like the Syria pamphlet, reflects a transitional period in British propaganda 
efforts regarding the Arabs and bears the hallmarks of input from Sykes (based 
on a similarity in style and motivation as well as his history of collaboration with 
Albina).   ‘The Arabs,’ the writer explained, 
have very often been described in books and articles published by occasional 
travellers as a decadent, greedy and lazy nation.  This impression was gathered by 
superficial observation and not through deep and sound study of the true nature and 
character of the race.  The real Arab is noble, intelligent, chivalrous and possesses 
many qualities that are apt to develop and improve under a just and beneficial 
rule.88  
Although the Arabs were intelligent and chivalrous they were not yet ready for 
self-government argued the writer, who himself claimed to be an Arab (Albina 
hailed from Jerusalem but lived in Florence).  Because of internal dissension 
between different religious groups, they needed an external arbiter who could 
‘restore good will and union amongst the different creeds’.89    Of course, the 
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writer argued that ‘a protectorate of England and France in their respective zones 
of influence’ would be the best solution as only ‘under the tutorship of a just and 
strong nation can [the region] effect its regeneration’.90  A German protectorship 
would not do, argued the writer, as the Arabs hated the Germans.  Similarly, they 
were unwilling to remain under the tyrannical rule of the Turks, which had 
weighed upon them for centuries.  
Sykes was able to constantly underscore his message to governmental circles 
when he took up responsibility for the production of a weekly Arabian Report for 
the War Committee (later the War Cabinet) that co-ordinated information gleaned 
from dispatches from the East as well as summarising relevant aspects of the 
Cairo production, the Arab Bulletin.91  According to Shane Leslie’s biography of 
Sykes, his appraisals in these reports made him ‘the driving force of the Arabian 
policy of the Government, and the Arabian Report was the medium through 
which that force was mainly exercised during the most critical period in Near 
Eastern affairs’.92   Sykes’s contacts in public and political life gave him even 
greater reach in conveying his message and, as a letter from Bertie Clayton to 
Sykes, dated 11 August 1916, indicates, those in Cairo continued to see Sykes as 
a mouthpiece for transmitting their views to relevant parties at home.  Thus, 
when Clayton objected to The Times publishing ‘the most dreadful nonsensical 
stuff’ about Turkey it was to Sykes that he turned and asked to speak to Wickham 
Steed, the paper’s influential foreign correspondent, about the matter.93   After 
Sykes’s death in 1919, DG Hogarth wrote a shrewd letter to Shane Leslie setting 
out his impressions of the man.  In an extract that Leslie tellingly chose not to 
use in his book, Hogarth described Sykes as being of greatest use to the causes 
that he adopted in London: 
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[T]here he was an invaluable champion.  Social position and parliamentary 
reputation reinforced courage and patent singleness of purpose, and he would 
prophesy bitter things in any company.  Men, whose knowledge of the East was far 
deeper and wider than his, prompted him and put up their ideas through him, 
knowing that the politician and brilliant amateur would get a hearing.94  
Sykes had proved a receptive mouthpiece following his 1915 visit to the region 
and in 1916 he wielded the power that men like Hogarth and Clayton had 
recognised to put the vision into effect, not only diplomatically, but for public 
consumption too.95  
3.3 War: After Sykes-Picot
The ‘shamelessly self-interested’ Secret Inter-Allied (Sykes-Picot) Agreement 
was completed on 16 May 1916.96   Its foundations lay in what the protagonists 
considered to be the historical rights of each party in the region and was, in 
essence, a deal designed to address issues between France and Britain, reflecting 
tensions between them in Europe not in the Middle East.  The French claimed an 
ancient entitlement to Syria dating from the Crusades, whereas India gave the 
British an obvious right to Southern Mesopotamia.  In light of these claims, 
Sykes and Georges-Picot agreed two areas (Red and Blue) where they planned to 
take direct control and two areas (A and B) in between the Red and Blue zones 
where they acknowledged Arab rights but planned to exert influence.   What was 
intended by the latter aspect was open to interpretation although, certainly, when 
they were negotiating the Agreement, Sykes and Georges-Picot had no concept 
of that region as consisting of a burgeoning Arab ‘nation’, ‘only requiring the 
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removal of the Turk, the advice of a mandatory and a little time to enable them to 
stand alone’.97   As Balfour subsequently put it, ‘it never occurred to them that 
they had to deal at all with nations in the modern and Western sense of the term. 
With the Arab race, Arab culture, and Arab social and religious organisation (to 
say nothing of Jews, Maronites, Druses and Kurds) they knew they had to deal. 
But this was a very different thing’.98   
With hindsight, Balfour provided a useful description of what was likely 
envisaged:
What its authors aimed at was the creation of two clearly-defined areas, one carved 
out of Syria and the other out of Mesopotamia – the first which should be French, 
as Tunis is French, the other English, as Egypt is English. Between them was to lie 
a huge tract occupied in part by nomad Bedouins, in part by a sedentary Arab-
speaking population, urban and agricultural, who should be independent in the 
sense that they would live their own life in their own way, but who would be under 
the patronage, and for certain purposes under the control, either of France or of 
England, according as they belonged to what in the agreement was described as 
area A or area B.99
Sykes was pleased with the outcome as the French compromised on the amount 
of territory they wanted and agreed to the notion of an ‘Arab State or a 
Confederation of Arab States’ under the titular leadership of an ‘Arab Chief’. 
They also agreed to international protection for the Holy Places and allowed for a 
British strategic link in Palestine with Mesopotamia – via the ports of Haifa and 
Acre.  Reaching agreement, Sykes considered, would bring certainty to Britain’s 
future policy in the region as well as promoting a trust-based relationship with 
the French.  ‘Under a scheme either of spheres or partition we stand square with 
our Allies’, Sykes had reasoned, ‘with instruments we can adhere to, boundaries 
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we can see, and interests we can respect, and consequently shall be able to unite 
in a co-operative policy with permanent purpose and unanimity’.100   His 
comments reflect not only the overriding concern with European events and 
relationships, but also reveal how in 1915 and 1916 it was still possible to 
unashamedly refer to the ‘partitioning’ of territory with regard solely to strategic 
and economic interests, and to negotiation with other Western powers without 
reference to the native population.101   This was the language of aggressive, 
acquisitive, imperialism.  However, ironically, the terms of the Agreement – in so 
far as they concerned Areas A and B – were simultaneously vague enough to 
leave open an interpretation that endorsed Arab independence and embraced the 
new Wilsonian notions of the later war years.  Sykes was quick to grasp this 
ambiguity and use it to his advantage, as shall be seen below.
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Sykes’s enthusiastic pursuit of a policy that would extend territory over which 
Britain had direct control (the Red Zone) and indirect control (Area B) fell out of 
favour even as he was completing the Agreement, not because of its old-school 
imperial tenor but for more pragmatic reasons.  As was evident from the findings 
of the De Bunsen Committee other governmental departments had little appetite 
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for adding to Britain’s headaches by increasing her territorial possessions.  As a 
government memorandum put it in July 1916, should Britain pursue any interests 
in Iraq they were to hold it ‘not by Imperial right, but under concession from the 
Arabs’.102  In addition, Delhi was not only ambivalent to supporting the Sherif 
but was strongly opposed to using Muslim Sepoys to support any military action 
undertaken by the Sherif in opposition to the caliphate (which could be construed 
as giving the conflict a religious dimension in a context where it was understood 
that India’s Muslim soldiers’ loyalty to Britain was purely secular).   Sykes had 
offended the Indian administration (which he described privately as ‘an anaemic 
giant with a head like a pea’) with his tactless dismissal of their capacity to take 
charge of any future administration in the Middle East and his critical comments 
on what he considered their pandering to Indian Muslim opinion.103  He had also 
antagonized the Egyptian administration which he thought lacked vigour and 
enthusiasm for the war effort.104  
In diplomatic circles, the Agreement was met with apprehension not least 
because it tied Britain to an arrangement with their traditional imperial rival, the 
French.  Memories of Fashoda remained strong, particularly in Egypt, and those 
on the ground in the Middle East were well aware that France’s imperial 
ambitions and perceived draconian colonial practices were frequently at odds 
with those of Britain.  Others simply thought Sykes had made a bad bargain, for 
example, Lord Curzon, who in a meeting with Sykes ‘strongly criticised the 
allocation of Alexandretta and contiguous spheres of Asia Minor to the French, 
and said that, in his opinion, the French had got much the best of the bargain’.105 
A further complication arose when the Sherif’s revolt went from hypothesis to 
reality on 5 June 1916 and the prospect of Britain actually being called to 
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account for the promises she had made to the Sherif became a reality.  The fact 
that the terms of the Agreement had been kept from him ensured that when they 
should emerge controversy was inevitable.
Sykes’s position became a defensive one.  He was a man who was singleminded 
in his pursuit of the ideas he believed in.  Whilst this approach produced results, 
those results were compromised by his failure to take into account the nuances 
and complexities of the situation.  As 1916 progressed, and the terms of the 
Agreement came under increasing scrutiny, his lack of experience also became 
more apparent.  This did not result in him changing his position, indeed he 
continued to advocate passionately the Sherif’s cause, and increasingly those of 
the Zionists and Armenians, but what he did – with alacrity – was to re-mould the 
language in which he communicated his message.106  Aware that acquisitive 
imperialism was increasingly out of step with the wartime vernacular, he 
embraced the language of self-determination as a means of transforming British 
objectives into ones that accorded with Wilsonian ideals.  The proclamation 
Sykes drafted on 5 March 1917 to be read out by Sir Stanley Maude on his entry 
into Baghdad, coming, as it did, shortly after Wilson’s address to the Senate in 
January, is extremely instructive in this regard.  Conscious of the ‘wide publicity 
which [the Proclamation] will have in the Arabic speaking world’, as well as the 
prospect of its  publication in allied and neutral countries, Sykes was given 
responsibility for its  careful drafting.107  Calling on the Arabs of Baghdad to 
grasp the opportunity being offered to them by the Allies, he declared:   
O people of Baghdad remember that  for 26 generations you have suffered under 
strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set  one Arab house against  another 
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in order that  they might  profit by your dissensions. This policy is abhorrent  to 
Great Britain and her Allies, for there can be neither peace nor prosperity where 
there is enmity and misgovernment. Therefore I am commanded to invite you, 
through your nobles and elders and representatives, to participate in the 
management of your civil affairs in collaboration with the political representatives 
of Great  Britain who accompany the British Army, so that you may be united with 
your kinsmen in North, East, South, and West in realising the aspirations of your 
race.108
Sykes offered liberation and fulfilment in exchange for collaboration.  In his 
original draft, he included the offer of ‘freedom to those who have proved 
themselves worthy to enjoy their own wealth and substance under their own 
institutions and laws’.109   This time, however, Sykes was not left to his own 
devices.  Already compromised in their dealings with the Sherif as a result of 
negotiations with the French, the British government was anxious not to be held 
hostage to fortune in Mesopotamia too.   Austen Chamberlain warned that he was 
‘uneasy about the wide terms of the promise conveyed’ and feared that ‘they may 
easily lead to charges of breach of faith in future, if circumstances render it 
impossible for us to give the complete freedom which they may be held to 
promise’.110   As an alternative, Chamberlain proposed the insertion, ‘It is the 
desire of the British Government that the Arabs of Irak and Baghdad shall in 
future be free from oppression and enjoy their wealth and substance under 
institutions and laws congenial to them’.111  In other words, the prospect of the 
Arabs being given discretion to determine their own institutions and laws was 
omitted.  
Sykes raised vociferous objection.  ‘The difference between the two paragraphs 
is this’, he argued, ‘the original paragraph, if properly translated, will mean “If 
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you support us you will be our equals in internal affairs which you will manage 
yourselves, if you do not we have a free hand”  – The amendment means 
“Whether you behave well or ill we shall give you good treatment, but we shall 
settle your affairs for you”’.112  Again, Sykes saw in Chamberlain’s language a 
desire to govern the Middle East like India, an approach of which he strongly 
disapproved.  ‘I am certain’, he declared, ‘if we take the line of trying to rule 
Arabs as we rule Indians we shall fail.  We shall introduce the social colour 
distinction and antagonise the whole Arab movement; we shall have the 
intellectuals against us from the very start, and it is the intellectuals who will rule 
public opinion when peace comes’.113   Unlike Indians, Sykes claimed, Arabs 
were proud and could not be treated ‘in the same spirit as one might approach 
tribesmen or natives who accept European superiority as a matter of course’.114 
He pointed out that the Turks had understood this and had ‘never denied the 
Arabs either social equality or executive power’.115   By advocating local 
autonomy, he argued, Britain would achieve popularity and influence whilst 
losing little: ‘If we play our cards properly by means of “advisers” instead of 
“rulers” and back Arab nationalism, we shall have a permanent footing at little 
cost’.116  Sykes believed that ostensible Arab rule with British guidance would in 
reality mean British control and he baldly, and naively, asserted that, were he in 
charge, he would ‘form a small committee of notables and members of the Arab 
Committee and then make them do as he wished’.117  
Sykes considered that advocating autonomy for the Arabs of Mesopotamia would 
engender support and influence whilst also precluding discontent (perhaps he 
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also sought personal vindication for his betrayal of the Sherif’s cause in the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement), but what he could not see were the risks associated with 
Britain setting it up as an ideal and then failing to deliver.  It was evident to those 
without Sykes’s blinkered perspective that neither the British nor Indian 
governments were yet able to make any decisions about the future 
administration.  They could neither promise an Arab state nor specify their own 
post-war role.  Although there was a reluctance to further extend direct rule, the 
option to annex at a future date had to be preserved.  Arthur Hirtzel, of the India 
Office, cautioned that he did not share Sykes’s ‘optimism as regards the Arab 
race & the Arab State’ and it was important to ‘avoid uttering words which we 
may hereafter have to eat if the Arab State proves  a failure.  In that event we shall 
almost certainly have to annex Bagdad, & we ought not to tie our hands now’.118 
In the end, even Chamberlain’s wording was not deemed sufficiently opaque and 
Sykes’s phrase was replaced by a vague assurance that it was not the wish of the 
British Government to impose ‘alien institutions’ upon the people of Baghdad 
and an expression of hope ‘that the aspirations  of your philosophers  and writers 
shall be realised and that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish, 
enjoying their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance 
with their sacred laws and their racial ideals’.119  
The tenor of the Baghdad Proclamation was echoed in The Commercial Future of 
Baghdad, a pamphlet written shortly after the city’s  fall.  The anonymous author 
made the now familiar point that British troops came ‘not as  conquerors or 
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enemies, but as liberators, who will help the people to restore their land’.120   The 
pamphlet went on to quote Sykes, who assured the reader that:
There is no reason why Baghdad and other centres should not turn out just  as good 
men in the professions and in commerce as the European countries.  People were 
studying Plato in Baghdad in the eighth century.  Turkey is the only nation which 
has not  been a source of profit to the Arab, and that  is because the Turk only looks 
for conquest.121
Sykes elucidated his  new attitude towards the Arabs in an article in The Times on 
30 March 1917 which can be read as  a companion piece to his  article of February 
dispelling the myth of the ‘Clean Fighting Turk’ (see Chapter Two) and which 
was, like the earlier article, disseminated widely by Wellington House.122   In 
much the same way as other writers  drew affinities between the Armenians and 
Europeans in order to elicit sympathy, so Sykes sought to emphasise that Arabs 
were not like ‘natives’ of Asia and Africa – a race to be ruled – rather they were a 
virile, physically superior, race, ‘lithe and supple, of good physique’, with 
‘perfect features, glossy hair, small hands and feet’.123   What particularly 
distinguished them was their past greatness and this was emphasised repeatedly. 
Thus, Baghdad in the middle ages was a place of ‘wits  and poets, philosophers 
and statesmen, lexicographers, learned doctors and metaphysicians’.124   The 
characteristics that had made Arab civilisation great were retained but suppressed 
in modern day Arabs because of centuries of contact with the destructive 
influence of the Turks.  Their underlying intelligence and resourcefulness  was 
apparent, argued Sykes, in the progress  made by Arabs who had escaped the 
Turkish yoke, for example, Syrians  who had emigrated to America and become 
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‘doctors, lawyers, journalists, and merchants’.125   Even at home, there was 
evidence of an Arab resurgence, ‘a movement towards  cohesion, a new sense of 
being ... the desire to realize their destiny is  a growing force’.126   To assist the 
Arabs in achieving their potential did not warrant Western imperialism of the 
‘white man’s burden’ denomination.  Western involvement had to be more 
selfless than that; their role should be seen as a ‘contribution to the fulfilment of 
the destiny of mankind’.  In other words, it was  up to Western powers to work 
together to aid other races in their quest for autonomy and to prepare them for a 
world partnership where the ‘fruitfulness of the earth’ could be shared.  
Some took Sykes’s rhetoric at face value and objected to what they perceived to 
be his unrealistic optimism regarding a burgeoning Arab movement.  British 
diplomat, J.H. Monahan, wrote to Balfour (who in turn forwarded Monahan’s 
letter to Professor Ross, head of the newly established School of Oriental 
Languages) warning that there was no revivalist movement in Arabia either in 
literature, art or architecture and claiming that all historic traditions were ‘utterly 
extinct except the Moslem theological philosophy’ which was far from modern in 
its outlook as  evidenced by the ‘excessive time spent in unintelligent learning of 
the Koran by heart’.127  William Ormsby-Gore, Sykes’s  assistant, reassured Sykes 
that, in his  opinion, a resurgence in Arabic culture was evident.  For example, 
journalism in Cairo and Mecca revealed a ‘progressive, virile and even literary 
use of the Arabic vernacular’ and the Koran was better at least than ‘any Turkish 
book – if there are such things’.128  
Such a debate was irrelevant in the circumstances.  Of course there were 
numerous Arab separatists  – Iraqis, Egyptians and Syrians – working with, and 
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had been executed by Cemal Pasha in 1915 and 1916) but, even if there had not 
been, it was incumbent upon Sykes to claim that a growing consciousness did 
exist.  In the absence of a policy of outright control, Britain could only justify her 
involvement in the region on the basis of self-help irrespective of whether the 
Arabs themselves had articulated such a goal.  In reality, Sykes’s opinion was 
that for the population as a whole, ‘having behind them centuries of Islamic 
tradition which knows politically neither colour, tongue nor frontiers’, the 
concept of nationalism – the ‘fundamental notion which runs through all 
European teaching, which somehow connects past glories and wrongs with a real 
or imaginary combination of language and blood’  – was an alien one.129   To 
apply it to Islamic societies meant ‘a misty idea of a vague Caliphate vaguely 
ruling over a number of confederations of Moslems who form the dominant 
political force in the region they inhabit’.130  It was to this perceived ‘misty idea’ 
that Sykes sought to appeal in the Middle East, although what he wished to 
inculcate, in due course, was a belief in secular nationalism, which he, like all 
Whitehall policy makers, considered inherently beneficial, with the result that 
‘each Moslem nation will be more interested in developing itself politically and 
commercially’ than in promoting Islamic unity.131  In theory, this  would staunch 
the danger of pan-Islamism although an inherent risk remained of religious 
consciousness  continuing to be a unifying factor and hence a drive towards 
nationalism could reinforce pan-Islamism rather than weaken it.  This prospect 
was something which Sykes continued to flag as a possibility that could be 
avoided by unwavering British support of the Arab cause.   
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It was important that a movement towards self-determination appear to be ignited 
from within not only to justify Britain’s involvement.  If the Sherif’s  revolt could 
be seen as a ‘spontaneous  and inevitable act’ it could be argued that it was in 
response to Ottoman oppression, ‘the result of the Turks  and Germans 
endeavouring to suppress the Arab language and trying to shackle Islam to their 
military car’.132  Further, in order to safeguard the support of Indian Muslims it 
was vital that Britain should not be seen to be dictating religious  issues relating 
to the caliphate and the safeguarding of the Holy Places.  With these 
considerations in mind, shortly after the publication of Sykes’s  article in The 
Times, he and Edward Long, of Wellington House, produced a pamphlet 
containing Sherif Hussein’s proclamation of Arab independence, in which he 
took the title of King of Hedjaz, and proclaimed the Arab peoples’ ‘ancient and 
inviolable religious, territorial, and national rights against impious foreign 
aggression’ (the pamphlet also contained the Baghdad Proclamation).133 
Emphasis was placed on the impiety of Turkey to underline that, rather than 
rising up in revolt against the only Muslim great power as acolyte of the Allies, 
the Arab movement was self-instigated, in opposition to the atheist Young Turks’ 
control of the region, and with the objective of achieving freedom for their race. 
For the remainder of the war, the propagandists  continued to emphasise the Arab 
movement as  one motivated from within, for example, in relation to attempts by 
Sykes to establish an Arab Legion, and the involvement of Sherifian troops in 
key battles, such as the fall of Damascus in October 1918.  With similar 
motivation, Sykes designed an Arab national flag, coloured black, green, white 
and red, to represent the unity of the great Arab dynasties and emblematic of their 
shared aspiration of a new nationalist future.134  
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Whilst Sykes’s propaganda was in keeping with Britain’s 1917 agenda, the 
agreement he had made with Georges-Picot remained out of kilter.  In Cairo men 
such as Reginald Wingate (the High Commissioner) and Hogarth openly called 
for its  renegotiation.  Sykes sought to distance himself from it by referring to it as 
the ‘Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement’ and the ‘Asia Minor Agreement’.  In a 
memo dated 18 July he asked that it ‘should be called the Anglo-French Arab 
agreement ... and not the Sykes-Picot Agreement’.135  However, he continued to 
claim that it reflected the tenets of Britain’s ongoing policy in the war and the 
region, namely, ‘the unalterable friendship of Great Britain and France’ and ‘the 
duty of Great Britain and France towards oppressed peoples’.136   In contrast, 
Hogarth and Wingate argued that America’s entry into the war, the common anti-
French feeling in the region and the fact that the Sherif ‘was in no way minded to 
observe either the letter or the spirit of the Agreement’ necessitated a 
reevaluation.137   In a fit of pique, Sykes, who had met the Sherif in Jeddah in 
May 1917 in order to explain the broad terms of the Agreement to him, angrily 
retorted that he was ‘tired of Englishmen who listen to a ridiculous Marmozet 
[sic.] like the King of Hejaz.  The Arabs are weak and divided but manageable by 
any one who chooses to manage them, and very easily worked by people who 
prefer to mismanage them’.138   Elsewhere, he dismissed them for their ‘low 
standard of mental, moral, and physical activity, induced by generations of 
inbreeding’ which he believed would preclude them from ever holding much 
weight in the ‘councils of the world’.139  Evidently, Sykes’s attitude towards the 
Arabs had not changed as radically as the propaganda he produced would 
suggest.  Indeed, these comments suggest that Sykes’s only real political 
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commitment lay in the pursuit of British interests, wheresoever those interests 
lay. 
In the summer of 1917 Sykes felt undermined and defensive but, with his 
customary bravura, he fought his corner which enabled him to write to Bertie 
Clayton that with ‘a few right and lefts, a breakfast with the PM and a successful 
speech in the House’ his opponents had been laid low ‘and I found myself myself 
again’.140   Sykes covered his back by conceding that whilst the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement was fine at the time of its negotiation, it was no longer in keeping 
with the spirit of the times.  He described it as an agreement of ‘an ancient 
Imperialist tendency’ and observed that whereas in 1915 it was acceptable to 
leave annexation open as a possibility, in late 1917 ‘the idea of annexation really 
must be dismissed’.141  By early 1918 he too was arguing that the Agreement was 
obsolete.  On 3 March, he wrote to Wingate that it was effectively ‘dead and 
gone, and the sooner scrapped the better’.142  In his opinion, only via a peace 
conference, with the consent of both the governed and the world, could an 
agreement as to the tutelage of one people by another be determined.  ‘Every 
Ministerial speech says as much, so why we don’t abandon the agreements I 
can’t imagine’.143  Of course, the problem with abandoning the Agreement was 
the potential effect on Anglo-French relations.  Sykes fully understood this and 
for so long as the Agreement remained current he sought to ameliorate its 
negative connotations by urging the French to revise their approach to 
imperialism in the same way as Britain was doing.  In the view of Sykes and 
many others, the French were out of step with the new world order as their 
approach to colonisation was still to ‘Gallicise and annex’.144  The British style 
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was ‘to rule the natives on their own lines, introducing as little British element as 
possible’ and they were accordingly more in tune with current ideologies.145  As 
late as September 1918, Sykes was entreating Georges-Picot to reconsider the 
French approach.  Currently, he argued, ‘Orientals’ are of the view that 
‘Frenchmen work for the glory and benefit of France’.146  It was imperative that 
they remould their image by stripping it of everything that was ‘incompatible 
with a humane and idealistic settlement of the world’.147      
Of course, key to Britain’s new approach was her ostensible support of the rights 
of oppressed nationalities, not just the Arabs but Zionists, Kurds and Armenians, 
too.  By pursuing these causes, argued Sykes, pan-Islamism could be neutered 
and India and Africa would be protected from the ‘Turco-German combine’.  If 
the argument regarding the political and strategic advantages failed, Sykes turned 
to the ideological, claiming in Parliament that whereas the object of the Germans 
was ‘dominion’, ‘ours is liberation’.148   Liberation was due to Ottoman 
minorities, to whom, he argued, ‘we and the other Entente Powers have 
obligations and whose fate is bound up with the principle of nationality, the 
antidote to Prussian military domination’.149   Nationalism had become, in the 
words of historian, James Renton, ‘the redemptive force that was to take Western 
Asia back towards civilization’.150
Sykes’s support of the Arab, Zionist and Armenian causes is apparent in the 
propaganda he prepared in anticipation of General Allenby’s entry into Jerusalem 
on 11 December 1917.  Sykes recognised that, like Maude’s entry into Baghdad, 
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it offered an invaluable opportunity of ‘impressing on the public and the world in 
general’ the British message.151  In a note entitled, ‘Points worth stressing on the 
British occupation of Jerusalem’, he was most eager to emphasise the British 
capacity for promoting good relations between different creeds and acting as 
impartial, fair, and humble arbiter; qualities which, Sykes argued, Christian, 
Muslim and Jew all recognised the British as possessing.  In contrast, Turkish 
policy had been ‘to impoverish the Moslems, reduce the Christians to warring 
factions and force the Jews to pauperism’.152  He took particular care to highlight 
British appreciation of Muslim sensitivities by indicating British knowledge of 
Islamic history and respect towards the religion and its followers.  Drawing 
parallels between an earlier Muslim occupation of Jerusalem (as opposed to that 
of Christian crusaders), and Allenby’s, he made the following point: 
When Omar the second Moslem Caliph took Jerusalem, the patriarch invited him 
to pray in the church of the Holy Sepulchre, the chivalrous Arab refused lest his 
people should in after times claim the church and prayed in the doorway instead of 
entering.  The doorkeepers of the Church are still Moslems and in memory of 
Omar’s magnanimity General Allenby confirmed them in their office.153
Sykes’s  message to the world, that a British presence was welcome to the 
oppressed minorities of the region, was subsequently reinforced in Wellington 
House pamphlets such as The Freedom of Jerusalem which described the joyful 
reaction of a wounded Arab officer of the Turkish Army on Allenby’s entry into 
the city.  ‘That Arab officer, like the Syrians, the Armenians, the Jews, and the 
other nationalities under the Turkish Empire, was an alien subject of the most 
oppressive, corrupt, and degenerate government that holds power in the world’ 
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and his  reaction was typical, wrote Mathews, of Muslim men throughout the 
city.154  
A British presence was preferable to that of the Turks, despite their shared 
religion because, as Sykes and others  explained, whereas the British genuinely 
supported and respected Islam, the Germans and Turks  cynically exploited it, in 
pursuance of their real pan-Turanian agenda.  Indeed, according to novelist E.F. 
Benson in Crescent and Iron Cross, the Arabs posed a significant threat to the 
Turks and their planned ‘Ottomanisation’, as they numbered only one million 
less than their Turkish overlords  (seven million as opposed to eight million). 
Accordingly, the CUP had stated that Arab Muslims were not of the true faith 
thereby releasing the Ottoman government from the prohibition in the Koran 
whereby Muslim cannot fight Muslim.155   Similarly, Benson described how the 
Turks translated the Koran from Arabic to Turkish, despite the fact that this  was 
forbidden by Islam, in order to pursue their policy of Ottomanisation.  Other 
efforts  were made to replace the Arabic language with Turkish but with limited 
success.156   Turkish treatment of Arab soldiers  in the Ottoman armies also 
indicated Turkish hatred of their fellow Muslims.  Thus,
In spite of the need for troops one half of [the Baghdad Arab army corps] was sent 
from Bagdad to Erzerum in the depth of winter, without any provision of warm 
clothing.  There, in those cold uplands, the men died at  a rate of fifty to sixty a day. 
Their commanding officer was a Turk .... Though these troops had fought 
admirably, he openly called them Arab traitors, and his orders seem to have been 
merely to get rid of them.  There were no courts-martial; they were just  taken into a 
climate which killed them.157  
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Benson quoted from the writings of a ‘prominent nationalist’, called Ahmed 
Sherif Bey, who wrote, ‘it is the business of the Porte to make the Arabs forget 
their own language, and to impose upon them instead that of the nation that rules 
them’.158   This, argued Benson, amounted to a ‘definite statement of the 
Nationalists’ hostility to all things Arab .... Even Moslems were but cattle for 
them, as also were Armenians and Greeks  and Kurds’.159   It also indicated that 
the Arabs had a dormant cultural heritage set to blossom once out of the control 
of the Turks, a heritage that Britain could help restore.  In this vein, Sykes and 
others emphasised the gifts  that ancient civilisations  from the region had 
bestowed on the contemporary world.  As the West languished in the Dark Ages, 
wrote Canon Parfit, ‘Bagdad was the capital of a vast Mohammedan dominion; 
when Busrah and Kufa were rival centres of learning; when Arab scholars were 
the first teachers of algebra and chemistry; when the light of learning was kept 
aglow in the East while barbarian Huns desolated the lands of Europe’.160 
Parallels  with Britain’s position during the war were implicit.  They too were 
holding the beacon of civilisation whilst the modern-day Hun desolated Europe 
and beyond.
Despite their historical greatness, immediate independence for the Arabs was not 
possible because of the years of being ground down by the Turks.  ‘A period of 
assistance, sponsorship, education and development must intervene before such 
peoples can hope to evolve stable and self-supporting institutions’.161  Sykes was 
keen to point out that help from the Allied democracies would be in the form of a 
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trusteeship which should prevent any ‘danger of annexation, permanent 
protectorate, or monopolistic exploitation’.162  After the Bolsheviks disclosed the 
terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in late November 1917, emphasising 
Britain’s benign intent became an even greater imperative.  Cemal Pasha, the 
Ottoman commander in Syria, published the provisions  in the Middle East and 
claimed that by working with the enemies of Islam the Sherif had ‘bartered the 
dignity conferred upon him by the Caliph of Islam for a state of enslavement to 
the British’.163  The Foreign Office assured Hussein that they were only seeking 
to ‘stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the establishment of an Arab 
world in which law shall replace Ottoman injustice’.164  T.E. Lawrence (whom 
Sykes had probably informed of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement when 
they met in May) felt Sykes had betrayed the Arab cause in the interests of 
Anglo-French relations but Sykes  told Clayton to tell him ‘that now he is  a great 
man he must behave as such and be broad in his views’.165  Arab independence 
would come in due course but a period of tutelage was necessary to avoid 
‘poverty and chaos.  Let him consider this as he hopes for the people he is 
fighting for’.166  
Sykes’s support for the Arab, Armenian and Zionist causes became more fervent 
as the war drew to its close.  He had, observed one of his contemporaries, a 
‘thoroughly English compassion for the under-dog’, perhaps originating from his 
own status as a Roman Catholic in Anglican England.167   But, in line with his 
overarching motivation, which was the furtherance of British interests, he also 
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believed that if these causes were not pursued the situation would become ‘not 
only complicated but impossible to control’.168    With his typically blinkered 
perspective, he seemingly thought that only a simple carve up of territory – a 
‘quid pro quo’ whereby each ‘nation’ obtained land in exchange for supporting 
each other’s claim – was a feasible foundation for co-operation. His language 
became increasingly messianic, as he envisaged Jerusalem becoming a place 
where all three peoples could find their spiritual home.  ‘If you look at 
Jerusalem’, he asked, ‘are there not moral forces, vaguely and dimly outlined, 
there stronger than any man could imagine, the moral force of Calvary and 
Sacrifice, the moral force of Zion and eternal hope, the moral force of Islam and 
obedience?’169  
Sykes’s obsessive views put him at odds with policy makers at home and in the 
Middle East.  According to Roger Adelson, by 1918 his minutes were ‘tolerated 
rather than heeded by Hardinge and Graham, for Sykes’s frank manner of 
expression broke all the diplomatic conventions to which these professionals 
conformed’.170  In Cairo, Clayton warned him that ‘an Arab-Jewish-Armenian 
combination is so foreign to any previous experience and to existing sentiment 
that we must proceed with great caution’.171  There was a serious danger, advised 
Clayton presciently, that proceeding along those lines could backfire: ‘by pushing 
[the Zionist cause] as hard as we appear to be doing, we are risking the 
possibility of Arab unity becoming something like an accomplished fact and 
being ranged against us’.172   Not only could Arab unity be a problem, but, 
cautioned Clayton, the risk of fundamentalism could be close behind:
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We have indications of considerable revivalist movement on Wahabi lines in 
Central Arabia, such as has in the past occurred when the prestige of Islam has 
fallen low.  We are not yet in a position to appreciate the strength of this 
movement, but the defeats which Turkey has suffered, the lack of a temporal head 
in Islam, and finally the fall of Jerusalem conduce to fostering it.173
Sykes dismissed Clayton’s concerns, arguing facilely that ‘patience, enthusiasm 
and determination surmount obstacles and make circumstances’.174  He and his 
assistant, Ormsby-Gore, thought that those on the ground were a little too 
supportive of Muslims.  ‘One can’t help noticing’, wrote Ormsby-Gore irritably, 
‘the ineradicable tendency of the Englishman who has lived in India or the Sudan 
to favour quite unconsciously the Moslem both against Christian and Jew’.175    
Sykes made a final visit to the region in November 1918.  Ostensibly, his purpose 
was to assist Allenby in relation to political matters but, according to Adelson, 
Clayton had received a letter from David Hogarth stating that Sykes had been 
sent out to get him out of the way and that his views were to be ignored.176   His 
papers from this visit contain a wealth of letters from Armenians, Jews, 
Christians and Arabs, appealing to Sykes for help in the promotion of their 
respective causes, as well as personal letters seeking his help on matters such as 
finding lost relatives and the reinstatement of property.  Many of the letters 
display a touching, heartfelt belief in Sykes as a champion of the rights of the 
oppressed, reflecting the power with which he had communicated his support for 
those causes in the region as well as at home and elsewhere.  Indeed, his office at 
the Foreign Office had, according to the Zionist leader, Nahum Sokolow, become 
by 1918 a meeting place and hub of activity for the promotion of the causes he 
espoused: ‘There was a constant coming and going of Foreign Office men, MPs, 
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Armenian politicians, Mahommedan Mullahs, officers, journalists, 
representatives of Syrian Committees, and deputations from philanthropic 
societies’.177  Irrespective of his diminished influence in diplomatic and political 
circles, his public reputation and high profile in the press meant that until the end 
of the war he remained the most potent figure in the moulding of opinion on the 
Middle East and British imperialism more generally.  Thus, for example, when 
the Ministry of Information was established in March 1918 it was to Sykes that 
Beaverbrook immediately turned for instructions regarding who was to take 
responsibility for propaganda relating to Ottoman Asia.178 
Sykes’s last speech in the House of Commons was on 1 August 1918 and 
concerned the establishment of the League of Nations (he was a founding 
member of the League of Nations Society along with H.G.Wells, Gilbert Murray 
and J.H. Thomas).  In it he envisaged a future free from war where imperialism 
took on an entirely new meaning and became a vehicle for the promotion of 
peace and civilisation instead of war and oppression:
The idea of annexation and conquest which urges people on to war, the 
practicability of conquest, seems to be growing more and more remote. We see 
Germany now with her perfect machinery conquering the Ukraine, but already she 
is beginning to meet active resistance, passive resistance, and revolutionary 
resistance. That, in fact, is a blow at the evil kind of Imperialism, the kind of 
Imperialism which hopes to conquer a place, annex it, and make it one's own .... 
All these things taken together, their cumulative effect is to make people more 
ready to consider the machinery for enforcing a permanent peace than the situation 
before the War made possible. One can conceive of things happening after the War 
which one never dreamed of before.179
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According to Hogarth, Sykes’s idealism was only tempered on his last visit when 
he finally appreciated the enormity of what he was seeking in his espousal of 
Zionist, Arab and Armenian nationalist movements, as he experienced the 
dissension and suspicion in the region at first hand.  Nevertheless, he returned to 
Europe in January 1919 optimistic that he could achieve the settlement he wanted 
at the Paris Peace Conference, seemingly unaware that the leaders of the causes 
he had championed were now charting their own disparate courses.  He died in 
Paris in February 1919 of Spanish influenza.  
※
As this  chapter has shown, Sykes was an integral part of the propaganda 
machinery relating to the Ottoman Empire in its entirety.  Not only did he shape 
cultural perceptions through his writing and speeches, but he also drove policy at 
a political and diplomatic level, as  well as  for propagandist purposes.  Indeed, the 
relationship between cultural constructions  on the one hand, and official policy 
on the other, is well illustrated by Sykes’s work.   His  writing encapsulates  the 
zeitgeist of wartime attitudes  towards an ‘East’ that remained tantalizingly exotic 
and romantic whilst also providing a backdrop for a more prosaic dialectic on the 
place of British imperialism in the post-war twentieth century.
In Said’s view ‘the British and the French saw the Orient as a geographical—and 
cultural, political, demographical, sociological, and historical—entity over whose 
destiny they believed themselves to have traditional entitlement’.180  Accordingly, 
for Said, Sykes  represented all that was arrogant and exploitative about the 
British imperial project.  Sykes’s own comments about Britain’s  ability to control 
and manipulate the Arabs in order to further her own ends seemingly reinforce 
Said’s condemnation.  As an editorial in The Times smugly put it in November 
1918, the establishment of independent states of Armenia, Arabia and Palestine 
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would perfectly serve British interests as ‘if and when these States are 
constituted ... [they will] perform the same functions as buffer States to India as 
Turkey was to have performed before she betrayed her ancient alliance with 
us’.181  Clearly, there were very practical and opportunistic reasons  for supporting 
minority causes.  However, alongside such hardheaded considerations, Sykes and 
his ilk, prompted by Wilsonian ideals, attempted to create a new kind of imperial 
project in the knowledge that to preserve and extend Britain’s influence after the 
war ostensible support of these ideals was crucial.  ‘As far as [the British] are 
concerned,’ wrote Sykes, ‘if we follow an Imperialist or annexationist line we 
shall only appear before the world as self seekers, if we follow the policy we 
have outlined in the Baghdad proclamation then no man can criticise us’.182  As 
part of this  process, it was essential to depict the Arab cause as one instigated 
from within rather than manipulated from Cairo and Whitehall, and so in the 
process of recreating British imperialism, the Middle East was remoulded from 
an Ottoman backwater made up of degenerate subject races to, as historian James 
Renton puts it, ‘a region of oppressed historical nations, the Arabs, Jews, and 
Armenians, who were on the verge of a remarkable renaissance following their 
liberation and future tutelage by Britain and the entente’.183  It was a synergistic 
process whereby the reshaping of British imperialism necessitated the creation of 
oppressed peoples  warranting tutelage, and vice versa, and, as  this chapter has 
demonstrated, Sykes was of fundamental significance in its articulation. 
Whether Sykes truly believed in these causes, despite his passionate advocacy of 
them, remains moot.  The findings of this chapter indicate that he was a man of 
conviction and principle only to the extent of his patriotism.  His primary 
motivation was always  the promotion of British interests and in this regard he 
was very much a man of his times.  He dropped his Turcophile stance, adopted 
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the Sherifian cause, negotiated the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and promoted 
Zionism and Armenian independence, primarily for this  purpose.  At the heart of 
his rationale was a conviction that maintenance of the Entente was the crux of 
British policy, a viewpoint that was to determine events  at the Paris Peace 
Conference, to the detriment of the minority causes Sykes  had championed. 
Sykes’s  racism also reflected the mores typical of his  generation.  His attitude 
towards the Arabs, Armenians and Jews was invariably patronising; whatever the 
views of the indigenous population, when it came to establishing what was ‘best’ 
for them, he knew better.  Thus, even in 1918, at the height of his  passionate 
advocacy of minority causes, he was outraged when he believed that Feisal had 
overstepped the boundaries of familiarity, observing that ‘if an Oriental, even a 
Prince, becomes impertinent’ it would lead to ‘great dangers’ in matters of Arab 
policy.184   Terms such as  ‘annexation, military triumph, Prestige, White men’s 
burdens’ may have been ‘consigned to the Diplomatic lumber-room’ but it was 
still the Europeans who would be dictating the conditions in which the new 
doctrine of ‘self-determination’ would be applied.185 
Whilst Sykes may have shared the widely held biodeterministic views of his 
contemporaries regarding the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and its culture, 
ironically, many of the core values he recognised as  key to that concept of 
Englishness were, in his opinion, under threat in the West but still tangible in the 
East: respect for authority, an established hierarchy, a clearly defined sense of 
right and wrong, simplicity of values, a martial tradition, and an ancient history. 
Despite its  exoticism, it was the evocation of similarities not differences between 
an idealised West and the East that made it so appealing to him and others.  Far 
from despising the East, Sykes yearned for a society that embraced elements  of 
Oriental culture because it offered an antidote to the negative aspects of 
modernity.  This was what attracted him and formed the basis of his lifelong 
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passion.  At both a personal and a political level, Sykes’s  relationship with the 
East was thus complex and mutable.  It was a reaction to the ongoing value 
system distinctive of the Edwardian society from which he came, both its 
perceived strengths and, importantly, its frailties, and yet it was simultaneously in 
a state of constant flux reflecting, as Porter puts it, ‘the continual interactions and 
trade-offs between power and identity, tradition and calculation’ as Britain 
navigated the strategic imperatives of war.186  
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Chapter Four – Marmaduke Pickthall: The Dissenter’s Perspective
Between 1903 and 1921, Marmaduke Pickthall published nine novels set in 
Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Yemen and Turkey and three collections of short stories 
mainly about the Near East.  He published a further six novels set in England. 
Pickthall made his living from writing and, as  well as his fictional output, he 
wrote extensively for a number of journals, in particular, The Athenæum and The 
New Age which, according to Samuel Hynes, was one of the two most advanced 
literary journals of the time.1  This chapter will examine both his fictional works 
and his journalism.  There is no surviving collection of his personal 
correspondence and hence it relies predominantly on his published material.2 
Described by Mark Sykes’s  son as ‘perhaps the best Orientalist of his time’3 
Pickthall was widely considered by his peers to be one of the most penetrating 
observers of the ‘Eastern mind’.4  Yet, despite his extensive output, Pickthall was 
not an influential figure either culturally or politically.  Indeed, even his  most 
acclaimed novel, Saïd the Fisherman, did not stand the test of time despite being 
both a commercial and critical success on its publication in 1903.  Writing in 
1923, E.M. Forster described him as ‘a writer of much merit who has not yet 
come into his  own’.5  Unbeknown to Forster, Pickthall was not to write another 
novel and never did ‘come into his own’.  He is nevertheless  a critical figure for 
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the purposes of this research for several reasons.  Of particular interest, in the 
context of the previous chapter, is his relationship with Mark Sykes both on a 
personal level and as an ideological counterpoint.  As will be seen below, the 
wartime trajectories of the two men intertwined and diverged in fascinating ways 
that have not previously been illuminated by either Sykes’s  or Pickthall’s 
biographers.  Indeed, of the two biographies of Pickthall, Anne Fremantle’s tends 
towards the hagiographic, whilst the other, Peter Clark’s admirable Marmaduke 
Pickthall: British Muslim, explores his  writings and his ideas  but covers  his 
entire life in a comparatively concise volume and hence is  necessarily brief in its 
exploration of the war years.6  Neither has as  its  focal point Pickthall’s role as a 
vocal critic of the government’s wartime policy towards the Ottoman Empire 
whose writing was prolific, erudite and incisive, offering the historian an 
important insight into the mindset of an informed outsider.  Further, irrespective 
of the influence that may be ascribed to him with the benefit of hindsight, at the 
time, his willingness to criticise not only Foreign Office policy, but also that of 
Wellington House, rendered him a notable dissenting figure, and one that 
attracted the attention of the highest authorities.  As shall be seen below, in 1917, 
his journalism was considered so seditious and potentially disruptive to the 
stability of the Empire that the Foreign Office contemplated his prosecution 
under the Defence of the Realm Act.
Although he was an outsider, Pickthall was not, as has been seen, the only 
Turcophile in Britain during the war years.  Indeed, he had a number of 
influential friends, among them Lord Cromer and the aristocratic poet, politician 
and explorer, Aubrey Herbert, who shared many of his views, but, unlike others, 
Pickthall was never willing to compromise his principles for the sake of political 
or military expediency.  As a consequence he was  capable of intransigence and 
gross errors  of judgment, notably when he disputed the CUP’s culpability in 
relation to the Armenian massacres  of 1915, but, equally, he was capable of great 
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clarity being unencumbered by doctrine or policy.  The result is  that whilst his 
writing, particularly his journalism, appeared decidedly polemical to his peers, 
from today’s  perspective many of his opinions seem remarkably modern and 
farsighted, reflecting a genuinely compassionate and tolerant humanity as well as 
considerable knowledge and understanding of Islam and the Near East.
4.1 Pickthall before the war 
Born in 1875, Pickthall was almost a direct contemporary of Sykes.  Although 
his background was humbler (his father was a clergyman), he benefited from a 
securer, more conventional childhood although, like Sykes, his education was 
peripatetic.  It did, however, include two years at Harrow which undoubtedly 
shaped his  future attitudes towards politicians and the Establishment and 
provided him with the material he needed for his satiric 1919 novel, Sir Limpidus 
(see below).  Like Sykes, he spent time as a young man exploring the East but he 
would have eschewed Sykes’s  mode of travel.  Rather than the ostentatious 
‘Grand Tour’ approach favoured by Mark and his father, Tatton Sykes, laden with 
baggage, servants and interpreters, Pickthall spent two years in Egypt, Syria, 
Palestine and Lebanon immersing himself in indigenous culture and languages 
(he was  a ‘genius for languages’ claimed his biographer, Anne Fremantle, who 
could learn ‘any modern language in two months’).7  He became a fluent Arabic 
speaker and actively chose to live in the poorer districts of the cities he visited so 
that he could mix with the locals.  He ‘frequented Turkish baths; ate native meals 
and slept in native houses – following the customs of the people of the land in all 
respects’.8   Expatriates disapproved of his mixing with the local population 
which, as Pickthall put it, was ‘one of those things which were never done, nor 
even contemplated by the kind of person who had always been my model’ and 
when his mother found out he was summoned home.9   Before he left he was 
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offered the position of Vice Consul at Haifa but the offer was withdrawn when it 
was discovered that he was only twenty.  Son of a clergyman, and Old Harrovian, 
at this  point in his  life Pickthall was still conventional enough to be deemed 
appropriate material for such a position.
Just like Sykes, Pickthall was captivated and enthralled by the ‘gorgeous East’. 
What struck him most was the ‘joyousness of [Eastern] life compared with 
anything that [he] had seen in Europe’.10   He had departed for the region unsure 
of who he was  or where his future lay and, like Sykes, found the East ‘provided 
him with emotional reserves’ and a path to self-belief and identity.11   The 
romance of the region was a potent intoxicant and inspiration.  When he left 
Beirut his Arabic tutor gave him a copy of The Thousand and One Nights as a 
leaving present and, even thirty years  later, Pickthall was able to write that it 
summoned for him evocations  of ‘the daily life of Damascus, Jerusalem, Aleppo, 
Cairo, and the other cities as  I found it’.12   As he recalled in middle age, ‘he had 
been bowled over by the romance of the East, by what he might reluctantly have 
acknowledged was a sentimental attitude’ but one which was common in English 
travellers.13   When he returned to England, he tried writing about his experiences 
and achieved literary success in 1903 with a novel, Saïd the Fisherman.14   The 
eponymous hero is an amoral Syrian peasant, and the book records his 
adventures and misadventures from 1860 to 1882, benchmarked at either end by 
real historical events, namely riots in Damascus in July 1860 and in Alexandria 
in 1882.  Drawing on his close interaction with the Syrian Arabs  he had met 
during his travels, Pickthall offered an engrossing story in a culturally and 
historically accurate setting.  He was interested in both commercial success and 
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literary acclaim and so, as well as  Saïd’s  dramatic life story, Pickthall catered to 
the appetites of a British public with a taste for literature, fictional and travel 
writing, that informed about an East they found alluring and fascinating but, 
equally, alien and repellent.
On one level Pickthall relied on prevailing cultural tropes  surrounding the East, 
both positive and negative.  Arab hospitality and kindness  were emphasised but 
also a propensity towards greed and corruption.  In the words of one character, 
‘bakshish is lord of all’.15   Similarly, unlike stoic Britons, the Arabs react in 
unmanly ways.  For example, when Saïd loses his money he flings himself on the 
ground ‘moaning, howling and blubbering’.16  Physically, the East was a paradise 
of ‘vivid blue’ seas, sands the ‘colour of a ripe orange’, horizons ‘soft and 
pearly’.17  In contrast, when the hapless Saïd ends up in London he encounters a 
dystopian nightmare.  Approaching from the Thames, he sees a world that:
seemed dead, and the stir of human life upon it loathsome as the foul brood of 
corruption.  The river wound between two banks of fog, on which strange shapes of 
roof and chimney, tower and steeple, and the masts of ships appeared carven or 
painted by a tremulous hand.  From all sides clouds of smoke arose, feeding the 
gloom and blending with it perpetually.  It was as if the whole land smouldered.18  
Pickthall vividly described the land of modernity and industrial progress, feared 
and loathed by Sykes and others.  The loss of humanity and civilisation in the 
interests of capitalism are starkly imagined in Pickthall’s descriptions of the great 
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What attracted the critics was  Pickthall’s novel approach of telling the story from 
a humble Muslim Syrian’s  perspective.   ‘If Mr Pickthall be a Briton, he is an 
artificer of astonishing cleverness,’ observed one reviewer.20   ‘Into this 
Mohammedan romance ... he has breathed a spirit so Oriental as almost to 
persuade his reader that Said is  as real as Sindbad’.21  The Athenæum considered 
that ‘it is worth a place upon any shelf beside Morier’s ‘Haji Baba,’ and as an 
exposition of Syrian life and character we know nothing to equal it.  Not even the 
early part of Burton’s ‘Pilgrimage’ has more intimate charm or more of the 
glamour of Eastern story’.22   Whereas most writers and novelists  looked at the 
region from the outside, Pickthall looked out from within.    In E.M. Forster’s 
words, ‘as  soon as we open his  cheerful pages, the western world vanishes 
without a malediction, like night at the opening of day’.23   So insightful was it 
thought to be that, according to Fremantle, ‘it was given to British officials in 
Egypt to be studied as a textbook of the manners of the country’.24
In depicting the Syrian perspective, one of Pickthall’s aims was undoubtedly to 
articulate the empathy he himself felt towards the indigenous population and its 
religion, thereby delving further than conventional characterisation.  Saïd himself 
is  a dishonest rogue, but Pickthall used other characters to present a nuanced 
articulation of good, honest, Muslim Arabs.  Ismaìl Abbâs, a Muslim notable, is 
described as moral, knowledgeable and devout, a ‘byword for learning and 
uprightness’.25   Saïd’s encounter with him reveals Ismaìl Abbâs to be a man of 
wisdom and tolerance who yearns for the heyday of enlightened Islam when 
‘learning flourished like a young tree, and the desire of knowledge was with 
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every man as  the breath of life’.26   On a humbler level, Saïd’s friend Selim is 
faithful and hard-working.  He provides a moral compass for Saïd, steering him, 
for example, away from brothels  as, to visit one is ‘a shame for a true believer’.27 
Islam itself is presented evenhandedly as a religion that could attract, on the one 
hand, unthinking louts like Saïd, for whom it is  an entirely superficial and 
opportunistic experience providing, amongst other things, a pretext for criminal 
behaviour during the riots (‘men, women and children were dragged out of the 
shadowy doorways  to be hacked to death on the causeway beneath the ribbon of 
peaceful blue sky ... The mob jeered and reviled their last agonies ... And the 
name of Allah was in every man’s mouth’). 28   Pickthall illustrated how, like any 
religion, the precepts  of Islam could be exploited by the unscrupulous.  For 
example, he sardonically described how Saïd considers himself a good Muslim 
because he ‘had not neglected to pray to Allah five times a day, had eaten no 
pork, and had been careful to avoid handling any unclean thing’.29   On the other 
hand, Pickthall sought to demonstrate how, in the right hands, Islam could offer a 
viable spiritual and cultural alternative to Christianity.  He captured, for example, 
the concept of Islam as an inherent part of the social structure, conveying the 
fellowship and shared morality it engendered, when he observed how a 
gregarious coffee house throng collectively stop talking and take out their prayer 
rugs when the muezzin calls them to prayer and ‘a shrill murmur from the city 
floated out over the darkening gardens – the chanting from a hundred minarets, 
the voice of the common conscience bidding all men pray’.30
As with Sykes’s pre-war travel writing, the Turks are depicted as benign rulers, 
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norm.  Accordingly, a character who makes his living as a beggar, describes how 
when he begged from a European missionary he ‘told him a grievous tale of how 
my house had been burned and all my children killed by Turkish soldiers.  This I 
said knowing that a Frank loves always to hear evil of the Turks’.31  In the years 
after the publication of Saïd the Fisherman, Pickthall became increasingly 
outspoken about what he perceived as  Western hostility to the Turks.  He found a 
means of expression in subsequent novels, and also in journalism, particularly in 
numerous articles and book reviews for The Athenæum and The New Age. 
Between 1903 and 1914 he became known as something of an authority on 
‘eastern subjects’ in much the same way as  Sykes.  During a subsequent visit to 
Egypt in 1907 he made the acquaintance of other influential thinkers on the East 
including Sykes himself as  well as Valentine Chirol, George Lloyd and Aubrey 
Herbert.32  
Although a committed Turcophile, Pickthall approved of Britain’s  Egyptian 
regime.  He articulated his position in his 1908 novel, The Children of the Nile: 
‘it did not greatly matter in whose hands rested the reigns of power – so long as 
justice prevailed and religion flourished.  Such ends were achieved when Egypt 
was controlled by red-faced loud-speaking Englishmen’.33   He continued to 
defend Cromer’s administration during the war, in particular, in relation to the 
controversial Denshawaï incident, which, as  has been seen in Chapter One, was 
capitalised upon by the Germans for propagandist purposes.  His  pro-imperialist 
stance is also evident in a review he wrote in August 1909 of another Egyptian-
based novel, The White Prophet by popular novelist, Hall Caine.34   Hall Caine, 
like Pickthall, empathised with the local population, but unlike Pickthall, he took 
a nationalist stance.  With echoes of the Mahdist movement in Sudan, and 
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by an unworldly prophet bent not on seizing power but on returning Egypt to a 
more spiritual, less corrupt state.  Pickthall did not think the book warranted 
attention from a literary perspective (Hall Caine was considered decidedly 
lowbrow, his works amounting to little more than the ‘Penny Dreadfuls’ of the 
Victorian era) but felt himself duty bound to review it comprehensively because 
it ‘has been translated into Arabic, and hailed with pæans by a section of the 
native press, thus attaining an importance, in regard to Egypt, which seems to us 
beyond its merits’.35   Pickthall felt that Hall Caine’s characterisation of both 
English and Egyptian characters was poor, observing sardonically that
except  for their free use of words like “damn” and “fool,” the “English” characters 
in this book have nothing English about them.  They stamp and gnash their teeth, 
fling themselves upon the ground, and weep and rave, like Orientals ... till by the 
end of the book we are almost  tempted to believe that, while Mr. Caine may have 
conversed with Orientals (through a dragoman [like Sykes]), he has never seen or 
heard, much less consorted with, an Englishman.36  
Hall Caine’s knowledge and understanding of Egypt and its peoples  was equally 
lacking in Pickthall’s  view.  He pointed out, for example, that ‘Mr. Caine uses 
Mohammedan as a synonym for Egyptian more than once, thus ignoring the 
existence of the Copts as part of the Egyptian nation and their right to equal 
consideration with the Muslims’.37   Further, Caine dangerously misjudged the 
political situation in present day Egypt: ‘the author’s picture of the fanaticism of 
the Mohammedans is much exaggerated, as concerning Egypt at the present day; 
and his suggestion of a return to the bare Coran, as preaching tolerance, sounds 
the depth of his ignorance of the whole subject’.38  The only concession Pickthall 
made was to point out that Hall Caine at least did not fall into the ‘common error 
of confusing civilization, in the modern sense, with Christianity’, a point that 
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went to the heart of Pickthall’s own ethos that Islam could be as  much a force for 
progress as Christianity.39
According to Michael Diamond, author of ‘Lesser Breeds’: Racial Attitudes in 
Popular British Culture, 1890-1940, Hall Caine’s  book was one of his least 
successful commercially, not because of its implausibility but because of his 
unpatriotic, anti-imperialist stance.40   George Bernard Shaw defended Caine’s 
position in a preface to a second edition, arguing that it enlightened the reader on 
the Egyptian case, but that edition never appeared and the preface was  published 
separately as a pamphlet.  Taking a similar stance to Pickthall, The Manchester 
Guardian took issue with Bernard Shaw’s defence, in particular, his  argument 
that Mr Caine should be listened to because of the number of books he sold.  ‘Mr 
Shaw brushes aside what he calls the hackneyed literary attack with the strange 
remark that Mr. CAINE “sells  a thousand copies where most other men of letters 
either sell a hundred or cannot escape from journalism into books at all,” and he 
ridicules talk about style as meaning merely that Mr. CAINE’s is  different from 
“ours”’.41   On the contrary argued The Manchester Guardian, as well as other 
reviewers such as those in The Spectator and The Saturday Review, the size of 
Caine’s readership was relevant only to the extent that it highlighted his 
irresponsibility in exploiting ‘his  popularity with a half-educated public to 
inflame sedition and defame his country’.42  
In contrast to Caine, Pickthall was invariably a thoughtful, careful writer of 
fiction who strove to be even-handed and to enlighten and educate rather than 
proselytize.  However, following the Balkan Wars  and a four month stay in 
Constantinople in 1913, he became more ardent in his support of the Turkish 
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administration and more politicised in his views on Britain’s relationship with it. 
He founded an Anglo-Ottoman Society to ‘advocate a political and commercial 
understanding between Great Britain and Turkey and firmly to oppose 
encroachment on the Ottoman Empire’.43   The Society was a success, attracting 
the support of, amongst others  Sir Louis Mallet (British Ambassador to 
Constantinople), Aubrey Herbert and E.G. Browne (Sykes’s old Cambridge 
tutor).44  In March 1914, his account of his time in Turkey (which first appeared 
as a series of articles in The New Age) was published in book form as With the 
Turk in Wartime.  Pickthall’s stance was  typical of men like Sykes and Herbert, 
who in 1914, earnestly sought the maintenance of Britain’s historical relationship 
with Turkey.  He considered himself a traditional English Tory of the Disraeli 
mould for whom patriotism and a commitment to the Ottoman Empire were not 
incompatible: ‘loving England and the East,’ argued Pickthall, ‘beholding our 
great Indian Empire, [Disraeli] wished England to become the benefactress of the 
East, its guide to freer life and more enlightened institutions’.45   Contrary to 
popular belief, argued Pickthall, Disraeli’s scheme was not peculiar to him but 
the result of an historical Eastern policy supported by many great nineteenth-
century statesmen:
Palmerston or Peel, by Canning, Pitt, and even earlier statesmen, who saw that 
England’s greatness depended not on these islands on the edge of Europe, nor on 
the annexation of new regions on the outskirts of the inhabited world, but on the 
possession of rich countries in the East, which many nations coveted.46  
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the wisdom of our ancestors who sought to interpose some independent  buffer state 
of military power at every point between our frontier and the frontier of the 
Russian Empire.  An independent Turkey was regarded by our older, better-
educated statesmen as just as necessary to the structure of the British Empire in the 
East as a safety-valve is to a steam engine: do away with it – the thing explodes.47  
For Pickthall, the success  of British rule in Egypt and India, was founded on 
‘universal toleration’.  Like Sykes, he vociferously objected to the response of 
the English press to the Balkan wars, namely the way they ignored or understated 
atrocities  committed by Christians on Muslims but not the other way round. 
Pickthall viewed this  coverage as tantamount to a fanatical crusade and one that 
served the ends not of the British Empire but of its ‘greatest Eastern rival’, 
Russia.48   He argued, that the traditional British imperial approach reflected a 
tolerant and universalist Christian ethos:
It  seemed to me that there were two kinds of Christianity; one, which would limit 
its benevolence to Christian peoples; the other, which regarded the world with all 
its creeds and races as the theatre for Christian charity and Christian justice.  The 
first, which still prevailed in Russia and the Balkan states, and still could claim 
adherents here in England, was essentially the same fanaticism which we blame so 
loudly when it  appears to the more ignorant  Mohammedans.  The second gave the 
spirit  of our Eastern empire, the spirit  of humanity and tolerance which one 
associates with modern life.49  
Not only was Britain’s current anti-Turkish approach intolerant and immoral, it 
was also shortsighted as it failed to take into account the effect on Muslim 
opinion within the Empire, or to recognise and embrace Eastern efforts, led by 
Turkey, to modernise and emulate Western nations.  Indeed, in Pickthall’s view, 
far from embracing Eastern efforts at modernisation, Western powers ‘shrink 
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back in horror as  did Frankenstein before his monster, trying frantically but in 
vain to wreck their work’.50
4.2 Pickthall During the War
Pickthall’s endorsement of the British Empire was founded on the same basis as 
his support of the Turkish regime.  He believed that both were built on tolerance 
of others.  Although he was interested in the political dimension, it was the 
spiritual and the moral elements that formed the cornerstone of his principles. 
Perhaps it was for this reason that after the outbreak of war, unlike Sykes, he was 
unable to discard his Turcophile leanings.  Throughout the war (and after), he 
retained unwavering loyalty towards the Turks and the CUP and, as the 
opportunistic Sykes’s influence and importance grew exponentially as  he 
reshaped his  views in light of wartime exigencies, Pickthall grew increasingly 
ostracized from mainstream political opinion and by 1917 even faced 
criminalization for his support of the enemy.  The growing gulf between his own 
views and the mainstream did not stop him from continuing to take a pro-Turkish 
stance in his writing despite the obvious commercial risks.  In keeping with the 
era, he wrote a number of novels with a propagandist agenda but, in contrast to 
Wellington House’s authors, his were in pursuit of a personal crusade to promote 
the Turks and their religion.  
A 1916 novel (which Fremantle claimed was ‘highly praised and widely read’ 51), 
The House of War, typifies Pickthall’s  approach which was to expound the idea 
of Islam and Turkish rule to an English-reading world and dispel unfavourable 
western interpretations of Islamic practices and attitudes, without preaching.52  In 
this  particular novel he deployed a naive young English missionary, Elsie 




52 Marmaduke Pickthall, The House of War (New York, 1916).
damage they could cause.  Elsie has been brought up in England to believe that 
Muslims were savage and uncivilised, thus when she meets  the Wâli (a local 
Muslim governor) she is disappointed to find him ‘immaculately clad in 
European fashion,’ because she had expected ‘something picturesque and 
barbarous, more evidently wicked than this neat old gentleman, who, but for his 
fez, might easily have been mistaken for a French diplomatist’.53   The Muslims 
she encounters  are not only sophisticated and cultured, they are also wise and 
tolerant.  Accordingly, when Elsie meets the Wâli’s daughter, Emineh, she finds a 
girl who is sweet and attractive, articulate, and educated in a tolerant, broad-
minded fashion, far removed from the subjugated and terrorised victim of an 
Eastern harem that typified the British notion of Muslim womanhood.  Emineh 
explains to Elsie the benevolent attitude of Ottoman rule to Christianity. 
Christians in the Empire had ‘always been permitted to perform their own 
religion.  They were not oppressed any more than were the poor Mahometans till 
they began to wish to ruin the whole country’.54   The British Consul explains to 
Elsie that there was ‘far more want and wretchedness among the Muslims’ than 
among the Christians who had been ‘cockered up and educated by the various 
missions, backed up by the foreign consuls’.55   Another character, a local 
Christian Syrian notable, Sheykh Bakîr, reflects that ‘he had heard his 
grandfather declare that [the bitter enmity between Christian and Muslim] was 
something new, the bad result of foreign interference.  Before the Muscovites and 
Franks began their meddling, the old gentleman had been wont to say, Christians 
and Muslims understood each other and were better neighbours’.56 
Thus Pickthall had Muslim and Christian, Englishman and Syrian, man and 
woman, advancing the view that Ottoman rule was benign, and that enmity 
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between Christian and Muslim was a consequence of Western interference.  His 
own position was most clearly articulated in the character of Fenn, an 
enlightened Englishman and romantic hero of the novel, who tells Elsie:
Before the missionaries of all Christian sects and nations flocked to this unlucky 
country, the native Christians were in general contented.  If most of them were 
poor, so were most of the Mahometans.  The burden of oppression was on both 
alike.  There was then a chance that  the two religions – you may call them races – 
would advance together to a higher stage of civilization.  Now the Christians are 
made discontented and seditious, petted by the foreign missionaries, who pour 
contempt on all the customs of the country and teach their converts the innate 
inferiority of the Muslims, basing their arguments on such unChristian things as 
iron-clads and steam-engines and factories.57  
The Syrian characters approve of Fenn.  Sheykh Bakîr respects him because ‘[he] 
takes men as he finds them, as God made them .... his  character is more that of a 
good Turk than of a Frank’.58   Again, Pickthall emphasised the importance of 
tolerance towards others  not only as the foundation of moral behaviour, but also 
as the key to successful imperial rule.  In this  respect Ottoman and British 
imperial methods  overlapped, although Pickthall believed that Western nations 
benefited from a ‘higher stage of civilisation’.  ‘Civilisation’ did not mean 
industrial progress, but a more enlightened, humanitarian, approach to things like 
‘personal security and attempts at even-handed justice’, and it was the duty of 
Western nations to help Eastern nations, under the leadership of the Turks, to 
reach this state.59  Thus, for Pickthall ‘Oriental’ government was less progressive 
than Western government but neither term should, in his opinion, be used 
interchangeably with Muslim or Christian government as either religion was 
capable of being associated with civilised, or indeed despotic, government 
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Whilst Pickthall believed that the Ottoman Empire would benefit from Western 
guidance, he thought that only the Turks could control the disparate population of 
Ottoman Asia.  ‘Whatever peace and order have existed for the last five centuries 
in Syria, Mesopotamia and the Kurd-Armenian vilayets is owing to the Turkish 
force’.60   Without them, the region would lose ‘the only factor which has made 
for peace and progress’.61   Pickthall’s belief in the essentially progressive nature 
of the CUP regime meant that when stories of the Armenian genocide began to 
emerge in the spring of 1915 he disputed them:
[The allegation that  they] took place at the command, or in any sense with the 
connivance, of the Turkish Government, seems most improbable .... The chief 
desire of the present  rulers in Turkey has always been to prove their country 
worthy to take rank among the civilised, enlightened empires of the world, and 
their ideas of civilisation and enlightenment are derived from English and French 
sources, not from German frightfulness.62
Instead, he claimed any Armenian deaths at the hands of the Turks were a 
reaction either to Armenian hostility or the result of violence on the part of the 
Kurds or Arabs.  Thus, in The House of War, the Wâli tells Elsie that Christians 
had suffered at Muslim hands only because ‘we love our land and our religion, 
and when either is assailed we kill’.63  He goes on to explain, ‘the massacres have 
never been on one side only’.64   Later, Fenn tells  Elsie that the West only hears 
Christian tales of woe because the Turks are too proud to ‘plead their case before 
the world.  The native Christians make the most of theirs.  Always remember that 
when you hear Turks accused’.65
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Pickthall took particular exception to Arnold Toynbee’s  1915 pamphlet, 
Armenian Atrocities: The Murder of a Nation.  In an article entitled ‘Gospel of 
Hate’ he excoriated Toynbee for his racism, for effectively claiming that the 
Armenians warranted special care and attention simply because they were 
Christian and were therefore better than Muslims.  As discussed in Chapter One, 
Toynbee had emphasised in his  pamphlet that disgraced Armenian girls  were 
‘Christian women, as civilized and refined as the women of Western Europe’ and 
Pickthall asked in return:
What  does Toynbee mean by that? Does he mean that  the peasant girls and women 
of Armenia are as civilized and refined as English ladies of the wealthy classes, or 
as the girls and women of a Suffolk village, or as the harridans of a London slum, 
or as the prostitutes of London and Paris?  The statement is unnecessary, and it 
seems to me deplorable, because it  is an appeal to the religious fanaticism, being 
based on the fanatical and altogether false assumption that Christians are 
intrinsically better than Mohammedans, and their lives of more worth.66 
As has  been seen in Chapter One, that is exactly what Toynbee and numerous 
others (for example, Stuermer and Ian Hamilton) seemingly believed.  Pickthall’s 
vociferous objection to this Christian ‘fanaticism’ was undoubtedly what 
prompted The House of War in which he sought to show not only the mischief 
caused by Christian missionaries, but also that Christian Arabs were just as 
capable of violence as their Muslim counterparts.  ‘Are the Eastern Christians 
better people than the Mohammedans in time of peace; more honest, kind, and 
just in all their dealings?’ he asked.67  And he answered, ‘They are not’.68  And, 
in war, he argued, the Christians were equally ruthless, being, like the Muslims, 
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‘Orientals’ in outlook.  In response, Toynbee defended his position in The New 
Age, arguing that he agreed both Christians  and Muslims were capable of 
committing atrocities but that this  did not negate the unique characteristics of the 
current events.69  
In 1916, Pickthall took on Sykes, ‘outing’ him as a hypocritical opportunist who 
had gone from reviling the Armenians to promoting their cause and sympathising 
with their plight.  Pickthall’s article in The New Age was prompted by Sykes’s 
letter to The Times of 20 April 1916.  In it, he distanced himself from a pamphlet 
by a Captain C.F. Dixon-Johnson, The Armenians, in which extracts from 
Sykes’s  books were cited offering a negative depiction of the Armenians.  As has 
been seen in the preceding chapter, by April of 1916 Sykes had embraced the 
idea of the break up of Ottoman Asia and the championing of the rights of its 
subject peoples as  a means of extending British interests  in the region.  Needless 
to say, Dixon-Johnson’s references to his prior work sat uncomfortably with his 
newfound views and Sykes was anxious to ensure that there could be no doubt as 
to his position.  Accordingly, in his letter to The Times, he wrote that far from 
being ‘in sympathy with the underlying ideas which inspire its author [Dixon-
Johnson]’ he had the ‘very deepest sympathy with unfortunate Armenian peoples, 
whose millennium of martyrdom’ was, he hoped, now ‘reaching its final stage’.70 
Pickthall responded with alacrity in The New Age, expressing his  disconcertion at 
the tone of Sykes’s disclaimer.  Citing extracts from The Caliphs’ Last Heritage, 
in which Sykes nailed his colours firmly to the mast, Pickthall (somewhat 
disingenuously one must assume) expressed himself anxious to ascertain ‘what 
has caused this sudden change in his opinions’.71  In May Pickthall corresponded 
further with Sykes when he became involved in a scheme to make a separate 
peace with Turkey, instigated in Switzerland by a group of Turks. 
Unsurprisingly, Sykes batted this away.  By now, with the terms of the Sykes-
215
69 Arnold Toynbee, ‘Letters to the Editor’, The New Age, 2 December 1915, XVIII,p.118.
70 Mark Sykes, ‘Letters to the Editor,’ The Times, 20 April 1916.
71 Marmaduke Pickthall, ‘Sir Mark Sykes and the Armenians’, The New Age, 4 May 1916, XIX, p.6.
Picot Agreement finalised and the Arab Revolt imminent, peace with Turkey was 
the last thing that Sykes wanted.
In early 1917, when the new anti-Turkish propaganda campaign was launched, 
Pickthall was  well-known as an Eastern expert but the continuation of his  vocal 
Turcophile stance after hostilities commenced ruled him out in the eyes of the 
Foreign Office as a potential source for propagandist material.  In a letter to the 
Admiralty, Montgomery observed that there was a shortage of experts  to take the 
government’s  position and ‘unfortunately some of the authorities with the best 
knowledge of the Turk are rather too fond of him, such as Sir Edwin Pears and 
Marmaduke Pickthall’.72   Pickthall alienated himself further in a speech for the 
Central Islamic Society in the summer of 1917 at Caxton Hall, which received 
coverage in the press and attracted the attention of the Foreign Office and the 
Arab Bureau.  The Near East reported that Pickthall had asserted that the only 
reason Palestine was a holy land alike for Christian, Jew and Muslim was 
because of Ottoman tolerance.  In contrast, ‘when the Crusaders conquered 
Palestine and ruled it for a time, they were far from showing the same tolerance 
as had been shown by the Moslems’.73   In Pickthall’s view it would be ‘a world 
disaster if [Palestine] were taken from Moslem government’.74   He warned that 
whereas the Zionist immigrants in Palestine were ‘marked by an extreme and 
narrow fanaticism’, the ‘Moslems did not hate Jews or Christians as such, and 
had always tolerated those religions in their country’.75  He predicted that Zionist 
supremacy would mean ‘oppression for the other elements of the population’ in 
the future.76
216
72 Montgomery to Fitzmaurice, 26 March 1917, TNA FO 395/139/42320.





Sykes’s  associate, Albina, reported to Sykes  and the Arab Bureau that the 
government needed to ‘keep a close watch on the movements, actions and 
correspondence’ of the Central Islamic Society which was  a ‘a motley gathering 
of seditious Indians, Egyptians, Nationalists and English and foreign 
adventurers’.77   ‘Can’t Pickthall be muzzled?’ queried Clayton of Sykes, 
although, as has been seen in Chapter Three, he shared Pickthall’s concerns 
regarding Sykes’s promotion of Zionism.78  As Albina put it in his covering letter 
to Sykes, ‘the introduction into Palestine of Jewish rule, or even Jewish 
predominance, will mean the spoilation of the Arab inhabitants of their hereditary 
rights’.79
The end of 1917 saw Pickthall’s position further compromised in the eyes of the 
Foreign Office when he wrote a letter to the editor of The Saturday Review 
deconstructing ‘The Turk Must Go’ propaganda efforts so carefully implemented 
by Sykes and Wellington House.   Pickthall’s letter was  a response to comments 
in an article in The Times of 26 November that ‘there has always been foremost 
in the minds of the Turks a long-standing desire for the total extinction of the 
Arab race, and hatred and scorn of the Arabs’.80  On the contrary, wrote Pickthall, 
‘this is twaddle .... The Turks never had the slightest desire for the extinction of 
the Arab race.  The Arabs of the Hejjâz, retaining their own tribal and feudal 
systems, were for the greater part of the period of Turkish suzerainty under a 
loose, and often merely nominal, not a despotic rule’.81   Far from being an 
oppressed minority awaiting the loosening of their shackles by their Western 
liberators, the Sherif and his predecessors ‘ranked as high Ottoman officials, and 
one can fancy that his present Highness must occasionally see in dreams his 
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pleasant palace on the Bosphorus and the old comfortable days’.82   In contrast to 
the Turks, wrote Pickthall, the Arabs of Arabia had always been made up of petty 
tribal fiefdoms and were neither great civilisers nor devout Muslims:
It  is the fashion for the moment to confuse the Arabs of Arabia and the desert with 
the vast  Arabic-speaking populations outside Arabia, in whom the mixture of 
Arabian blood is very small, who acquired the Arab speech when they embraced 
Islâm.  These (Muslims) were the people who produced the splendid civilisations 
of Cordova, Cairo, Baghdad, and Damascus.  The noble followers of the Prophet 
became one with them, merging their nationality in their religion, as became true 
Muslims.  The Arabs who remained behind in Arabia soon resumed their ancient 
habits, their tribal raids and jealousies.  All the civilisations which arose to any 
height in the peninsula were the work of mixed Muslim populations in the plains 
and cities, protected by the Caliphate against the highland Arabs.83
Pickthall’s words bear a remarkable resemblance to the pre-war writing of Sykes 
and Hogarth referred to in Chapters  Two and Three.  Indeed, Sykes was still 
writing in this  vein into 1915, but whereas Sykes  and Hogarth revised their 
opinions in light of Britain’s changing strategy, Pickthall stuck doggedly to the 
view that authentic Arabs were little better than unscrupulous bandits, far 
removed from the noble race of nascent nationalists depicted by Sykes  and 
Wellington House in the latter half of the war.  In subsequent years Pickthall 
expressed ‘horror’ that people would assume that he and T.E. Lawrence had 
much in common.84   On the contrary, Pickthall disapproved of Arab nationalism 
and of Lawrence himself whom he considered self-regarding and entirely 
disingenuous.  ‘He was  undoubtedly a man of talent in his way’, wrote Pickthall 
grudgingly, ‘but it was a way I disliked, and I cannot help regarding the fame he 
managed to acquire as a popular aberration which the future historian will be 
quite unable to substantiate on grounds of fact’.85  
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Pickthall’s letter to The Saturday Review went on to attack directly Britain’s 
propaganda efforts with regards  to the world’s  Muslims in a way that must have 
incensed Sykes and seemed like a personal attack especially at a time when, as 
has been seen in Chapter Three, he was feeling personally besieged.  Pickthall 
expressed amazement that the details of the Sykes-Picot Agreement had received 
such wide coverage in the press  ‘for they show the Allies to have been quite 
conscienceless in their designs upon an Asiatic Empire, and will rouse the utmost 
horror in the East’.86   Further, he drew attention to the government’s  failure to 
take advantage of the propagandist opportunities presented by their refusal to 
remove the caliphate at the behest of Russia, ‘with the declaration that it was  an 
affair for Muslims only to decide’.87   In Pickthall’s view effective propaganda 
would have proclaimed this fact with ‘flaring headlines’ as it showed an 
understanding of Islamic practices and a respect for Muslim people.88  He further 
outraged Sykes by referring to the Sherif as the government’s  ally which was 
fundamentally in contradiction with Sykes’s  efforts to ensure the revolt appeared 
as if it were fomented entirely from within.
Pickthall was  outside of the secret corridors of political power and did not have 
in-depth knowledge of Sykes’s or Wellington House’s machinations.  Even so, by 
delving into an assessment of the government’s  propagandist efforts and referring 
to the Sherif as the government’s ally he must have known he was treading on 
dangerous ground.  In his own way, Pickthall was as blinkered as Sykes in his 
belief that Britain’s best interests were served by helping the Turks  modernise 
their Asian empire, and his absolute unwillingness to consider alternatives.  With 
his knowledge of the region and of Islam, this made him a very dangerous 
opponent.  The Foreign Office clearly saw his vocal and erudite opposition to 
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their policies, and to their propaganda techniques, as a threat.  In a Foreign Office 
Memorandum Stephen Gaselee and others considered whether Pickthall could be 
prosecuted under DORA.  It was  decided that it was inadvisable, not because 
there was no case to answer, but because the attention that the question of 
whether or not the Sherif was an ‘ally’ of Britain would receive rendered it 
undesirable because of the potential effect on Indian Muslim opinion.89   Instead, 
Gaselee suggested, ‘a letter of protest from Col. Buchan to Mr Baumann [the 
editor of The Saturday Review] would perhaps best meet the case’.90
Sykes, also raised the matter of Pickthall’s letter in his  ‘Appreciation of the 
Attached Eastern Report No. XLVI’, dated 14 December 1917.  He 
acknowledged the power of Pickthall’s  comments but sought to dismiss them as 
tantamount to ‘enemy propaganda’ rather than recognising them as valid and 
acute criticism of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and his propagandist strategies.  In 
his typically dramatic fashion, Sykes wrote:
Mr Pickthall has written a letter to the “Saturday Review” ... which is in its way a 
masterpiece of enemy propaganda.  He – 
(a.) Insinuates that our ally King Hussein is a venal traitor.
(b.) Does his best to set the Arabs at variance.
(c.) Suggests that we have violated the holy territory by introducing police into 
Mecca.
(d.) Goes in for pure Turcophilism.
The editor of the “Saturday Review,” Mr Bauman, might be informed of the ill-
effects of such letters; when they reach Egypt and India they are used by our 
enemies for all they are worth.91
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For Sykes, Pickthall’s comments represented the antithesis of the position which 
he and Wellington House had so carefully sought to cultivate.  He must have 
been livid at Pickthall’s trenchant attack on the failures  and hypocrisies  of his 
dealings with the Sherif and his  propagandist efforts  and it was not just he and 
the Foreign Office who were annoyed. The Secretary of State for India 
telegrammed the Indian Viceroy, on 15 December, suggesting that it was 
‘desirable to prevent circulation [of The Saturday Review] in India and re-export 
to Arabia.  Foreign Office have sent similar instructions to Cairo’.92
Pickthall was rendered further suspect when he announced his  conversion to 
Islam on 29 November 1917 and declared Islam alone to be a progressive 
religion.  ‘Pickthall took on the name Muhammad and immediately became one 
of the pillars  of the British Islamic community’.93   The Muslim community in 
Britain during the war revolved around the mosque in Woking whose Imam was 
Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, a barrister and scholar from Lahore who had come to 
England in 1913 with the object of enlightening the British on the tenets of Islam 
and making converts.94   He was ‘a powerful personality with much energy and a 
command of trenchant English .... and gave a coherence previously lacking to 
British Islam’.95   Under Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, ‘Woking became a social centre 
of British Islam, an essential port of call for foreign Muslim dignitaries.  Visiting 
Indian princes, in later times the Amir Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the Amir 
Abdullah of Transjordan, all made their way to the mosque at Woking’.96 
Pickthall was already involved in this  community through his championing of the 
Islamic faith and of the Turkish regime.  He had written for the Islamic Review 
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and Modern India, set up by Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, and participated in rallies 
and lectures.  His  conversion simply cemented existing ties and enabled him in 
1919 to act as Imam when Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din returned to India.
It was perhaps opportune for Pickthall that he was called up in 1918.  He had 
always claimed that he wanted to fight for his country as long as he did not have 
to fight the Turks and, in fact, he was happy and enjoyed a sense of purpose 
during his war service.97   ‘For the first time in his life’, wrote Anne Fremantle, 
‘Marmaduke found in England the same feeling of comradeship as he had found 
in the East’.98   He became a corporal and was put in charge of an influenza 
hospital. Despite this, for some reason, he felt that Sykes had developed a 
personal vendetta towards him.  Although neither of his biographers refers to it, 
Sykes’s  papers  from 1918 contain a letter from Aubrey Herbert to George Lloyd 
in which he wrote,
I have had a letter from Marmaduke Pickthall, who believes that  he is being 
persecuted by Mark.  I don’t  believe that Mark would consciously persecute any 
one, but he is fanatical about his own ideas and cannot bear being thwarted. 
Pickthall says that  Mark told the Editor of “The Saturday Review” that  he, 
Pickthall, was a member of the C.U.P., which I think is quite possible .... I hope 
that you will do what you can to help Marmaduke Pickthall.  Men like Cromer and 
Machell don’t give their friendship without some reason.  Afterall, Pickthall is a 
genius at his work ....99  
George Lloyd must have raised the matter with Sykes as, on 11 July 1918, Sykes 
wrote to him assuring him that he had not been persecuting Pickthall and had 
only contacted The Saturday Review at the Foreign Office’s request regarding 
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Pickthall’s ‘disgraceful’ articles in that publication.  Sykes referred to the fact 
that Pickthall had now been called up and noted that ‘I have had nothing to do 
with the man for over two years  [presumably when Pickthall was agitating for a 
separate peace with Turkey in 1916] except to urge that he should be well treated 
if and when he was called up’.100
4.3 Beyond the War
Very soon after the war ended Pickthall produced a satirical novel called Sir 
Limpidus which made clear his disillusionment regarding the Establishment that 
he had found himself at odds with during the war.101  As  a work of literary merit, 
Sir Limpidus does not stand out, and contemporary critics were restrained in their 
praise.  E.M. Forster considered all Pickthall’s  novels about England ‘bad’ 
whereas  on Ottoman Asia he considered him to be ‘the only contemporary 
English novelist who understands the nearer East’.102  Sir Limpidus nevertheless 
offers the reader valuable insights into the perspective of an astute outsider on the 
operation of power and position in Edwardian Britain.  In addition, it helps 
further enlighten the researcher on Pickthall’s own wartime stance, as well as 
offering insights into his views  on Sykes, who, as will be seen below, bore 
remarkable similarities to the novel’s  eponymous hero. Like Sykes, Limpidus is 
born into an aristocratic family with a large estate whose function ‘was to furnish 
sport to the possessor and his  bidden friends’.103   His  father, Sir Rusticus, 
believes  his  duty is to bring Limpidus up in ‘the good old English way – to ride 
straight, shoot straight and walk straight.  We’ll have no crookedness’.104  Part of 
this  process involved attendance at a famous  school.  Initially, Limpidus is 
shocked by what he encounters, which is  not what he expected from so elevated 
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an establishment attended by generations of his  family.  ‘Blasphemy, foul 
language, brutality, petty larceny – surely these were not included in the system 
which his father had so warmly praised’.105   Pickthall picked out the irony of 
similarities  between the English public school system and the ‘barbaric’ janissary 
system of the Ottomans:
By wise provision of the early sultans, were Christian children taken from their 
parents and forcibly converted to another faith, to form a stalwart  guard for the 
existing order, free from all mawkish sentiment and human ties.  But  the parents of 
the Janissaries, it is said, objected.  The parents of young Limpidus and his 
compeers disbursed large sums of money in order that their sons might undergo 
that special treatment.106
Pickthall implied that it was not for a scholarly education that families sent their 
sons to famous public schools:
It  was for the rough-and-tumble life, the fun, the hardship, the indelicacy, the 
rubbing off of eccentricities, that the nobility and gentry sent  their sons there; and 
the snobs sent  their sons to meet  the sons of the nobility and gentry, to acquire their 
tone and to become like them the guard of the existing order, free of its court  and 
eligible for its honours.107  
As Kelly Boyd suggests, school was focused on ‘the creation of a national ruling 
class defined by birth and money’ and ‘scholarship was derided’.108  Despite his 
initial misgivings, Limpidus soon moulds himself into the school product. 
George Carillion, who performs a similar role to Fenn in The House of War as  the 
mouthpiece of many of Pickthall’s own views, comments that Limpidus has 
‘acquired the tone and catchwords of this place more perfectly than any other boy 
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or diplomacy whereas  he, Carillion, will never be able to pursue such a career as 
he cannot ‘play the game’.  ‘I can’t keep my sympathies confined to “our own 
fellows” – I’m always thinking of outsiders.  It’s  a handicap’.110   In contrast to 
the clever and original Carillion, Limpidus is mediocrity incarnate and this 
mediocrity is  the key to his  success and popularity at school.  ‘The business of a 
gentleman’, believed Limpidus, ‘was to approve or disapprove, according to the 
accepted standard of his set’ not to be original or inventive.111   Limpidus had 
learned to ‘play the game’, in other words, he had learned the public school code 
that would distinguish him as a privileged Englishman from those who were 
not.112 
By the time Limpidus  arrives at Cambridge his  conscience has been ‘beaten to a 
pulp’ and 
just  as the janissaries of old Turkish sultans imagined that the world belonged to 
them and behaved accordingly, while posing as the custodians of law and order, so 
Limpidus looked out on life with a marauder’s eye and deemed that he was born to 
reap its pleasures, on the understanding that he was a bulwark of his native land.113  
His unwavering belief in his  own superiority is evidenced on his European tour, 
when Pickthall incisively depicts an encounter with an Italian whom Limpidus 
has inadvertently insulted.  The Italian challenges Limpidus to a duel which, of 
course, he agrees to without any hesitation.  After being wounded in the arm he 
invites  everyone to drink beer and eat sandwiches with him.  ‘His  friend, who 
understood Italian, told him they admired his courage, which astonished 
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that Providence would let a decent Englishman be killed by an Italian 
monkey’.114   
Pickthall’s description of Limpidus’s travels to Egypt and Palestine, reflect his 
absolute disdain for those travellers who visited solely with the purpose of sport 
and temporal pleasure, failing entirely to pay attention to the culture, history or 
people of the regions through which they travelled:  
[H]e shot wild duck in sight of famous temples, and quail within the shadow of the 
pyramids.  He bought  some Arab ponies, and played polo.  Then he went on to 
Palestine, passed through Jerusalem, and had a shot at  wild boar in the Jordan 
valley; thence on to Asia Minor, where the sport was better, but  the conditions 
much too rough.115  
In Constantinople, ‘he visited a mosque or two, and rode once round the walls. 
He found the city picturesque but dull, and wondered how the Turks survived 
without the drink’.116  Limpidus  progresses to Russia, where he is  infatuated by 
the lifestyle he encounters.  With the blackest of humour, Pickthall describes how 
Limpidus is  struck by how ‘everything was  run like clockwork upon proper lines. 
The people knew their place; they were contented, pious, and respectful.  If any 
rascal tried to agitate them and upset them he was put away’.117   Reflecting 
Pickthall’s belief in Russian hostility to the Turks as  lying at the root of British 
policy, he described how the gullible Limpidus is  convinced by the Russians that 
the Turk must go and that Russia must have a large slice of the Ottoman Empire. 
‘I don’t dislike the Turk’, the Russian nobleman insists to Limpidus, aiming 
straight at the heart of their shared sensibilities, ‘he has the manners of a 







Like Sykes, Limpidus  returns from his  travels determined to write a book.  ‘I’ve 
seen some funny places off the beaten track; and, for one thing, very few 
Englishmen have seen as much as I have of the inner life of Russia’.119  His book 
is  so boring and unoriginal that he takes  the advice of Carillion and gets a ghost 
writer to help him finish it.  Limpidus  is certain that when the book is published, 
‘all the world would know him for a young man to be reckoned with, an 
intellectual giant of the ruling class’.120   The book is a success  and having 
established a reputation as  a Russophile, as well as author of a well-known book, 
he is appointed as a junior member of the diplomatic service in St Petersburg just 
as Sykes  was  sent to Constantinople.  Inevitably, Limpidus soon decides to enter 
Parliament or, as Pickthall described it, ‘the well-kept playground of an ancient 
game with rules  and customs and a hierarchy’.121    The book Limpidus has 
written serves him well.  In words that could have been addressed directly to 
Sykes, the head of his party assures Limpidus a great political future:
You are young, but you have written a book of serious import  on a subject in which 
many members of the House are deeply interested.  You are the heir to great 
estates.  You have a stake in the country.  You are what  the House considers as a 
solid man; and, if you choose, you can rise to almost  any height.  The House will 
always listen to a man like you.122  
The leader of his  party also gives him the nod on when to make his maiden 
speech which Limpidus is told should be upon his  ‘special subject, Russia, in 
relation to Great Britain’s foreign policy’.123  Just like Sykes’s maiden speech on 
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the Ottoman Empire it is well-received, Limpidus’s  intent being, in typically 
vacuous fashion, to ensure the speech is ‘approved of by everybody’.124
Very quickly, Limpidus rises to the position of Cabinet Minister.  Carillion 
ponders on the fact that posts  are so often filled with men lacking expertise in 
their area.  This, he opines, is not muddle but self-preservation:
You see the uninitiated think that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs must  be 
a splendid linguist  and a travelled man.  As a matter of fact he need not  be either. 
The only important  thing is that he should be the type of man who fits into the 
place assigned to him in the machine .... the man who knows too much, and is too 
much in earnest, must at all costs be kept out.125  
This man was, of course, Pickthall himself, banished to oblivion because he was 
too knowledgeable about the Near East, too empathetic with ‘outsiders’, too 
committed to his principles.126   Limpidus’s lack of principle is starkly imagined 
when he decides to support the women’s suffrage movement having long 
opposed it.  Like Sykes’s volte face from committed Turcophile to proponent of 
the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire, Limpidus is motivated not by right 
and wrong but by opportunism, because to continue to oppose it was simply to be 
‘upon the losing side’.127  
Pickthall’s disillusionment with British politics  were no doubt partly to blame for 
his decision to leave England in 1920 and take up a position as editor of the 
Bombay Chronicle, an Indian Nationalist newspaper, although he said that his 
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his departure, he continued to advocate passionately the Turkish cause and did 
not become more diplomatic in his criticisms of those aspects  of British policy he 
objected to.  In 1920, he wrote to Herbert that ‘if a malignant madman with a 
“down” on England had been put in charge of our “Mohammedan” propaganda 
during the war, it could not have been more nicely calculated to offend the 
East’.129   In the short term, his critics would have declared him wrong.  The 
Empire’s Muslims did not rise against their overlords during the war; if British 
prestige had slipped, it had been re-established; and, she had positioned herself 
well to secure post-war influence in the Middle East.  In the longer term, 
however, many of Pickthall’s observations seem startlingly, heartbreakingly, 
prescient, not least his  prediction that the carving up of the region by Western 
powers would lead to civil strife.  For example, writing in 1915, he observed:
Most  English pro-Turks, and they are numbered by the hundred thousand, have 
despaired of the survival of a Turkish Empire.  They now would plead for a small, 
entirely independent  Turkish State, with other small, entirely independent Muslim 
States around it, covering the whole region of the present Asiatic Turkish Empire. 
The scheme, thus vaguely stated, seems attractive; and it is, perhaps, better than 
nothing, which is all its authors claim for it.  But  everyone who knows the lands in 
question at  all intimately, will see difficulties.  In the first  place, who is to define 
the boundaries of those several independent States?  Where different Powers with 
diverse interests arrange a boundary line by dint  of haggling, the result  is apt  to be 
disheartening, as in the case of Albania; where the line was drawn between villages 
and their own pasture lands, between large mountain districts and their market-
towns.  And in a land of fighting tribes, that  leads to strife.  Secondly, the provinces 
of Asiatic Turkey are none of them inhabited by Christians or by Muslims only. 
Most  of them, indeed, contain a wonderful collection of conflicting creeds and 
petty nationalities.130
Whether he was  equally insightful in his  belief that only a benign Muslim power 
could manage the challenges posed by the region’s diversity is a question that 
cannot be answered but that his rationale reflected a sincere belief in tolerance 
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and equality as the foundation of successful rule is  indubitable.  Whilst he 
believed the Turkish regime represented these values he, nevertheless, shared the 
opinion of his contemporaries that Western civilisation was more enlightened 
than ‘Oriental’ civilisation and it was the duty of Western powers to assist 
Oriental governments on the path to progress  in terms of matters  such as 
education and the rule of law.  Where he diverged from his contemporaries was 
in his  disapproval of the way in which they used the notions of Oriental and 
Islamic civilisation interchangeably.  To him the two notions were very different. 
Whereas ‘Oriental’ civilisation, whether practised by Muslim or Christian, was 
‘three hundred years, at least, behind’ Western civilisation, the precepts of the 
Islamic faith as laid down by the Prophet were inherently progressive.131   Of 
course, Pickthall’s  views were fundamentally undermined by the CUP’s 
endorsement of the Armenian massacres.  But whilst he was wrong in his 
exculpation of the regime from responsibility, his point regarding Toynbee’s, and 
others, focus on the fact that the atrocities were being committed by Muslims 
against Christians was a valid one.  For him, this prejudice warranted the label 
‘fanaticism’ as much as any actions undertaken by Muslims.   
The same rationale led Pickthall to fear the establishment of the League of 
Nations.  Whereas Sykes was  one of its original supporters, Pickthall worried 
about its potential to become an exclusionary institution of Christian nations 
only.  In his view, this would be the antithesis of everything the British Empire 
stood for.  Even after the war, Pickthall considered the British Empire shared 
greater affinity with the Ottoman Empire than it did with other Christian powers. 
‘From the moment it became an empire,’ argued Pickthall, Britain ‘has had more 
in common with the Muslim Empire than with Byzantium or Spain or Portugal or 
any technically Christian empire of the past’ as both empires espoused ‘liberty of 
conscience’ and the tolerance of ‘religious communities other than Christian’.132 
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Pickthall was seemingly as unwavering a Turcophile in 1919 as he had been in 
1914.  As Clark points out, ‘his loyalty to the Committee of Union and Progress 
outlived the committee’ itself.133  As far as  Pickthall was concerned, ‘Turkey has 
never been the villain of the piece at all.  The villain of the piece was Czarist 
Russia, now defunct’.134   
※
Pickthall was a patriot and an imperialist, as  much convinced of the superiority 
of Western civilisation as any of his contemporaries.  Like T.E. Lawrence, Sykes, 
Hogarth, Clayton and numerous others, he would no doubt fall within the ambit 
of imperial historian John MacKenzie’s disparaging grouping of those members 
of a British generation who ‘travelled with overweening self-confidence, using 
the badge of their Britishness as a passport to all kinds of cultural feasts  and 
voyages  of self-discovery’.135   Just like them, Pickthall considered that his 
experience of the East gave him a unique right to opine on what was right for its 
future.  As Clark observes, ‘like them he claimed a special authority as a result of 
his own particular experience.  Like them, this led him to project ethnic 
stereotypes’.136   Patronisingly, he thought he knew best what was in Turkish 
interests, as well as the British Empire’s, just as Sykes  claimed a special 
knowledge.  What differentiated Pickthall was his conviction that civilisation 
meant matters  such as access to education and justice and was entirely distinct 
from the question of religion.  The fact that the West was largely Christian and 
the Ottomans were largely Muslim was irrelevant to any assessment of their 
relative degree of civilisation.  Pickthall’s scholarly knowledge of Islam had 
convinced him that it was not a bar to progress.  Indeed, it was  inherently a 
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progressive religion when correctly interpreted.  Accordingly, the East was just as 
capable as the West of an advanced degree of civilisation.  Britain could better 
protect her global position by recognising this and fostering the East’s own path 
towards progress than by stepping in and taking control herself.  The West’s  lack 
of understanding and knowledge of the region, its  culture and its religions, could 
only lead, in the long run, to civil strife and a backlash of hatred against Western 
powers.  
Pickthall was also one of the very few to recognise the subtleties of Wellington 
House’s Eastern propagandist efforts, to critique it and to try to counter it.  The 
relative freedom of the British press enabled him to confront the government’s 
activities in such a way that in 1917 those in the highest authority feared the 
consequences of his words.  The result was censorship in Egypt and India as his 
comments in relation to the Sykes-Picot Agreement and Britain’s alliance with 
the Sherif were just too close to the bone.  Whilst the demise of Turkey’s Asian 
empire proved unstoppable, Pickthall may have taken heart from the fact that, as 
was seen in Chapter Two, the motif of the ‘Clean Fighting Turk’ never really 
disappeared.  In a review of Pickthall’s  1921 novel, The Early Hours, the 
government’s  wartime efforts to dispel the image would seem to have entirely 
passed by The Saturday Review’s anonymous reviewer.   Far from contradicting 
Pickthall’s belief that ‘the Turk is a born gentleman’, the reviewer raised the old 
suggestion that it was the mixed races of the Ottoman Empire that were to blame 
for Turkish belligerence: ‘the Turkish functionary is rarely a pure-blooded Turk, 
but a mixture of Armenian, Greek, and Georgian, in which the survival of the 
fittest has often brought into being a singularly able and detestable individual’.137 
Just as in the pre-war days, it was the Levantines, invariably Christian, who were 
really culpable not the good old Turk.  Whilst Wellington House may have been 
successful in their projection of a revitalised Arab race, their efforts in relation to 
the Turks were perhaps more transitory.
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An established and successful author, a notable Eastern expert, a prolific 
journalist, a patriot, in many ways Pickthall conformed to the expectations  of 
Edwardian society.  Only relentless  adherence to his  principles stood in the way 
of potential power and influence.  His marginalisation, perceived treachery and 
personal sense of exclusion and isolation, suggest the extent to which during the 
war dissent from the government's  position was both exceptional and 
unacceptable. As shall be seen in the next chapter, his fiction, too, marked him 
out through his efforts to empathise with the voice of the colonised, but, of 
course, his gravest offence lay in the potential of his  journalism to undermine the 
Empire’s prestige by challenging British support of the Arab Revolt and her 
enmity towards the CUP.  As has been seen, these were subjects that lay at the 
heart of  Britain’s Ottoman-related propaganda.  Pickthall was fortunate indeed 
that the prospect of unwanted attention precluded his prosecution under DORA.
233
Chapter Five – Fiction and Ottoman Asia
Whilst Chapters One, Two and Three focused on state-sponsored activities, it is 
contended that the activities of the ‘state’ cannot, and should not, be separated 
from the cultural formation of ideas.  The two are synergistic.  Whilst on the one 
hand politicians  and propagandists followed an official policy they remained 
individuals, shaped by ‘a particular set of ideas and cultural concepts, a 
mentalité’.1   This final substantive chapter will seek to construct further the 
contemporary cultural reality by examining in greater detail the fictional writing 
of the period.  As  Edward Said asserted, narratives were ‘immensely important in 
the formation of imperial attitudes, references, and experiences’ and, despite their 
fictitious content, they engaged with real issues and anxieties.2   This was 
particularly so in the early twentieth century when much writing was 
‘diagnostic’ in nature.  As David Trotter observes, ‘a number of writers sought to 
emulate their heavyweight Victorian predecessors  by combining a didactic 
intention with healthy sales figures’.3  A loaded novel, purposefully conveying a 
social or political message, was entirely in keeping with the Edwardians’ literary 
heritage and, of course, it was  from this heritage that Masterman drew when he 
turned to England’s novelists to provide wartime propaganda.  
The chapter will begin with some observations on Edwardian literature relating 
to the themes of this thesis  before turning to an analysis of John Buchan’s novel 
of 1916, Greenmantle.4  The conjunction of didactic intention and popular fiction 
is  epitomised in Buchan’s wartime novel which is  unique in its status as  a 
bestseller with broad and enduring appeal, written by someone integral to the 
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government’s  propaganda work and intimately connected with both military 
intelligence and Foreign Office policy.  In terms of printed material, it can be 
seen as a consummate example of the amalgamation of official policy and 
popular culture, and hence, in light of its themes, is a critical source for the 
purposes of this research.  Finally, it will turn to the immediate aftermath of the 
war touching on its effect on the types of fiction under consideration.  
As in the preceding chapters, the intention is to show how Britain’s  response to 
the East and its  Islamic peoples was not a consequence of a single overriding 
concern but a reaction to several.  Like official propaganda, Eastern fiction sat 
within an ongoing dialogue regarding the purpose and legitimacy of imperialism 
that reflected contemporary concerns  as well as historic assumptions.  Whilst 
often reliant on stereotypes, it was  nevertheless fluid and reactive, responding not 
only to cultural preoccupations but also, in due course, to the strategic 
imperatives of the war. 
5.1 The attractions of ‘Eastern’ Fiction
Edwardian Britons  shared a long-standing appetite for exotic Eastern literature 
that arguably dated from the publication of a French translation of The Thousand 
and One Nights by Antoine Galland in 1704.  It was an instant success and 
galvanised popular interest in the Orient.  Galland, and subsequent English 
translators such as  Edward Lane and Richard Burton, appealed to their readers’ 
imaginations but also assured them that their publications had the additional 
merit of being educational by offering a true and accurate insight into the 
customs and institutions  of Muslims.  Norman Daniel asserted that the impact of 
the Nights on European culture cannot be overestimated and the frequent 
references to it in endless  texts, not least those of Sykes, Pickthall and Buchan, 
support this contention.5  The cultural mentalité of Edwardian Britain, was made 
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up in part of the Nights which, in the nineteenth century, had become a standard 
work in gentlemen’s libraries.6   Whilst stimulating interest in the East, at the 
same time the Nights emphasised perceived differences between East and West. 
By creating a mythopoeic East, it encouraged a belief that Muslims were 
different, physically and culturally, thereby arguably eroding any natural sense of 
common humanity and facilitating an imperial relation.  A mythopoeic East was 
cemented in the public imagination in work such as Thomas Moore’s Lalla 
Rookh (1817), Morier’s The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan (1824), and 
Fitzgerald’s English translations  of Omar Khayyám’s Rubáiyát.  A number of 
historians see James Elroy Flecker’s poetic play Hassan: The Story of Hassan of 
Bagdad and How He Came to Make the Golden Journey to Samarkand (written 
between 1913 and 1914 but published posthumously in 1922) as the summation 
of this tradition.7   Flecker, another young Oxford graduate, and member of the 
Levant Consular Service, was inspired to write Hassan after reading a French 
translation of the Nights and by his travels in the Ottoman Empire between 1910 
and 1914.8   His vivid depiction of a magical, picture-book East captured the 
imagination of London’s theatrical producers  and led to Hassan’s performance 
on the London stage in 1923 (see below).
Like the Nights, Eastern fiction at the end of the long nineteenth century fed an 
enduring appetite for escapist entertainment.  Often formulaic in structure, it 
fitted the template that historian, Reeva Spector Simon, describes of books that 
have ‘emotional appeal and fill the need for vicarious experience and the desire 
to escape from reality into a more exciting life: sexual fantasy and sudden 
wealth, interaction with other cultures, victory over great and unconquerable 
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odds  ...’.9   The East offered the perfect escape route as the antithesis of the 
‘overpowering ugliness of the Victorian industrial landscape and the appalling 
conditions in which most people lived’.10   The contrast between Syria and 
London presented by Pickthall in Saïd the Fisherman aptly illustrates this point.
Whilst Edwardians may have sought an escape from their domestic lives, the 
historian Mary Hammond, a specialist in reading tastes and publishing during the 
early twentieth century, argues that in some respects they viewed ‘Victorianism 
as a simpler age if not a golden one’ and harked back nostalgically to the greater 
certainties of those times.11   Accordingly, the ‘popular novel once more 
‘worlding’ in the (often sexually) untamed spaces of Africa [and Arabia?]’ was 
much in demand, although, it is  argued here that, whilst there was an ongoing 
appetite for imperial settings, the complexities and uncertainties  of the new 
century were nevertheless  embedded in the fiction of the period.12   Samuel 
Hynes, in The Edwardian Turn of Mind, cites  Charles  Masterman who, before the 
war, had been the literary editor of a daily paper, and observed of Edwardian 
literature that it was ‘at war with civilisation’.13  D.G. Hogarth, future head of the 
Arab Bureau, articulated the concern when he observed, ‘our civilization has 
grown so complex that a long dormant instinct of revolt is awake.  The 
individual, chafing under his burden of social observance, wants to return, for 
however short a time, to more primitive life and feel his  self-sufficiency’.14 
Fiction with an Eastern theme provided a backdrop for a dialectic exploring the 
meaning, purpose and direction of Western civilisation.
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As well as  providing a context for discourse on progress and civilisation, the 
Middle East was  seen by academics, explorers and Orientalists as one of the few 
regions of the world yet to be fully understood, explored, or indeed, conquered. 
As Priya Satia, argues, the numerous travelers and scholars  who gravitated 
towards the region were part of a cultural industry that fulfilled an appetite at 
home for information on the region, an appetite she refers to as a ‘literary cult of 
the desert’.15  It was a topic of interest not only because of its untapped potential 
but because of the religious significance of the Holy Land and because of fears 
that due to modern developments such as the Young Turk revolution and the 
construction of the Baghdad Railway, it was  a land whose historic integrity 
would soon disappear.  Figures such as  Gertrude Bell, David Hogarth, T.E. 
Lawrence, Aubrey Herbert, not to mention Sykes  and Pickthall, travelled there 
either with the intention of becoming writers or with the idea that going there 
was primarily of literary interest.  Intimately connected with the mainstream of 
Edwardian society via their social and political connections, these figures helped 
shape cultural norms.  
As touched upon elsewhere, another element of the Edwardian mentalité was the 
perceived spiritual crisis.  Just as in the eighteenth century when the mythical 
East had seemingly offered an alternative to rationalism, so in the early twentieth 
century some saw it as an antidote to an existential crisis brought about by 
progress and modernity.16   Thus many of the protagonists  of Eastern-based 
fiction from this period were there because they were in search of a spiritual 
identity.  One such example is  the heroine in Robert Hichens’ hugely popular 
1904 novel, The Garden of Allah, who, on arriving within the ‘huge spaces’ of 
the Sahara, heard ‘the footsteps of freedom treading towards the south .... [and] 
all her dull perplexities, all her bitterness of ennui, all her questionings and 
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doubts, were swept away on the keen desert wind into the endless plains’.17  The 
East offered both a physical and a cultural reductionism perceived to be long 
gone from the ‘narrow, crowded world’ of Western Europe.18   Indeed, the East 
had a redemptive purity when contrasted with the West, besmirched as it was by 
commercialism and modernity.  This  viewpoint is  apparent in the many contrasts 
between Eastern landscapes and London scenes.  As Hichens’ heroine puts it, 
‘surely it was difficult to be clean of soul’ in the ‘desperate dirt of London 
mornings’.19 
This was not the literature of high culture, dense and layered with meaning, like 
Conrad’s ‘Heart of Darkness’ or Woolf’s The Village in the Jungle (both masterly 
explorations of the tension between civilisation and nature, between imperialists 
and the colonised, and set in Africa and Sri Lanka respectively), nor was it the 
most crude and naive style of imperial story telling as represented, for example, 
in the work of Edgar Wallace or Cutcliffe Hyne, and later in the ‘pulp 
orientalism’ of Sax Roehmer.20   In general, like Pickthall’s novels, this Eastern 
fiction lay somewhere in the middle.  These were ‘books of the hour’ and were 
concerned with imperialism, and Britain’s role as  an imperial power, but not 
necessarily via the straightforward retelling of imperial adventure stories. 
Reflecting the preoccupations of the era, such novels looked beyond conquest to 
the complexities  and practicalities of the imperial relationship.  Whilst many of 
the vestiges of the traditional imperial adventure story remained in terms, for 
example, of the upright British hero, or the travails of an inhospitable climate, 
they often strove to engage with the contemporary dialectic concerning the 
morality and legitimacy of imperialism.  Like Pickthall, many novelists had 
visited the region and formed their opinions firsthand.  Unlike Pickthall, their 
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work was largely introspective, approaching the subject from the experience and 
anxieties of the imperialists  not the colonised.  As  Zachary Lockman points out, 
the public appetite was  for the fantasy of the East and there was ‘relatively little 
interest in how the indigenous inhabitants of these lands actually lived, what they 
thought, or how they saw the world’.21  
With the exception of Pickthall’s  work perhaps, such novels were not written for 
the intelligentsia but the ‘masses’ or the ‘herd’, to use two of Mary Hammond’s 
terms.22   Historically, this has led some literary critics, notably Edward Said, to 
dismiss such popular literature as  irrelevant, or, at least, as  lacking cultural 
validity for the purposes of historical analysis  but, as Hammond warns, it is 
important to acknowledge the ‘slipperiness of generic definitions’ because of the 
closeness and interdependence of popular and literary fiction.23   Although these 
books were neither classic works of literature nor written for the intellectual élite, 
one cannot assume the identity of the readership or the influence (or lack of 
influence) of one genre over another.  The Orientalist scholar, and trenchant critic 
of Said, Robert Irwin, has  highlighted the dangers of Said’s own ‘over-
interpretation of selected works  from the canon of high literature’ which he 
argues is both misleading and shortsighted.24   In Irwin’s  view ‘it is  unsafe to 
assume that wider attitudes to the Orient were shaped by the intellectual elite in 
some kind of trickle-down effect’.25   For the purposes of this  thesis, which is 
concerned with the themes  and not the quality of the fiction, it is asserted that 
popular fiction has  just as great a claim to being historical source material as 
does literary fiction, and its  commercial success  confirms it as  a rich source for 
the illumination of current ideas and attitudes within British society.
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5.2 The Themes of Edwardian Eastern Fiction
An appropriate place to start is with the atrocity narratives of the 1890s generated 
on the back of the Mahdist uprising in Sudan in the 1880s and 1890s as they 
(building on the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Bulgarian atrocities  of the 1870s) 
signified a shift in popular attitudes whereby the notion of the barbarous Oriental 
was given a definitively Islamic flavour, when the articulation of Islam as a 
‘menace’, as ‘fanatical’ and resistant to the West’s civilising efforts, solidified. 
Although ostensibly non-fiction, the borderline between fact and fiction was 
imprecisely drawn in these works whose purpose was essentially to entertain and 
satisfy a voracious  appetite for sensationalist atrocity accounts.  Of primary 
importance in creating the idea of the Mahdiyya as the epitome of Islamic 
brutality and fanaticism was the work of Reginald Wingate, Director of 
Intelligence for the Egyptian Army and subsequent High Commissioner and 
protagonist in the creation of Eastern-related propaganda during the war.  In the 
1890s he produced three accounts, including two captivity narratives, depicting 
life in the Sudan under the Mahdiyya as mired in debauchery, cruelty and 
primitivism.26  In the words of explorer Henry Stanley, Wingate’s account of the 
captivity of Father Ohrwalder, Ten Years’ Captivity, was ‘one of the most terrible 
of books; for its powerful way of leaving impressions on the mind ... of “Death, 
Dead Bones, Desolation”’.27   Whilst Wingate’s work on Ohrwalder was a modest 
commercial success, his 1896 account of the captivity and escape of Rudolph von 
Slatin, Fire and Sword in the Sudan, was a bestseller. By 1898 it had, according 
to its  publisher, Edward Arnold, become a ‘standard work’ and had ‘found its 
way into every Library’ in Britain.28  
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As the title implies, Fire and Sword was a sensationalist and lurid tale of war and 
adventure.  Full of battles, political intrigue, accounts of suffering, imprisonment 
and torture, it was a perfect fit with the juvenile literature produced by Henty, 
Stevenson, and others, as well as with many of the motifs  of the Nights 
(particularly Burton’s translation).  In keeping with High Victorian imperial 
ideology, the enemy was not another Western race, but an uncivilised Oriental 
race whose vices  were depicted in prurient detail, satisfying not only the readers’ 
salacious  interests but also fuelling the conceptual culture of British imperialism 
whereby the inadequacies of less progressive peoples could be held up in contrast 
to Western civilisation thereby justifying British intervention.  Another writer, 
and a subsequent recruit to the wartime propaganda effort, captivated by the idea 
of the wild, Islamic fundamentalists of Sudan was Arthur Conan Doyle, who 
penned The Tragedy of the Korosko in 1898.29  Set in 1895 when the Mahdiyya 
was still at large, it tells the story of a group of spoilt Western tourists  who 
undergo a life-changing experience when they are kidnapped by the Mahdists 
whilst holidaying on the Nile.  Like Wingate, Conan Doyle capitalised on the 
public’s interest in sensationalist, voyeuristic literature where Western characters 
fall victim to the debauchery and fanaticism of Islamic extremists.  Some of the 
party are killed, all of them suffer from privations and their captors’ cruelty, 
whilst the threat of joining the Khalifa’s harem hangs over the women 
throughout.  
Whilst the work of all novelists of this period was arguably ‘imbued with, if not 
animated by, an awareness  that a vast portion of the earth’s surface was subject to 
Britain’, those who engaged with British involvement in the Middle East 
approached the subject more directly.30   Having recently worked in Egypt and 
witnessed the British administration at close quarters, Conan Doyle was, like 
Pickthall, a supporter of the regime and contributed to the ongoing debate 
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regarding the morality of Britain’s  occupation of Egypt.  Indeed, in the opinion 
of Norman Daniel, Conan Doyle’s book was nothing less  than a tour de force, ‘so 
completely are the bones of the imperial expectations of 1898 laid bare’ for the 
subsequent delectation of the historian.31   Conan Doyle used the character of a 
cynical Frenchman to voice the view that the occupation was  entirely self-
serving.  In contrast, two Englishmen, a retired colonel and a young diplomat, 
articulate the British position.  The diplomat bemoans Britain’s self-sacrificing 
approach to the world whereby she, still the world’s prevailing superpower, 
continues to play the role of global policeman:
Now we police the land for Dervishes and brigands and every sort  of danger to 
civilisation .... If a Kurd breaks loose in Asia Minor, the world wants to know why 
Great Britain does not keep him in order.  If there is a military mutiny in Egypt, or 
a Jehad in the Soudan, it  is still Great  Britain who has to set it right .... We get  hard 
knocks and no thanks, and why should we do it?  Let Europe do its own dirty 
work.32  
Colonel Cochrane responds that it is a nation’s duty to further the principles  of 
civilisation and, like a good soldier, Britain ‘is  often called upon to carry out 
what is  unpleasant and unprofitable; but if it is obviously right, it is mere 
shirking not to undertake it’.33  
Whereas Britain was striving to bring progress to less enlightened races, Conan 
Doyle depicted the Arabs as monolithic, unchanged for centuries.  ‘In all save the 
rifles  in their hands’, described Conan Doyle, ‘there was nothing to distinguish 
these men from the desert warriors who first carried the crescent flag out of 
Arabia’.34  Whilst their primitivism was  a source of marvel, their fanaticism was 
to be feared.  As Colonel Cochrane declares ‘there is no iconoclast in the world 
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like an extreme Mohammedan’.35   Despite the perceived threat of Islamic 
fanaticism, Conan Doyle, like Sykes, Lawrence and numerous others, was 
fascinated by the self-negating, existential appeal of the desert as well as  by the 
intoxicating power of Islam as a source of motivation and a uniting force 
amongst men.  Both represented the antithesis  of modern, Western society, so 
complex, self-regarding, and rational.  Describing the Arabs’ prayer ritual, Conan 
Doyle observed:  
The great red sun was down with half its disc slipped behind the violet bank upon 
the horizon.  It was the hour of Arab prayer .... And how they prayed, these 
fanatical Moslems! Wrapt, absorbed, with yearning eyes and shining faces, rising, 
stooping, grovelling with their foreheads upon their praying carpets.  Who could 
doubt, as he watched their strenuous, heart-whole devotion, that  here was a great 
living power in the world, reactionary but tremendous, countless millions all 
thinking as one from Cape Juby to the confines of China?  Let  a common wave 
pass over them, let  a great  soldier or organiser arise among them to use the grand 
material at his hand, and who shall say that this may not  be the besom with which 
Providence may sweep the rotten, decadent, impossible, halfhearted south of 
Europe, as it did a thousand years ago, until it makes room for a sounder stock?36
In Islam and the desert lay possible answers to the Edwardian spiritual crisis but 
its power also highlighted the Empire’s fragility.  Perhaps there was  also 
something about the region and its history that emphasised the ephemerality of 
imperial control.  Writing in 1914, another Wellington House propagandist, 
William Le Queux, reflected in his novel, The Hand of Allah, upon its 
transitoriness when he contemplated the ‘bare, barren site of what was once the 
greatest city in the world: Thebes’ but which was  now swallowed up by sand.37 
Just as ‘Thebes rose, became the greatest city in the world, and then fell, just as 
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As mentioned above, Conan Doyle contributed to the dialectic regarding the 
British occupation of Egypt.  This was a common theme.  Marmaduke Pickthall 
defended the regime in his 1908 novel, The Children of the Nile, and, as 
discussed in the preceding chapter, Hall Caine’s damning, and controversial 
account, The White Prophet, was published in 1909.  A riposte to Hall Caine’s 
work was written by Douglas Sladen in 1909, The Tragedy of the Pyramids, in 
which Sladen, like Pickthall, implied that strong British rule was  appropriate for 
Egypt.39  Percy White wrote another popular book on the subject in 1914, Cairo, 
which was reissued in 1919.40   Gilbert Parker, the prominent Wellington House 
figure, also wrote Egyptian tales, notably The Weavers in 1907.41   Set before the 
British occupation, Parker depicted Ottoman rule as violent and exploitative but 
the Muslim subjects themselves were, when not subject to fanaticism, benign and 
devout.  As  one character puts it, in Egypt ‘the people are all right and the 
Government all wrong’.42   Opprobrium was  reserved principally for the 
Levantines, those ‘cormorant usurers – Greeks, Armenians, and Syrians, a 
hideous salvage corps, who saved the house of a man that they might at last walk 
off with his  shirt and the cloth under which he was carried to his grave’.43 
Nahoum Pasha, an Armenian and the novel’s chief antagonist, ‘Christian though 
he was’, was nevertheless, ‘Oriental to his furthermost corner, and had the 
culture of a French savant.  He had also the primitive view of life, and the morals 
of a race who, in the clash of East and West, set against Western character and 
directness and loyalty’.44   It is up to Parker’s protagonist, a young, idealistic 
Quaker, bearing a remarkable similarity to General Gordon in his earnest 
idealism and saintliness, to bring justice and fair play to the Khedive’s court.  
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The vilification of Orientals who embraced Western influences extended to 
Muslims.  Thus in Cairo, the English hero’s antagonist is an Oxford educated 
Egyptian, Sayed Bey, whose English education is seen as a veneer behind which 
lies his real, Eastern character:  
He was, he boasted, a Mohammedan much as his “advanced” European 
acquaintances were Christians – that is to say, agnostically.  Yet he was as ready to 
believe in witchcraft as to quote Huxley ....  In spite, therefore of Oxford and 
England, of London and Paris, his culture was but a thin veneer that fell off in 
flakes whenever shaken.45  
The villain in Le Queux’s The Hand of Allah is  also an Oxford educated 
Egyptian, Ahmed Amim.  He is ‘broad-shouldered, well-set-up and athletic, with 
a dark, refined face and intense black eyes’.46   Like Cairo’s  Sayed Bey, Ahmed 
Amim has the veneer of a ‘refined, polite Egyptian gentleman’ but in private ‘his 
habits were those of the low-class native.  At night he would slink into the ill-lit 
slums of Cairo and smoke hasheesh in the lowest of the Arab cafés’.47
The views expressed by authors such as Le Queux and White reflected a 
contemporary dialogue regarding the benefits of bestowing a Western education 
on the colonised (a subject that animated Sykes, as has been seen in Chapter 
Three).  For many, liberal education policies, far from strengthening ties between 
colonised and coloniser, were seen as having the opposite effect.  As a character 
in Hall Caine’s The White Prophet pithily puts it, ‘Teach your dog to snap and 
he’ll soon bite you’.48   More broadly, it was  commonly believed that adulteration 
of castes and societies inevitably led to bad results.  Such superficially civilised 
Muslims as Ahmed Amim and Sayed Bey posed a particular danger to white 
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women.  Le Queux’s Ahmed Amim charms the ladies of London Society with his 
civilised exterior and underlying animal magnetism and power.  At a London 
soirée ‘no man was so sought after ... by the other sex as the tall, grinning, 
brown-faced personage in the red fez’.49   ‘Women adored him.  His soft, quaint 
English sounded to them musical and pretty, his manners were charming, and his 
refined tact and delicacy, combined with his enormous wealth, appealed to 
them’.50   In Le Queux’s opinion the ‘Mohammedan’ was frequently attractive to 
women and he put this down to ‘the romance which surrounds [them]’.51   The 
aura of romance was  undoubtedly bound up with the mystique of the Nights. 
Thus one of Amim Bey’s attractions was ‘his splendid palace – a veritable 
Aladdin’s palace – at Heliopolis’.52  
Amim is not a figure to be mocked or patronised in Le Queux’s story.  He is 
fearsome and threatening.  A danger to the government, to the Empire, to the 
purity of white women.  He has  the guile, the strength, the money and the motive 
to beat them at their own game.  He holds the English heroine, Marjorie, in his 
thrall like ‘a crushed butterfly in the hollow of his hand’.53   This is not the 
dimwitted, primitive savage of earlier imperial literature.  On the contrary, Amim 
is  a force to be reckoned with.  He is adept at espionage and has contacts and 
spies all over the West.  In this, explained Le Queux, he was ‘only following the 
habit of certain great [Jewish?] European and American financiers’.54  Here was a 
figure who ‘more than one [English] man’ envied for his  ‘influence, his position, 
and his success  with the opposite sex’.55   Of course, there were still those who 
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were ‘disgusted’ by Amim, who ‘hated the taint of the black blood’.56  And yet, it 
is  only in the final denouement that Le Queux reduces him to an imperial 
stereotype, easily outmanoeuvred by his English love rival and losing all self-
possession when he is arrested for murder, leaving the English protagonists  to 
live happily ever after on the banks of the Nile, benign imperial benefactors.57
Amim represents the destabilisation of imperial assumptions and yet, as 
Diamond points out liaisons between Orientals and Anglo-Saxon women 
invariably remained unfulfilled in pre-war fiction.58   According to historian, 
Robert MacDonald, this  taboo on interracial relations and disapproval of 
miscegenation was  a deeply held sexual response to a fear of the ‘other’ as a 
body who held the potential to contaminate and weaken.59   Certainly, as has 
already been discussed, the idea of degeneration, both cultural and biological, 
was a prevailing fear in Edwardian Britain and, as David Trotter has noted, was 
evident in numerous fictional representations, such as Mr Hyde, Moriarty, Count 
Dracula, Quint and Miss Jessel, and the picture of Dorian Gray, not to mention 
Kurtz’s ‘abominations’ in ‘Heart of Darkness’.60   Indeed, Boehmer identifies in 
Conrad an implication that, far from being different and separate, inside the 
European imperialists dwelt a primitive ‘other’ threatening to expose the 
fraudulent premise of the project of European expansion.61   
In order for a happy ending in a romance between an Oriental and an Anglo-
Saxon woman it would have to transpire that the original racial classification was 
a mistake, for example, because unbeknown to everyone the character was 





59 MacDonald, The Language of Empire, p.35.
60 See Trotter, p.197.
61 Boehmer, Migrant Metaphors, p.59.
response of the morally sound female protagonist was similarly unequivocal, as, 
for example, in the case of Hall Caine’s  pro-nationalist The White Prophet. 
Whilst he may have bucked the trend so far as his politics were concerned, Hall 
Caine was assiduous in ensuring that the physical feelings of the heroine, Helena, 
for the eponymous Muslim were in careful accordance with prevailing mores. 
Generically, women may have been susceptible to the charms of powerful 
Orientals, but the heroines of these novels were able to see through the civilised 
veneer to the barbarism beneath.  Thus, Helena describes how the close 
proximity of the White Prophet made her skin creep and gave her ‘a feeling 
which I had never known before – a feeling of repulsion – the feeling of the 
white woman about the black man’.62  
‘Let the White go to the White and the Black to the Black’, advised Rudyard 
Kipling.63   Dire consequences were the inevitable result of sexual relations 
between English men and native women according to even the most insightful of 
colonial observers (see, for example, Kipling’s tale ‘Without Benefit of Clergy’ 
and Woolf’s ‘A Tale Told by Moonlight’).64   Of course, India was the context in 
which the taboo on sex between the colonised and their British imperial masters 
had arisen but it is notable that of the novels  reviewed in this section and set in 
Ottoman Asia none contains a narrative where Western male protagonists  and 
Muslim women have meaningful relations.  Here, the idea of the Orient as a 
place demarcated by the West as overwhelming ‘feminine’ can usefully be 
considered.  If India was a feminised Oriental ‘other’, supine and languid, the 
lands of Ottoman Asia were arguably perceived as  less torpid and hence more 
masculine.   It was a region where the parameters of the imperial embrace were 
less certain and this may account for the prevalence of virile, threatening Muslim 
characters  who pose a risk to the English heroine, metonymically associated with 
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the Empire.  Indeed, even Eastern women could be perceived as  minacious.  In 
The Garden of Allah, Hichens vividly describes  three dancing girls emerging 
from the desert dunes as  embodying the ‘otherness’ of the East, an inalienably 
foreign and primitive place: 
On their heads, piled high with gorgeous handkerchiefs, were golden crowns which 
glittered in the sun-rays, and tufts of scarlet feathers.  Their oval faces, covered 
with paint, were partially concealed by long strings of gold coins, which flowed 
from their crowns down over their large breasts and disappeared towards their 
waists .... Their dresses were of scarlet, apple-green and purple silks, partially 
covered by floating shawls of spangled muslin .... Their hands, which they held 
high, gesticulating above the crest of the dune, were painted blood red.65
These women are vital, sexual, timeless.  Their primitivism repels whilst it 
simultaneously appeals  to a thirst for an energy and vigour perceived as 
diminished in the West.  For the English heroines of these novels the East was 
frequently as invigorating an experience as  it was for the men.  For example, 
Kathlyn Rhodes, author of a number of books set in Egypt, depicted it as a place 
of romance and adventure, where, away from the constraints of civilised life, 
Western women could live more freely and give way to their passions.66  Strong, 
intelligent, independent English women feature in numerous books  including 
Hichens’ The Garden of Allah, Hall Caine’s  The White Prophet and Le Queux’s 
The Hand of Allah.       
Whilst these books undoubtedly reflected prevailing contemporary concerns, 
their structure was usually formulaic.67   The East was a place of adventure for 
Englishmen and women of a brave and noble disposition where they might 
encounter horrors and privations far removed from the safety of home but also 
experience the exoticism and mystique of a fictional East encapsulated by the 
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Nights.  Morality was clearly defined in accordance with prevailing cultural 
standards, thus there was no ambit for interracial romance.  In its crudest form, 
this  formula was to be found in the juvenile literature of the period produced by 
novelists such as  Rider Haggard, Henty and Kingston, and publications such as 
the Boy’s Own Paper, where the world was depicted, in the words of John 
MacKenzie, ‘as a vast adventure playground in which Anglo-Saxon superiority 
could be repeatedly demonstrated vis-à-vis all other races, most of whom were 
depicted as  treacherous and evil’.68   Britain’s  imperial psyche and the cultural 
construction of masculinity in the late Victorian and Edwardian era were closely 
linked and yet, Kelly Boyd, an expert on the Boy’s Own phenomenon, observes 
that the turn of the century witnessed a shift in the depiction of the archetypal 
Anglo-Saxon hero.  In the last decades of the nineteenth century he was arrogant, 
mastered those around him and pursued his own aggressively individualistic 
path.  In contrast, the Edwardian hero was  a more socially aware creation with a 
‘less assured hold on masculinity’.69   Boyd attributes this to a recognition of a 
need for administrators and team workers  instead of conquerors  but it is  arguable 
that even here, in the least subtle form of imperial story-telling, such 
transformations  were also a reaction to the anxieties already discussed, such as 
increasing self-consciousness  regarding Britain’s aggressive imperialism and 
tremulousness about shifting trends in society not least in terms of the virility of 
Anglo-Saxon stock which had been so proudly and unquestioningly represented 
in earlier days.
In conclusion, a number of trends already referred to in this  thesis can be 
identified in these Edwardian era novels.  Concerns regarding the Empire’s 
future, its legitimacy, fears of pan-Islamism, the cost of progress, the degeneracy 
of British stock and, not least, the depiction of the Oriental ‘other’ as a sometime 
fascinating exotic and a sometime repellent threat are all evident.  Worthy of 
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particular disgust was  the Oriental, whether Christian or Muslim, tainted by 
Western influence.  Traditional Islam, met with approval, often with awe or fear, 
but adulterated Muslims were met solely with disdain.  Whether this  was because 
they lacked the raw power of ‘true believers’ or could be patronisingly viewed as 
aspirational Europeans or because of, as  Pickthall put it, the fear of unleashing a 
‘Frankenstein’s monster’ on the Western world, are all conceivable explanations 
for this.  This  was a period before the ‘Hun’ had become the all-pervasive ‘other’ 
against which Britons compared themselves and against whom they were to be 
judged.  But by 1915, when, as has been seen in Chapter One, there was little 
room for another ‘other’ as well as the Hun, the popular Eastern novel of the pre-
war era had all but disappeared.  
5.3 Greenmantle
Fictional stories set in Ottoman Asia, so abundant during the Edwardian era, 
dried up once the war started.  The trend evidenced in the analysis of Wellington 
House’s output for 1915 appears to be mirrored more broadly in the publishing 
world.   As  identified in Chapters One and Two, there was neither official interest 
in, nor a public appetite for, reading material that extended far beyond the 
geographical immediacies of the war.  Indeed, some historians have identified the 
war as precipitating a creative dearth in the world of fiction.  In the words of the 
late Peter Firchow:
A mental slum, like a slum in a city, soon tends to grow monotonous.  The 
buildings assume a drab sameness and the individuals merge into a shabby, 
demoralized, and somewhat threatening mass.  So too with the thousands of pages 
of explanation and justification, attack and counterattack, produced by politicians, 
professors, journalists, historians, and propagandistic men and women of every 
description, public and private, during the Great War.70
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This somewhat dramatic interpretation identifies correctly the obsession with 
‘explanation and justification, attack and counterattack’ highlighted earlier in this 
thesis, and as the vast majority of leading writers  of the era were called upon by 
Wellington House, it seems compelling.  The war engulfed them intellectually, 
morally and spiritually, as  well as practically.  A further challenge to literary 
endeavour was posed by the nature of modern warfare.  Trench fighting was 
certainly not the stuff of romance and adventure familiar to readers of Parker, 
Hichens  and Hall Caine.  Kelly Boyd pinpoints the problem when she observes, 
in relation to the Boy’s Own papers, that war stories set in the Boer War were 
much more prevalent than Great War stories ‘probably due to the particular 
problems of finding heroic stories in trench warfare’.71   She goes on to suggest 
that, ‘by the end of 1916 most papers had abandoned the pretense of setting 
stories in the services or at the front.  Letters from the trenches disappeared.  The 
majority of the stories in the papers returned to the themes of pre-war 
publications.  Sport, school and detective fiction retained a central place in the 
magazines’.72  
The difficulties of making the war exciting and romantic for consumers of 
popular fiction was as much a problem for the writers of adult fiction as  it was 
for the juvenile papers and John Buchan would have been more aware of this 
than most both as  a novelist and as author of the serialised history of the war as it 
occurred, commissioned by Nelson.73   Buchan was little known as a novelist at 
the war’s  outbreak and was not one of the writers  Masterman called to 
Wellington House in September 1914.  His  public profile increased early in the 
war thanks to his work for Nelson (and the exposure this and his social 
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connections offered him to military and political figures, as  well as to the press) 
and to the publication of The Thirty-Nine Steps in October 1915 (having been 
serialised over the summer in Blackwood’s).74   Buchan solved the conundrum of 
how to write marketable fiction about the war by setting The Thirty-Nine Steps 
not in the trenches but in the world of espionage.  The Germans are the enemy 
but the fast-paced plot takes place in Britain.  In 1916, he published a sequel, 
Greenmantle.  Again, rather than attempt to set his novel on the Western Front, 
the context closest to the heart of the British public, he turned his attention to 
Turkey.  
In light of its  subject matter Greenmantle has  been called a ‘singular war novel’ 
and yet, it was a shrewd and prescient move on Buchan’s  part.75   A novel set 
during the war but with a plot that rather than stagnating on the Western Front, 
provided a thrilling, fast-paced, adventure story that would have seemed 
comfortingly familiar to those who had grown up on Stevenson, Henty and Rider 
Haggard.  Unsurprisingly, Greenmantle proved immensely popular.  In 1916 it 
sold 34,426 copies.  Sales dwindled in 1917 but in 1918 over 50,000 copies were 
sold.76  If Hodder & Stoughton had not published Conan Doyle’s  The Return of 
Sherlock  Holmes in 1918, Greenmantle would have been their best-selling novel 
that year and it has stood the test of time.  It went through over thirty editions in 
its first twenty years and has never been out of print.77   Contemporary reviewers 
liked the fast-paced plot but described it as fantastical.  ‘Mr Buchan remarks that 
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the war has driven the word “improbable” from our vocabulary, and that 
melodrama has become the prosiest realism.  Melodrama, however, if we may be 
pardoned for saying so, rarely goes as  far as  “Greenmantle”’.78   Critics viewed 
the book as  an opportunity for escapism in gloomy times.  It was to be read as an 
‘antidote and complement to the graver volumes about the dire hostilities’.79  No 
doubt Buchan did see it as offering escapism on one level.  Morale boosters were 
badly needed, especially in the latter half of 1916, but the plot was not 
fantastical.  
The story concerns Hannay’s efforts to foil an Islamic jihad, which has  been 
conceived and nurtured by German ringleaders.  Whilst the average Briton may 
have found the detail of the plot implausible, the concepts of pan-Islamism and 
jihad were familiar ones within government circles, and, as has been seen in the 
preceding chapters, a preoccupation of a fearful Whitehall.  Indeed, the closeness 
of Buchan’s plot to some of Britain’s  vital strategic concerns, leads  Hew 
Strachan to observe, in his article on Buchan during the war, that the
central conundrum posed by Buchan’s wartime activities is the one raised by Lloyd 
George in his memoirs: what  was the relationship between Buchan the man of 
affairs, historian, and propagandist, and Buchan the novelist?  How far did fact, or 
knowledge of the facts, affect  his fiction?  How could a man commissioned in the 
Intelligence Corps, operating within the Foreign Office and then at  General 
Headquarters, continue to be allowed to write thrillers that were so close to the 
truth, and that  went to the heart of some of the central preoccupations of British 
wartime intelligence?80  
The answer may lie in the fact that his popular readership did react with 
incredulity and hence the Hannay books did not threaten British intelligence but, 
on the other hand, served a positive, propagandist purpose in numerous respects. 
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Whilst Buchan may not have had official endorsement for his novel, indeed he 
claimed it was merely something he had scribbled down on journeys to amuse 
himself, it fitted very comfortably within the Wellington House mould.81 
Although he had not yet assumed his role as de facto head of the Department of 
Information, Buchan was already involved in propaganda work for the Foreign 
Office (one historian describes him in 1916 as the Foreign Office’s ‘chief “spin 
doctor”’82) and had produced a number of books and pamphlets for Wellington 
House, including Britain’s War by Land and The Achievement of France in 1915, 
(and The Battle of Jutland in late 1916).83   He was  entirely at home with 
Masterman’s propagandist techniques.  
Identifying Buchan’s wartime novels as propaganda does not, of course, mean 
dismissing them as lacking intellectual integrity.  Like the majority of Wellington 
House’s writers, Buchan believed propaganda meant ‘the dissemination of true 
facts wherever they would do good, and not the manufacture of stories which, 
however flattering to the Allies, however derogatory to the enemy, had no firm 
basis in fact’ and he saw no moral dilemma in seeking to influence readers by 
conveying what he believed to be the truth.84   Writing in relation to Buchan’s 
work for Nelson’s History of the War, Keith Grieves  observes that ‘books which 
broadly served strategic propagandist objectives will be deemed propaganda, to 
the exclusion of any review of the writer’s intent and overall perspective’.85  This 
implies a post-war, pejorative understanding of propaganda.  What is submitted 
here is that Buchan’s writing could simultaneously amount to propaganda (as  he 
understood it) and a thorough and genuine reflection of his own views.  As 
Strachan puts it, for Buchan propaganda was simply ‘a form of truth-telling’.86 
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That this ‘truth-telling’ entailed a degree of didacticism would have been 
something he felt entirely comfortable with.  After all, he was doing no more 
than following a tradition set by many of his Edwardian and Victorian 
predecessors.
The importance of Greenmantle as a resource for the purposes  of this research 
cannot be overstated.  It is  unique as a war novel written during the war with a 
focus on Britain’s conflict with Turkey; it is a significant book because of its 
enduring popularity; and, it was written by a figure on the ‘inside’ with 
knowledge of both Foreign Office and military strategy as  well as  a close 
relationship with the propaganda machine organised from Wellington House.  It 
informs the historian on all the themes of this thesis: on Britain’s perception of 
herself as an imperial power and as  a power peopled by a certain type of race, her 
view of the Oriental ‘other’ as well as  the German ‘other’ of the war years, on the 
means by which she justified her role as belligerent and on her strategic 
imperatives  during the first half of the war.  Furthermore, as discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, it is contended that such an exploration has not 
previously been undertaken despite substantial academic interest in Buchan’s life 
and works.  To date, he is the subject of three biographies, and much critical 
writing on subjects  as diverse as his Calvinism, his attitudes towards women and 
his supernatural tales.  An important collection of essays, reassessing his work 
and his significance, was published in 2009 and sought to demonstrate his 
relevance to new ‘cultural, historical and literary exploration’.87  His novels have 
featured particularly within the context of two areas of literary criticism: first, as 
early examples within the genre of twentieth-century spy fiction and, secondly, in 
the context of Anglo-German literary encounters.88   Only Ahmed al-Rawi, an 
Iraqi scholar, has made a serious attempt (in articles for Macdonald’s 2009 
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collection of essays, in The Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History and in 
The John Buchan Journal) to read Greenmantle closely as  a text from which 
Buchan’s views on Arab and Turkish Muslims can be interpreted in the context 
of Britain’s imperial position.89  In contrast to the findings  of this thesis, Al-Rawi 
refers  only to a ‘deep-rooted’ hatred of Muslim Turks in the early twentieth 
century and concludes sweepingly that Buchan ‘emphasizes that the East is 
backward and decadent, and its people are mostly corrupt and childish’.90   The 
substantive problem with al-Rawi’s  analysis is his failure to place Buchan within 
his historical context both culturally and, more specifically, as a propagandist 
working within the ambit of the government’s wartime objectives.  
Greenmantle as a general work of propaganda
Recruitment was one of the primary functions of British war propaganda between 
1914 and 1916, and Buchan did not miss an opportunity to assist.  ‘It is a 
wonderful war for youth and brains’ declares Sir Walter Bullivant, the Foreign 
Office operative who recruits  Richard Hannay for the mission, underlining the 
opportunities  which the war offered for ambitious young men.91   When Hannay 
reaches the war zone at Erzerum where the Turks are engaging the Russians, he 
is  soothed by the sound of the big guns which remind him of his  time on the 
Western Front.  The guns represent the experience he shared with ‘so many good 
fellows’ when he engaged in ‘proper work, and the only task for a man’.92   His 
work as  a spy may be dangerous and exciting, comparable with ‘playing chuck-
farthing at the Loos cross-roads’, however, it is of secondary importance to the 
real business which is  taking place on the Western Front.93   Buchan even 
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attempted to convince the reader that the Western Front was more exciting than 
being a spy, when Hannay observes at the end of his adventure that it ‘was a side-
show which, whatever its importance, had none of the exhilaration of the main 
effort’.94   Hannay and his friend Sandy Arbuthnot reflect on how lucky they are 
to have participated in the war, and observe how much worse it must be for men 
with families and hence how important it was for unattached men to volunteer.  
[T]hink of the men with wives and children and homes that  were the biggest things 
in life to them.  For fellows like us to shirk would be black cowardice.  It’s small 
credit  for us to stick it  out.  But  when those others shut  their teeth and went 
forward, they were blessed heroes .... .95  
Buchan was a ‘Westerner’ and made it very clear where the heart of the war lay. 
However, like those in the War Cabinet, he did not believe the importance of the 
Western Front precluded the need to suppress activities in the East that could 
serve as a distraction and thereby lead to failure in the West.  ‘If the East blazes 
up, our effort will be distracted from Europe,’ explains Bullivant, ‘and the great 
coup may fail.  The stakes  are no less than victory and defeat’.96   Hannay must 
prevent the Entente war effort from being diverted from their fight on the 
Western Front by stopping the Germans from inciting a global jihad.  In order to 
uncover the plot, Hannay needs to infiltrate the German ringleaders.  He pretends 
to be a Boer who hates the English and has a plan for helping the Germans win 
the war.  As a consequence he is introduced to Colonel von Stumm, a ‘perfect 
mountain of a fellow, six and a half feet if he was an inch, with shoulders  on him 
like a shorthorn bull’.97   Hannay seeks to convince the Germans that he is on 







England will not let East Africa go.  She fears for Egypt and she fears too for India. 
If you press her there she will send armies and more armies till she is so weak in 
Europe that  a child can crush her.  That is England’s way.  She cares more for her 
Empire than for what may happen to her allies.98  
Hannay knows that this is what the Germans want to hear but, of course, it is the 
opposite of the position Buchan describes  as the real British stance which is to 
focus on the Western Front and support her European allies.  Whilst obviously 
intended to mislead, Hannay’s proposal accurately reflected the reality of 
concerns during 1915 and 1916 regarding allegations by France and Russia that 
England was not pulling her weight in the Allied war effort and did indeed put 
her own interests first.    
The Germans in Greenmantle
Some academics, including Stevenson, Storer and Firchow, suggest that 
Buchan’s Hannay novels offered him an opportunity to escape from the bonds of 
‘hypocritical propaganda’ and express his own personal views.99  As proof of this 
they cite his sympathetic depiction of some German characters in Greenmantle, 
including the Kaiser, as opposed to his depiction of Germans  elsewhere.  Once 
again, this  is to fail to take into account Buchan’s own understanding of 
propaganda, which was as a form of truth-telling and hence not remotely 
hypocritical.  A more likely explanation is that Buchan, who had spent much of 
the year prior to writing Greenmantle close to the Front and had been present as 
an observer at several battles, knew first-hand that relentless denigration of the 
enemy did not necessarily sit well with the troops.  On the contrary, in a book 
written ostensibly with the intention ‘simply to entertain’ them, he would have 
understood that, whilst British soldiers may not have liked Fritz, he held their 
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grudging respect and sympathy.100   Thus, when describing the German army, 
Hannay observes that ‘her men were nothing to boast of on the average ... but she 
seemed to have an inexhaustible supply of hard, competent N.C.O.s’.101  
Colonel von Stumm, on the other hand, by far the most vividly depicted enemy 
character, is proffered as  an example of the archetypal wartime Hun: primitive 
and militaristic.  He is a bully and physically bestial, like a ‘big ape’.102  Hannay 
has to act submissively which goes  against the grain for the plucky Scot.  ‘For 
the first time in my life I had been bullied without hitting back.  When I realized 
it I nearly choked with anger’.103   In contrast to Stumm, Hannay is a man who 
stands up for his  values  whatever the odds  and not to do so is unconscionable. 
Stumm is rendered especially loathsome and unnatural by the fact that as a 
counterpoint to his brutality, he has a delicate, feminine side.  In Stumm’s private 
quarters he has a room which is excessively luxurious and refined: ‘It was the 
room of a man who had a fashion for frippery, who had a perverted taste for soft 
delicate things ... I began to see the queer other side to my host, that evil side 
which gossip had spoken of as not unknown in the German army’.104  The Huns 
are alien and unwholesome, the antithesis of Hannay and Sandy who are 
straightforward, plain-speaking, upright men (and, of course, heterosexual).
But what really seemed to distinguish the Germans from the British, even men 
like Herr Gaudian (a German engineer whom Buchan treats sympathetically), 
appears  to be a parallel of what separated the British from Muslims, namely, a 
propensity for fanaticism, in Germany’s  case stemming from excessive 
patriotism.  Thus ‘she produced good and bad, cads and gentlemen, but she could 
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put a bit of the fanatic into them all’.105  When Hannay meets the enigmatic Hilda 
von Einem, the German woman at the heart of the plot, she too is described as 
having pale eyes with ‘the cold light of the fanatic’.106  However, just as Gilbert 
Parker posited in The World in the Crucible, Buchan viewed German fanaticism 
as different to the pure simplicity of Islam because they had sinned against the 
light, the beacon of civilisation.  In terms reminiscent of the simplistic, anti-
Nietzschean diatribe expressed in Wellington House propaganda and in the press, 
Buchan wrote that Germany ‘wants to destroy and simplify; but it isn’t the 
simplicity of the ascetic, which is of the spirit, but the simplicity of the madman 
that grinds down all the contrivances of civilization to a featureless 
monotony’.107   Buchan echoed the sentiments, observed in the preceding 
chapters, that religious fanaticism could be disparaged but it could also be met 
with fear and awe whereas German fanaticism was unacceptable because of its 
deviation from civilised standards.  In either case, the notion of ‘fanaticism’, 
undoubtedly an ‘attitude word’, was the antithesis of English commonsense and 
decency.108   It represented the chaotic, the irrational and the unreasonable, 
standing in opposition to British order.   
As mentioned above, the mastermind of the German plot is not a man but a 
woman, Hilda von Einem, described as the most dangerous woman on earth, a 
‘Super-woman’ of the Nietzschean variety.109   According to Storer she is 
dangerous and threatening not because she is German but because she is a 
woman playing a man’s game.110   She ‘eschews traditional gender roles and 
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espionage’.111   In the previous  section the use of gender definitions to delineate 
East and West was discussed and it was asserted that the Middle East was 
arguably a more masculine version of the mythopoeic East than Britain felt 
comfortable with.  In the years preceding the war it had become a less passive, 
more threatening place than the feminised version represented by languorous 
India.  The unsettling of traditional assumptions allowed for strong English 
women to experience the East as  a zone for adventure not for domestic drama, in 
other words as a masculinised zone.  Perhaps, von Einem is  doubly threatening 
because as well as machinating in a man’s world, she does so in a realm that is 
already perceived as potentially menacing and emasculating.  Von Einem is  the 
metonymical representation of a conjunction that must have seemed horrifying to 
the Edwardian elite: the threat of enfranchised, modern woman combined with 
the threat to the Empire of an assertive and aggressive East.
Fears of a pan-Islamic threat
Reflecting the realities of the political situation, Foreign Office figure, Walter 
Bullivant, points out to Hannay that the Kaiser’s call to jihad has yet to ignite the 
Islamic world.  Nonetheless, he is sceptical about the apparent lack of fire in the 
bellies of the Ottoman Empire’s Muslims.  No doubt, harking back to the more 
fanatical activities of Muslims in the past, particularly the Sudanese Mahdiyya, 
and reflecting the government’s  fears regarding pan-Islamic activities, he 
believes there must be more going on in the Muslim world than meets the eye:  
The Sheikh-ul-Islam is neglected and though the Kaiser proclaims a Holy War and 
calls himself Hadji Mohammed Guilliamo, and says the Hohenzollerns are 
descended from the Prophet, that  seems to have fallen pretty flat.  The ordinary 
man again will answer that Islam in Turkey is becoming a back number, and that 
Krupp guns are the new gods.  Yet – I don’t  know.  I do not  quite believe in Islam 




Mid-1916 was, of course, a low point in terms of British prestige following the 
failures in the Dardanelles and Mesopotamia.  It was during this period that Mark 
Sykes sought to galvanize Eastern-related propaganda within Wellington House 
and al-Haqīqah was instituted.  Despite its failure in the first two years  of the 
war, a German-inspired Islamic jihad remained a pressing concern.  As ever, the 
paramount fear was its  potentially damaging impact on India.  Bullivant 
articulates this and explains to Hannay:
[T]he Syrian army is as fanatical as the hordes of the Mahdi.  The Senussi [in 
Libya] have taken a hand in the game.  The Persian Moslems are threatening 
trouble.  There is a dry wind blowing through the East, and the parched grasses 
wait the spark.  And the wind is blowing towards the Indian border.113 
Bullivant believes that whilst the Germans may be able to manipulate opinion 
they will need more than their militarism to ignite a holy war.  They will need 
some totem such as the coming of the Mahdi in Sudan in 1882.  If such a sacred 
symbol could be found it would be much easier for the Germans to co-opt 
Muslims in the Middle East.  ‘Islam is  a fighting creed, and the mullah still 
stands in the pulpit with the Koran in one hand and a drawn sword in the other. 
Supposing there is some Ark of the Covenant which will madden the remotest 
Moslem peasant with dreams of Paradise?’114   Hannay and Sandy hypothesize 
that the Germans must have identified a person who is  descended from the 
Prophet.  No-one else, they believe, would have sufficient influence to bind all of 
Islam together.  ‘To capture all Islam – and I gather that is what we fear – the 
man must be of the Koreish, the tribe of the Prophet himself’.115  No mention is 
made of the Sherif of Mecca but he was surely in Buchan’s  mind.  After all, he 





When Hannay is trying to gain German trust by posing as  a pro-German Boer, he 
seeks to establish his  credibility by proposing to the Germans that he can incite a 
religiously oriented uprising in East Africa amongst the Muslims:
First find the race that fears its priests.  It is waiting for you – the Mussulmans of 
Somaliland and the Abyssinian border and the Blue and White Nile.  They would be like 
dried grasses to catch fire if you used the flint and steel of their religion.  Look what  the 
English suffered from a crazy Mullah [the ‘Mad Mullah’, Muhammad Abdullah Hassan 
of Somaliland] who ruled only a dozen villages.  Once get  the flames going and they will 
lick up the pagans of the west  and south.  That is the way of Africa.  How many 
thousands, think you, were in the Mahdi’s army who never heard of the Prophet  till they 
saw the black flags of the Emirs going into battle?116  
Buchan could just as easily have mentioned Ali Dinar of Darfur who had 
declared a jihad against the British in 1915 and was only defeated after the 
Egyptian Army invaded Darfur in May 1916.  Certainly, the prospect of an 
African jihad whilst more remote and hence less threatening to the Empire was 
taken seriously by the Foreign Office.  Mark Sykes’s papers contain a 
memorandum of a meeting in which he discussed the susceptibility of African 
Muslims to fanaticism and warned that ‘the negro turned Mohammedan is a 
fiercer and more fanatical upholder of the faith than the more educated Arab’.117 
In Sykes’s view, expressed in eerily similar terms to Hannay’s, ‘although 
admittedly a Turkish Jehad would find few followers [in East Africa], an African 
Jehad would be widely acceptable and would be likely to spread in a very 
alarming manner’.118
Of course, whilst pan-Islamism was perceived as a real threat, Buchan stressed 
Britain’s ability to deal with it.  To express  vulnerability would be contrary to the 
imperative of maintaining British prestige.  Bullivant, for example, echoing the 
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romantic world of imperial espionage created by Kipling in Kim, emphasises the 
power and the reach of the British Empire: 
I have reports from agents everywhere – pedlars in South Russia, Afghanistan 
horse-dealers, Turcoman merchants, pilgrims on the road to Mecca, sheikhs in 
North Africa, sailors on the Black Sea coasters, sheep-skinned Mongols, Hindu 
fakirs, Greek traders in the Gulf, as well as respectable consuls who use cyphers.119  
A similar point is made when Blenkiron, Hannay’s  American ally, comments on 
the strength and scale of Britain’s intelligence network.  ‘I calculate there isn’t 
much that happens in any corner of the earth that you don’t know within twenty-
four hours’.120  Thus, Britain’s power is  not merely mechanical.  It is embodied in 
the extent of her influence, the global nexus of contacts and the unique ability of 
British men, epitomized by explorer Richard Burton, to adapt, to infiltrate, to 
immerse themselves in foreign cultures whilst never, of course, allowing 
themselves to forget who they were or why they were there.
When Hannay gets  to Constantinople he encounters  the ‘Company of the Rosy 
Hours’ (an influential Islamic sect described as ‘the most famous fraternity in 
Western Asia’).121   They assist Hannay in his mission, as they have been 
infiltrated by his  friend and accomplice, Sandy Arbuthnot.  Describing the leader 
(who is actually Sandy in disguise although Hannay doesn’t know it at the time), 
he observes that he was  ‘a tall man dressed in skins .... [h]e capered like a wild 
animal, keeping up a strange high monotone that fairly gave me the creeps’.122 
Later, he describes how Sandy, in his costume, ‘had the appearance of some mad 
mullah’.123  For Buchan, madness, fanaticism and Islam were cut from the same 
cloth, and yet he credits the Companions with a degree of authenticity.  They 
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were ‘magic workers’ able to create illusions and entrance people with their 
music and dancing.  Hannay finds them daunting and mysterious.  They have a 
powerful simplicity and devoutness which does not warrant ridicule or disdain. 
Again, it is evident that the label of fanaticism when attached to Muslims called 
for a different response to the militaristic fanaticism attached to the Germans.
Respect for the ‘Old Turk’ and Traditional Islam
When Sandy is undercover as a member of the Company, he finds out that there 
is indeed a religious movement underway:
A seer has arisen of the blood of the Prophet, who will restore the Khalifate to its 
old glories and Islam to its old purity.  His sayings are everywhere in the Moslem 
world.  All the orthodox believers have them at  heart.  That  is why they are 
enduring grinding poverty and preposterous taxation, and that is why their young 
men are rolling up to the armies and dying without  complaint in Gallipoli and 
Transcaucasia.  They believe they are on the eve of a great deliverance.124  
These sentiments have much in common with those of Masefield and 
Wedgwood, considered in Chapter One.  Contrary to al-Rawi’s assertion that 
Islam is depicted ‘as a merciless and militant religion’, Buchan’s  characters 
express respect and admiration.125   Like Masefield and Wedgwood, Sandy is 
impressed by the piety of Muslim soldiers and their commitment to their faith. 
Their willingness to follow a new prophet is not described as especially naive or 
gullible.  On the contrary, Hannay and Arbuthnot are convinced that for a prophet 
to be followed he would have to be authentic.  ‘He’d have to be rather a wonder 
on his own account – saintly, eloquent and that sort of thing’.126  In the words of 
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Gaudian, the German engineer of whom Hannay approves, Islam ‘is a noble faith 
and despises liars and boasters and betrayers of their salt’.127  
How then, have these honest and devout Turks come under the control of the 
CUP?  Bullivant, in explaining this conundrum to Hannay, echoes the view that 
the CUP were not real Turks but ‘Levantines’ seeking to despoil and exploit and 
using religion to do so.  They consist in Bullivant’s words, of ‘a Polish 
adventurer, meaning Enver, and a collection of Jews and gipsies’ who have taken 
advantage of Turkish piety.128  In Buchan’s writing the perceived contamination 
posed by the coalescence of East and West is as evident as in the pre-war 
examples given in the preceding section of this  chapter.  Thus, for example, when 
Hannay encounters Mr Kuprasso, the proprietor of a coffee-house, he describes 
him in highly unflattering terms: ‘He was a fat, oldish fellow with a long nose, 
very like the Greek traders you see on the Zanzibar coast.  I beckoned to him and 
he waddled forward, smiling oilily’.129   Kuprasso typifies the British idea of the 
Levantine, debauched and untrustworthy and, like the CUP, a malign and 
manipulative influence on true Turks.  
Buchan was respectful towards traditional Islam and the ‘Old Turk’.  He also 
sought to avoid undermining Turkish soldiery whilst simultaneously accenting 
Britain’s ability to defeat the Ottomans on the battlefield (just as  he sought to 
emphasise the risks  of pan-Islamism whilst also stressing the Empire’s ability to 
counter it).  Accordingly, he did not dismiss Turkish soldiers as weak as to do so 
would run counter to 1916 assumptions regarding the fighting spirit of the Turk 
following the Gallipoli evacuation in January 1916 and setbacks in 
Mesopotamia, but he emphasised that poor leadership and lack of supplies 
rendered them vulnerable.   When Hannay sees some Gallipoli troops on the 





by poor management and lack of supplies: ‘many were deplorably ragged, and I 
didn’t think much of their boots’.130   In a subsequent passage, Hannay is  even 
more complimentary of the Turkish soldier, epitomizing a view which, as has 
been seen in preceding chapters, was common in 1916:
All morning we wriggled through a big lot  of troops, a brigade at  least, who swung 
along at  a great  pace with a fine free stride that I don’t think I have ever seen 
bettered.  I must  say I took a fancy to the Turkish fighting man: I remembered the 
testimonial our fellows gave him as a clean fighter, and I felt very bitter that 
Germany should have lugged him into this dirty business.131
Manifestly, at the time Buchan wrote Greenmantle, the legend of the ‘clean 
fighting Turk’ was alive and well.
The Imperial Ideal
In his memoirs Buchan wrote that Hannay had traits copied from several friends 
whereas  Sandy Arbuthnot was ‘reminiscent of Aubrey Herbert’.132   Together, 
Hannay and Arbuthnot are exemplars of the British imperial figure, but it is 
Arbuthnot who captures the imagination and who lies at the heart of the novel as 
the grown up successor of the Boy’s Own heroes of juvenile fiction.133  Indeed, in 
the view of historian Robert MacDonald, Buchan and his peers, such as Conan 
Doyle and Sapper, took exactly the same model as  the juvenile fiction but 
substituted men for boys, or at least, introduced ‘man-boys’ who fulfilled the 
criteria of contemporary masculinity in terms of their bravery and decency but 
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read as a one-dimensional, cartoon figure bringing 1980s film character Indiana 
Jones to mind, it is worth stopping to consider Buchan’s representation of 
Arbuthnot, and his reliance on the real life figure of Aubrey Herbert, to 
extrapolate what attributes, beyond ‘bravery and decency’ were considered 
important in the wartime imperial figure.  If Buchan was trying to convey the 
tenets of Britain’s civilisation, to emphasise in the battle of ideas why her value 
system was preferable to Germany’s, how were these values represented in 
Arbuthnot?
  
Aubrey Herbert, intimate friend and colleague of Mark Sykes and friend of both 
Pickthall and Buchan, was the son of the Earl of Carnarvon.135  He attended Eton 
and Oxford where one of his closest friends was Raymond Asquith (who was 
also a friend of Buchan’s).  Herbert’s childhood had been circumscribed by his 
near-blindness.  Attributed to a congenital malformation, he was  told by his 
doctors that his eyes  were so weak he should only use them to read for twenty 
minutes each day.136   It was only when he was seventeen that an operation 
improved his sight to the extent that he ‘could see distances, albeit indistinctly. 
He could shoot, and distinguish figures across  a room, though not well enough to 
recognise them’.137  Perhaps it was  the limitations imposed upon his childhood 
by his  poor sight that nurtured in him an exaggerated thirst for adventure, or at 
least gave him a sense that he needed to seize every opportunity he could to taste 
life to the full (he became near blind again, this time permanently, in 1923 when 
the retina of his good eye became detached).138  Certainly, just like Sykes, whose 
childhood was lived in the shadow of his parents’ scandal, Herbert left university 
with something to prove to himself and others.  Like Sykes, he was of an 
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essentially happy, optimistic disposition, confident of his place in the world and 
his entitlement as an Englishman.  Less like Sykes, who, at least according to 
Gertrude Bell, always travelled like a tourist, with a retinue of home comforts 
and servants, Herbert became an intrepid, risk-taking adventurer who steered 
well off the beaten track and was much aided by his skill as a linguist, able to 
converse in Turkish, Arabic, Albanian, Greek, French, Italian, and German.139
By 1914, Herbert had forged a reputation for himself as an Eastern expert, 
attributable less to his published material than to the renown he acquired for his 
fearless  exploits  in the region, including a journey in 1905 to the remote Yemeni 
city of Sen’aa in the wake of a war between Yemeni rebels and the Turks, a 
journey in 1906 across the Syrian desert from Baghdad to Damascus, and 
numerous visits to war torn Albania in the company of a reprobate Albanian 
highlander named Kiazim.  Buchan’s Sandy Arbuthnot, as  well as being an old 
Etonian and Oxford graduate, is also, like Herbert, intellectual, multi-lingual, and 
a plucky adventurer, whose exploits in Asia are the stuff of legend.  Buchan 
seemed especially to admire what he conceived as  the British willingness, and 
ability, to truly fathom other races and cultures, attributes  he considered unique 
to the British style of imperialism.  Accordingly, he observed in the context of his 
description of Sandy that ‘we call ourselves insular, but the truth is that we are 
the only race on earth that can produce men capable of getting inside the skin of 
remote peoples’.140  Whereas  the British could understand foreigners, a German 
could not as he ‘has no gift for laying himself alongside different types of men .... 
He may have plenty of brains, as Stumm had, but he has the poorest notion of 
psychology of any of God’s creatures’.141  
Herbert’s interest in, and frequent empathy for, different races and cultures was 
well known and, during his travels, he, like Sykes and Pickthall, formed a deep 
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attachment to the Turks and for Constantinople.  Whilst he quickly became 
disenchanted with the CUP, his encounters  with the Turks  led him to believe they 
were a brave, compassionate and generous people.142   He saw Turkish rule in 
Ottoman Asia as a potential force for order in a region riven by belligerent 
factions.  In contrast, echoing the stance of Sykes (and Pickthall) the Arabs of 
Persia were ‘an immoral people’ and the Marsh Arabs were ‘a very low type, 
hideous, [and] very savage looking’.143   His attitude had not changed when he 
ended up in Mesopotamia in early 1916, in a bid to relieve Townsend at Kut, and 
found the Marsh Arabs  ‘always in the background like ghouls, swarming on 
every battlefield and killing the wounded of both sides’.144  
When war broke out, Herbert remained sympathetic towards the Turks although, 
by late 1915, he had become resigned to the prospect of the dismantlement of 
their Asian Empire.145  His  sympathy was undiminished by his participation as an 
Intelligence Officer in the Gallipoli campaign where his main duty was as 
interpreter and interrogator of prisoners and deserters.  Although he balked at not 
being able to fight, he was appeased by the fact that this meant he would not have 
to hurt Turkish soldiers.  In his 1919 account of the campaign his ongoing 
compassion and respect for the Turks is evident and clearly remained unabated 
even after the war’s end.  He thought the Turks fought ‘splendidly’146 and ‘very 
gallantly’147  and bemoaned the way the Allied commanders  treated them like 
‘Hottentots’, in other words, underestimated them as ignorant savages incapable 
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of fighting bravely or effectively.148   He commented on the respect the Allied 
soldiers gradually gained for the Turkish soldiers, and how ‘no one seems 
annoyed when I say they are good fellows’.149  Later he observed that ‘it is very 
curious the way the men speak of [the Turks] here.  They still can’t be made to 
wear gas  helmets because they say the Turks are clean fighters and won’t use 
gas’.150  His most extensive comment comes in his entry for 16th August 1915. 
He observed:
[T]here was a remarkable contrast between our war against  the Germans and the 
Turks.  In France the British soldier started fighting good-naturedly [Herbert was at 
Mons in August and September of 1914], and it took considerable time to work 
him up to a pitch of hatred; at Anzac the troops from the Dominions began their 
campaign with feelings of contempt and hatred, which gradually turned to respect 
for the Moslems.151
In Herbert’s experience, the pre-war idea of the ‘Clean Fighting Turk’ was 
reinforced rather than diminished by the reality of engaging with them.
In France, Gallipoli and Mesopotamia, Herbert showed unfailing gallantry, 
honesty, loyalty and compassion.  In the Dardanelles he was instrumental in 
arranging a truce so the dead of both sides could be buried.  He objected to the 
shelling of a mosque, seeing ‘no difference in principle between this and the 
destruction of Rheims Cathedral’.152   He took care of the sick and injured, 
including Turkish wounded, frequently at the risk of his own life.  At Kut he 
offered to join Townsend and give himself up to the Turks if it would make life 
easier to have him as an intermediary should Townsend and his troops  surrender. 
When Kut did fall, Herbert negotiated with the Turkish victors, pressing hard for 
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leniency towards  the Arab followers of Townsend’s troops as well as fair 
treatment for the Allied prisoners.  He stood up to General Gorringe, one of the 
Allied military commanders in the Mesopotamian campaign and widely 
considered to be a rude and aggressive bully, garnering universal popularity in 
the camp where soldiers  came up to him and shook his hand, imploring him to 
‘stay and insult [Gorringe] once again’.153   On his return to England he was 
instrumental in ensuring the appointment of the Royal Commission, set up to 
investigate the tragic shortcomings of the Mesopotamian campaign.
His moral integrity and his honesty, as much as his courage and sense of 
adventure, singled Herbert out as  a true imperial hero in Buchan’s  eyes.  Like 
Herbert, for both Sandy and Hannay ‘honour’ comes before all.  Thus, after 
Sandy has, as part of his undercover operation as a member of the Company of 
the Rosy Hours, aided Hilda von Einem in her enterprises, he feels his character 
has been besmirched and Hannay sees this as posing a threat to Sandy’s sanity. 
‘[Sandy] would take more than mortal risks, and you couldn’t scare him by any 
ordinary terror.  But let his  old conscience get cross-eyed, let him find himself in 
some situation which in his eyes involved his  honour and he might go stark 
crazy’.154   In contrast, it is  the ‘Oriental’ propensity for dishonesty that causes 
Buchan’s heroes the greatest consternation.  When Hannay encounters bribery 
and corruption in Turkey he is so outraged that he is  prepared to reject a bribe 
despite the fact that in doing so he jeopardizes  the entire mission.   Corruption is 
unconscionable in any circumstances and makes Hannay ‘boil up like a 
geyser’.155  His reaction to the Turkish culprit, Rasta Bey, is an urge ‘to lay him 
over my knee and spank him’.156   Rasta Bey, the ‘Oriental’, is like a naughty 
child who needs  to be taught what is right and wrong by a member of a class, and 
a race, who understand the value of integrity, duty and the rule of law.
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On a grander scale, the new Turkish regime warranted similar opprobrium.  As 
Blenkiron puts it (in Buchan’s attempt at an American vernacular), ‘those boys 
[Enver and Talaat] aren’t any good.  Enver’s bright enough, and for sure he’s  got 
sand.  He’ll stick out a fight like a Vermont game-chicken, but he lacks the larger 
vision, sir.  He doesn’t understand the intricacies of the job no more than a 
suckling child’.157   The CUP leaders may be tough, as evidenced by their 
wartime military successes, but they are the equivalent of nineteenth-century 
gunslingers: ‘a pack of adventurers’ lacking the insight and experience to rule 
successfully.158  Of course, as has been argued throughout this thesis, Britain was 
peerless in the expertise with which she articulated the benefits  of her rule and 
her concept of civilisation.  Her nineteenth and early twentieth-century attempts 
to vindicate her expansionism on the basis of bestowing her civilisation on the 
less enlightened flowed seamlessly into justification for her belligerency.  The 
moral force behind both was widely considered to lie in the idea of the British 
national ‘character’.159   As Disraeli had put it in the 1870s, ‘it is not our iron 
ships, it is not our celebrated regiments, it is not these things which have created 
or indeed really maintain our empire.  It is the character of our people’.160  The 
essence of national ‘character’ was, in the words of historian, Sir Charles  Lucas, 
writing in 1915, a ‘strong sense of justice and love of fair play’ fostered by the 
‘system of the great English public schools’.161  Combined with these attributes 
was a level of humility found wanting in other Western races, which manifested 
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National character underwrote not only Britain’s entitlement to rule over ‘subject 
races’ but also her willingness to oppose the militaristic Hun, and Herbert, like 
Hannay and Arbuthnot, had ‘character’ in abundance.  Another key to British 
imperial success according to Lucas  was the ability of the Englishman to adapt 
and respond to the nuances  of any situation.  ‘It is the practical capacity of the 
Englishman, his readiness to adjust the means to the end, his  indifference to 
routine and rigid system, which ... has enabled the English race to handle with at 
least some considerable measure of success great areas and millions of human 
beings’.162  Again, it can be seen that it was not the unyielding stickler for rules 
who was considered to have secured the success  of the Empire, but the rule-
breaker, the Establishment figure who lay slightly outside the mainstream, such 
as Clive, Gordon, Burton, and, naturally, Aubrey Herbert.  These ‘left fielders’ 
could adapt and become so absorbed in their imperial duties that they could seem 
like fish out of water on their return to the metropole.  Thus, in Greenmantle, 
Buchan observed, ‘lean, brown men from the ends  of the earth may be seen on 
the London pavements now and then in creased clothes, walking with the light 
outland step, slinking into clubs as if they could not remember whether or not 
they belonged to them’.163  But, of course, their club membership confirms that 
they do belong.  The key to their success  may have been their capacity for 
adaptation but underneath they remain steadfastly English.  Buchan, an outsider, 
a Scot from a modest background, likely had a keener awareness than most of the 
criteria required to fit the Establishment mould.  Impeccably aristocratic and 
well-connected, but also gallant, scrupulously honest, intrepid, self-deprecating, 
and intellectually curious, it is unsurprising that Herbert, the quintessence of the 
elite English imperial gentleman, was a keystone for Buchan in his depiction of 
heroism, masculinity and the British notion of civilisation.
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Orientalism
Thus, Buchan’s  depiction of fanaticism, of Islam, of Germans and of ‘Orientals’ 
can be seen to capture many of the cultural and strategic preoccupations of 1916 
already addressed here.  Far from a static, consistent Orientalist discourse, his 
novel reveals  total engagement with prevailing concerns.  However, to conclude 
from this that he did not also perpetuate pre-existing stereotypes  regarding a 
mythopoeic East would be misleading.  As has  been seen, contemporary 
responses to Islam and the East usually went hand in hand with a continued 
reliance on caricature and cliché and Greenmantle was no exception.  Thus, as 
Hannay proceeds towards Constantinople by train he finds the journey 
frustratingly slow and comments that on crossing the border into Turkey ‘we 
struck the real supineness  of the East’.164   Similarly, Blenkiron points out the 
tardiness of the Turkish police but puts it down to the ‘languid ways of an 
oriental despotism’.165    Al-Rawi’s claim that Buchan sought to ‘propagate 
positive ideas of the British Empire and present negative stereotypes of the 
German and Turkish powers’ has foundation.166  
Although, when Buchan visited Constantinople in 1910, he described it as ‘pure 
Arabian Nights’, his narration of Hannay’s  initial impression of the city was 
entirely different.167  Certainly, Hannay expects ‘a sort of fairyland Eastern city, 
all white marble and blue water, and stately Turks in surplices, and veiled houris, 
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I saw what I took to be mosques and minarets, and they were about as impressive 
as factory chimneys.  By and by we crossed a bridge, and paid a penny for the 
privilege.  If I had known it was the famous Golden Horn I would have looked at it 
with more interest, but I saw nothing save a lot of moth-eaten barges and some 
queer little boats like gondolas ... I saw one old fellow who looked like my notion 
of a Turk, but most  of the population had the appearance of London old-clothes 
men.169  
Buchan went to some lengths to dispel the myth of an Orient redolent in 
mystique and grandeur.  Instead, he portrayed Constantinople as a city both poor 
and ordinary.  Worse, it was the deformed offspring of meshing East and West, its 
people and architecture more akin to squalid Western equivalents than to the 
stolid, hearty Anatolians  or the grand Islamic architecture admired in Britain. 
Whilst Turkish soldiery merited respect, even admiration, Buchan gave himself 
free rein to depict their capital as the antithesis  of an affluent, ordered British 
equivalent.  
The more Hannay immerses himself in Constantinople, the more he finds it a 
lawless, chaotic, and degenerate place.  When he heads toward the point of his 
rendezvous with Sandy and Blenkiron, he finds the street where the cafe is 
located, to be ‘the filthiest place of all’.170   Later, while exploring the city, 
Hannay observes that it was ‘the rabble that caught the eye – a very wild, 
pinched, miserable rabble.  I never in my life saw such swarms of beggars’.171 
Buchan’s negative depiction of Constantinople may have been motivated by an 
intention to, as Said put it in his polemical study, construct it in opposition to a 
civilised West thereby justifying intervention and control.  In the context of the 
war, however, it is likely that his  interpretation was more complex.  By rendering 
Constantinople in this  light, Buchan was able to condemn the CUP 





he sought to lower the city’s prestige as home to the caliphate, rendering it 
instead a mundane rather than a sacred place, mired in corruption and degenerate 
Levantine influence.
Despite his depiction of Constantinople as squalid and lawless, Buchan made use 
of another familiar trope, that of the East as a place of exoticism, mystery and 
mysticism.  Accordingly, the prophet, Greenmantle, at the heart of the story is 
intriguingly and evocatively known amongst his followers  simply as ‘the 
Emerald’ and his  ministers are called ‘Sapphire, Ruby, Pearl and Topaz’.172 
When Sandy is called upon to wear Greenmantle’s  totemic green shirt, Buchan 
gives it an aura of Oriental splendour completely unfamiliar to Hannay, the 
stoical Briton: ‘I call it silk, but it was like no silk I have ever known, so 
exquisite in the mesh, with such a sheen and depth in it’.173  When Hannay tries 
to picture the prophet himself, the nearest he can get is ‘a picture of an old man 
in a turban coming out of a bottle in a cloud of smoke, which I remembered from 
a child’s  edition of the Arabian Nights’.174  However, later, when Sandy describes 
the prophet, whom he has met, he does  so in more nuanced terms, reflecting the 
views and sympathies of those early twentieth-century writers  and explorers who 
were deeply affected by the existential appeal of the desert and the power of a 
pared-down, ascetic vision of Islam:  
He is the greatest gentleman you can picture, with a dignity like a high mountain. 
He is a dreamer and a poet, too – a genius if I can judge these things.  I think I can 
assess him rightly, for I know something of the soul of the East  ...  The West  knows 
nothing of the true oriental.  It  pictures him as lapped in colour and idleness and 
luxury and gorgeous dreams.  But  it is all wrong.  The Kâf he yearns for is an 
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Arbuthnot’s comments reflect the fashionable concerns of the Edwardian 
intelligentsia already discussed.  It is possible that Buchan was also in tune with 
an apparent empathy amongst British troops not just towards Turkish soldiery, as 
evidenced for example by Herbert’s diaries, but towards Islam, or at least with 
the idea of fatalism, which was seen as  an integral part of it.  In a 1919 report on 
‘The Army and Religion’ during the war, the writer, D.S. Cairns, reflected on the 
‘sudden apparition of an ancient creed’ in the trenches, namely fatalism, and also 
noted the ‘remarkable popularity of Omar Khayyám’, the medieval Persian 
astronomer and poet who advocated a philosophy of living life in the moment 
and to its fullest potential.176  Thus, in Greenmantle, even Hannay is  not immune 
to the attractions  of Eastern spirituality.  Towards the climax, as he finds himself 
increasingly at risk of death, he adopts a ‘new Kismet philosophy ... I reckoned 
that if risks were foreordained, so were difficulties, and both must be taken as 
part of the day’s work’.177  Indeed, there were those in the military who viewed a 
fatalistic attitude as more appropriate, and certainly more useful in terms  of battle 
effectiveness, for soldiers engaged in industrialised warfare.  Michael Snape cites 
Senior Staff Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Beddington, who asked for the removal 
of a Chaplain because “[he] would stress all the time that unless you were really 
good your chances  of going to Heaven were poor, whilst the doctrine needed for 
men of an infantry division, whose expectation of life was bound to be short, 
should in my view approximate to that of the Mohammedan religion, i.e., he that 
dies in battle goes to heaven’.178
Whether Buchan was echoing the fashionable views of the time, empathising 
with the spiritual crisis  faced by soldiers  in the trenches, or simply reiterating 
how tolerance constituted a key element of British national character, the prophet 
called Greenmantle is depicted as sincere and devout.  He ‘speaks straight to the 
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heart of Islam, and it’s an honourable message’.179  It is, of course, the Germans 
who are the true villains of the novel.  They have taken Greenmantle’s  message 
and twisted it into ‘part of that damned German propaganda.  His unworldliness 
has been used for a cunning political move, and his  creed of space and simplicity 
for the furtherance of the last word in human degeneracy’.180   Ironically, it is 
arguably here that Buchan was most guilty of the sins of Said’s Orientalism in his 
assumption that only with European leadership could Orientals amount to a 
meaningful foe.  As Reeva Spector Simon puts it in Spies and Holy Wars, ‘for 
Buchan, while “Islam” was clearly a possible threat to the West, it could also be 
channeled and controlled by it – if not by Germany, then certainly by Britain. 
Muslims were waiting for a leader’.181
Conclusions
Was Greenmantle a work of propaganda? Absolutely.  Just as much as  in his  non-
fiction works for Wellington House, Buchan’s  intention was to influence opinion 
by conveying that both Britons and the British Empire were forces that promoted 
world civilisation in its truest form, thereby explaining and justifying both her 
belligerence and her imperial status and ambitions.  As Hew Strachan has 
written, ‘for Buchan, fact and fiction were not alternatives, but part of a 
continuum.  His novels were vehicles for his ideas and beliefs, a way of 
propagating values that he thought important through heroes who were often 
based on real people’.182  Greenmantle’s  legacy is therefore not just as a ‘classic 
British spy adventure’ or a ‘shocker’ intended solely to entertain the troops. 
Buchan’s approach, combined with his  military and official knowledge, and his 
relationship with Wellington House, resulted in a work that penetrates to the very 
heart of Britain’s wartime psyche as  a belligerent and an imperial power. Like a 
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prehistoric insect caught in amber, Buchan’s novel captures the essence of the 
propagandist message Britain sought to convey to the world in the summer of 
1916, revealing both her self-perception as well as the ways in which she defined 
and understood others.  
Buchan’s conviction in Britain’s role as  protector and promoter of civilisation is 
brought home on the last page of the book, as he describes the approach of the 
Russian troops towards Erzerum where they are about to defeat the Turks.183 
Hannay and Sandy have joined the Cossack charge.  Sandy, who is now 
impersonating Greenmantle (who has died) and is wearing his green robes, is 
ahead of Hannay, and Hannay describes the scene:
In the very front, now nearing the city ramparts, was one man.  He was like the 
point  of the steel spear soon to be driven home.  In the clear morning air I could see 
that he did not wear the uniform of the invaders.  He was turbaned and rode like 
one possessed, and against the snow I caught the dark sheen of emerald.  As he 
rode it seemed that the fleeing Turks were stricken still, and sank by the roadside 
with eyes strained after his unheeding figure....
Then I knew that  the prophesy had been true, and that  their prophet had not  failed 
them.  The long-looked-for revelation had come.  Greenmantle had appeared at last 
to an awaiting people.184
Sandy, the beacon of British greatness, spearheads the Russian troops.  Thus, 
Buchan’s final message is that for true liberation the benighted East must look 
neither to the Germans, nor to religious  faith.  It is to the Empire that the 
beleaguered must turn.185 
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5.4 The End of the War and After
There were a small number of other popular novels published during the war 
with themes relating to Muslims and the Empire.  These include Talbot Mundy’s 
King of the Khyber Rifles set in Afghanistan.186  Like Greenmantle, King of the 
Khyber Rifles concerns British efforts to foil an Islamic uprising.  Again, it is 
concluded that ‘there has been none in spite of all Turkey’s  and Germany’s 
efforts.  There have been sporadic raids, much as usual, but nothing one brigade 
could not easily deal with’.187  In the course of the novel, Mundy emphatically 
praised the Indian Army for its loyalty to the Empire.  ‘The Red Sea [was] full of 
racing transports, crowded with dark-skinned gentlemen whose one prayer was 
that the war might not be over before they should have struck a blow for 
Britain’.188  
Kipling’s The Eyes of Asia, takes  a similar theme in that its  aim was to 
demonstrate to the reader India’s  loyalty and commitment to the Allied war 
effort.  Although this book does not appear in the Schedule of Literature it has all 
the hallmarks of a government sponsored work, particularly in the context of 
documents contained in India Office papers.  In June 1916, Edward Long of 
Wellington House wrote to Arthur Hirtzel informing him that he had been asked 
to ‘publish a book dealing with the part played by Indian soldiers in the war.  It 
would take the form rather of gallant deeds performed by Indian soldiers, and 
would be published ... for circulation in India, as  well as here, and in Neutral 
Countries’.189  As Hirtzel’s  assistant J.E. Shuckburgh put it, the idea was  that by 
recording acts  of bravery the deeds ‘will speak for themselves: Indians could not 
have behaved so gallantly if their heart were not in the cause’.190   However, 
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Hirtzel, with his customary cunning, cautioned that ‘neither from the military nor 
from the political point of view does it seem desirable to encourage exaggerated 
ideas  of Indian valour .... [T]o separate the “black pepper” from the “red pepper” 
– to use a metaphor common in letters  from Indian soldiers – may give further 
currency to the belief that most of the fighting has been done by Indians’.191 
Thereafter, interest in the project rapidly waned and eventually the idea was 
dropped, ostensibly because ‘it was found that there was no adequate material 
available on which to base it’.192 
Edmund Barrow, the India Office’s Military Secretary, suggested that it would 
take Rudyard Kipling to put things in ‘proper perspective’, in other words, to 
ensure that any account of Indian bravery was put in the context of the 
considerably greater bravery of their white counterparts.193   It appears that 
Kipling was indeed approached at around the same time and given extracts from 
the censored letters of Indian soldiers with a view to working out ‘how best to 
give intelligence to neutrals’.194  The Eyes of Asia, an epistolary novel containing 
four letters from Indian soldiers  serving in Europe to friends and family at home 
recounting their impressions of the war, was the result.  The idea of relying on 
Indian gallantry to evidence loyalty to the Empire was dropped entirely.  Instead, 
the Indians in these fictional letters were humble and naive, loyal servants to the 
Empire, upon whom, Kipling was  keen to show, Western civilisation had made 
an excellent impression during their time in France.
Two of the four letters were from Muslim soldiers, one, a young Afghani 
sharpshooter, tells his parents  that ‘we Indian troops  are esteemed and honoured 
by all’195  and that ‘France is a country created by Allah, and its people are 
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manifestly a reasonable people’.196  A Punjabi trooper writes  to his mother that he 
is  well cared for, ‘I am more comfortable here, I swear it to you, Mother, than 
any high officer in India’.197  Kipling referred to the long tradition of honorable 
service by Muslims in the Indian Army and the respect and monetary rewards 
such service entailed. Neither the Punjabi nor the Afghan have any criticisms to 
raise against England or France in their treatment.  Whilst they are bemused by 
some cultural practices, they are impressed with the civilisation they find.  The 
Punjabi assures his mother that he desires  ‘nothing that is  contrary to the Faith’ 
but his exposure to this new world means that ‘what was ample yesterday does 
not cover even the palm of the hand to-day’.198 
Published in American and British newspapers in 1917, and subsequently printed 
as a book in America, The Eyes of Asia sought to show that colonial troops were 
not the victims of imperial exploitation but active and willing participants in the 
Allies’ war effort.  Kipling also identified and attempted to address a problem 
which had long concerned Europe’s imperialists, namely, the consequences  of 
exposure of the colonised to the Western civilisation they had long found 
themselves subject to.  In an exercise surely of wish fulfillment, he depicted the 
soldiers as experiencing Western civilisation in a wholly positive light, rather 
than the hostile, chaotic, barbaric reality of life in the trenches.  As the Polish 
journalist, Ryszard Kapuściński, put it so well (in relation to the second world 
war), when the colonised came to fight in the white man’s war they, within whom 
‘the notion that the white man was untouchable, unconquerable, that whites 
constituted a homogeneous, cohesive force’ had been inculcated so effectively, 
were shocked to observe that the white men ‘were fighting one another, shooting 
one another, destroying one another’s cities’.199   Exposing the colonised to the 
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Of course, the immediate aftermath of the war did witness unrest across the 
Empire including in Egypt, Afghanistan and India.  In a second edition of Percy 
White’s Cairo, published in 1919 with a new preface by the author, White 
blamed the troubles in Egypt on the absence of a strong leader like Kitchener and 
also on the foibles of the Egyptian character which he said was prone to 
impatience and extremes of behaviour.  The response of the Egyptian to post-war 
economic hardship and political upheaval was to fall prey to nationalist agitators 
and give ‘ready credence to rumours that his  religion was being threatened, that 
the Caliph was  to be nominated by Christians, mosques converted into Christian 
churches’.200   It was only a matter of time, argued White, before the people 
would calm down and ‘that sense of ancient peace associated with the noblest 
monuments of a departed civilisation’ could be restored.201
Cairo was  not the only book set in North Africa published in 1919.  That year 
also saw the release of the iconic ‘desert romance’, E.M. Hull’s The Sheik.202  As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, there were numerous similar novels produced 
before the war but The Sheik was different.  In it, an aristocratic English woman, 
Diana Mayo, is  kidnapped and repeatedly, and explicitly, raped by Arab Sheik, 
Ahmed Ben Hassan, a ‘tall and broad-shouldered’ man with ‘the handsomest and 
the cruellest face that [the heroine has] ever seen’.203  After some months, Diana 
realises that far from hating her captor, she loves him.  ‘Her heart was given for 
all time to the fierce desert man who was so different from all other men whom 
she had met, a lawless savage who had taken her to satisfy a passing fancy and 




202 E.M. Hull, The Sheik (London, 1919).  Wife of a pig farmer called Percy, Ethel Hull apparently wrote 
the novel to amuse herself whilst her husband was serving in France.
203 Hull, The Sheik, p.58.
204 Ibid., p.132.
but Hull depicts him as the epitome of virile masculinity.  Although at the end of 
the book, it transpires that Ben Hassan is  really the son of European nobility, the 
reader is captivated and held in thrall by the idea of an English lady subjugated 
and violated not by a European aristocrat, but by a man who looks and behaves 
like the writer’s conception of a ‘pure Arab’.205  
The Sheik  was a huge hit, spawning numerous  sequels  and imitators as well as 
Rudolph Valentino’s legendary film version.  In many subsequent works within 
the genre, it was no longer necessary for the Arab hero to have secret European 
antecedents.  For example, in Joan Conquest’s Desert Love, published in 1920, 
the aristocratic English heroine marries Hahmed, the ‘Camel King’ of ‘South 
Arabia’ whose heritage, although ‘noble’, was nonetheless pure Arab.206   In 
Norma Lorimer’s The Shadow of Egypt, the married English heroine falls in love 
with a dashing Syrian Arab.  Her English husband, Harold, ‘the very 
manifestation of sound mediocrity’207, is contrasted with the spotlessly 
honorable, ‘virile Wolf’ who is her Syrian lover.208    The idea of the romantic 
Arab sheikh became so popular that, according to historian, Billie Melman, at its 
highpoint young men imitated the 
mannerisms and gestures of the “love god”.  Arab garments, Arab cigarettes, and 
Arab motifs in decoration became the craze ... such was the sheikh mania that 
newspapers in Britain and America pontificated that  the emergence and spread of 
the stereotype of the eastern lover was a threat to the ideals of western manhood.209  
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Perhaps in these post-war desert romances it is possible to discern a tangible 
result of Wellington House’s  propaganda efforts.  They illustrate that, as Sykes 
had desired, the depiction of Arabs for popular consumption was no longer of 
dirty, avaricious bandits  warranting only disdain, but of noble, virile, masculine 
men, who were even allowed to penetrate the virtue of English women.210   The 
popularity of such novels was almost certainly also a reaction to the 
emasculating, disempowering experience of trench warfare as  the war in Arabia 
increasingly came to be seen as a venue for more traditional, and romantic, ideas 
of what war ought to entail, as well as a means of escaping from the tragedies 
and deprivations of the war’s  immediate aftermath at home.  Equally, whilst the 
imperial bravura of the late nineteenth century was a thing of the past, in the 
war’s  immediate aftermath there was a newfound confidence, and certainty, in 
Britain’s global positioning.  After all, she had secured and extended her empire 
and won the war.  With the masculinity and virility of her own stock proven, she 
could afford to be magnanimous in accommodating others. 
The prewar taste for the Orient of myth as a means of escapism after the war is 
evident in the success of theatrical productions with an Oriental theme, including 
a stage version of Robert Hichens’ 1904 novel, The Garden of Allah, which 
played in 1920 and, according to The Bookman, vividly recreated the desert 
landscape.  ‘The camels, the mules, the goats, the sand, the sandstorm, the 
apparatus of the East, are all so real that over against them the raptures and 
despairs  of the lovers seem almost artificial’.211   1923 saw the first stage 
production of Flecker’s  The Story of Hassan.  Again, it was the pageantry, the 
spectacle, the costumes, the vigour of the production that led to packed houses 
and impressed the critics.212   In the words of Basil Dean, Hassan’s  producer, 
Flecker had a ‘nostalgia and a panache for the colour, the lust and the cruelty of 
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the East as it existed in the illustrated pages  of One Thousand and One Nights’ 
and it was this  that he sought to recreate.213   The production ran for 281 
performances and was a critical, as well as  a financial, success.214    In the 
immediate aftermath of the war, London’s theatre goers clearly had an appetite 
for the luxurious, the sensuous and the exotic, tastes that were not lost on 
American journalist, Lowell Thomas, the man commonly held responsible for 
creating the mythological T.E. Lawrence, the ‘modern Arabian Knight .... the 
mysterious blond Bedouin’.215
Thomas, had originally come to Europe in 1917 looking for a story to report to 
readers back home.  It did not take him long to realise that the mechanised, 
attritional warfare of the Western Front was unlikely to produce the kind of 
drama he had in mind.  He went to Wellington House, and it was John Buchan 
who suggested he go instead to Palestine and put him in touch with General 
Allenby. He met Lawrence in Jerusalem in early 1918 and spent some time with 
him in Aqaba and in the desert.  In early 1919 he wrote an illustrated lecture 
about the war for an American audience which he subsequently adapted to With 
Allenby in Palestine and presented in Covent Garden in August 1919.216   This 
was as much an ‘Oriental show’, as Hitchens’ or Flecker’s.  According to Philip 
Knightley, in his introduction to the 2002 edition of Thomas’s subsequent book 
about Lawrence:
when the curtain went  up, several exotically-dressed young women performed the 
Dance of the Seven Veils in front  of a set which portrayed the Nile with the distant 
pyramids faintly illuminated by the moon.  A lyric tenor then sang a haunting 
musical parody of the Islamic call to prayer.  As Thomas himself came on stage, 
braziers in the theatre aisles poured Oriental incense into the air.217
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MacKenzie argues that the huge popularity of Thomas’s  show (it is estimated that 
four million people saw it) and the emergence of the Lawrence of legend filled a 
need ‘to find an exhilarating, romantic and heroic corner of the war with 
recognisable objectives that would make the carnage seem worthwhile’.218  He 
may be overlooking revisionist historiography that emphasises the positive, 
commemorative attitude to the war commonly held in the interwar period in his 
reference to the public’s need to justify the ‘carnage’ of the war.219  However, 
MacKenzie is certainly right to identify the ongoing need for a British hero who 
fulfilled enduring expectations, the type of hero epitomised by Sandy Arbuthnot 
in Greenmantle.  But in Lawrence, the imperial hero was subtly changed.  By 
dressing as an Arab, he attached to himself their vitality, and newfound 
masculinity, whilst retaining his Englishness.  He was doubly heroic.  
The recent discovery of correspondence between Buchan and theatrical producer 
Leon Lion from the period 1919 to 1922 indicates  that Buchan also sought to 
capitalise on the public’s  appetite for Eastern-themed productions by attempting 
to bring Greenmantle to the stage.220   Notably, a letter from 1921 reveals that 
Buchan changed the setting for the final scenes from Erzerum to Jerusalem, 
conceivably to tie in with Thomas’s show and ride on the T.E. Lawrence 
bandwagon.221   Lawrence was representative not only of revitalised British 
heroism, he was also manifestly an imperialist for the post-war world order, a 
natural leader like his pre-war predecessors because he was an Englishman, but 
further, he was one who understood and could collaborate with ‘natives’ and 
hence help them to realise their own destiny.  He was thus an essential figure of 
post-war British imperialism.  Unsurprisingly, by 1929, when Buchan wrote The 
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Courts of the Morning, his representation of Sandy Arbuthnot now shared more 
traits with Lawrence than Herbert.222  In his memoirs, Buchan observed, ‘I am 
not a very tractable person or much of a hero-worshipper, but I could have 
followed Lawrence over the edge of the world.  I loved him for himself, and also 
because there seemed to be reborn in him all the lost friends of my youth’.223 
Clearly, for Buchan and many others, Lawrence symbolised neither just the post-
war imperial ‘facilitator’ of independence under British tutelage, nor was he 
simply the last in a long line of maverick imperial heroes stretching back to 
‘Clive of India’ and ‘Gordon of Khartoum’.  He was also a living reminder of the 
‘lost generation’, of the officer class for whom greatness had been promised, but 
whose lives had been cut short in Flanders.  It is surely no wonder that Lawrence 
himself found the weight of expectation thrust upon him, too much to bear. 
Ironically, it was Buchan who secured his entry into the RAF.
※
In an article on Anglo-Indian literature during the Raj, American academic, 
Robin Jared Lewis, summarised it as asking two basic questions: ‘Who are we?’ 
and ‘What are we doing here?’224   According to Lewis, novelist Paul Scott 
(author of the Raj Quartet) believed that the answer to the second question would 
suffice for the first as well.  These questions, it is asserted here, have much 
broader application.  Surely they are what is  being asked by the novelists 
throughout this chapter?  This was an exercise in both introspection and in the 
outward projection of attempts to explain and justify Britain’s global imperial 
project and, subsequently, her wartime belligerence.  Edwardian novelists 
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answered the question, ‘What are we doing here?’, by considering a number of 
underlying questions: what did Britain represent, who were her people, what did 
she want, who and what stood in opposition to her and her aims?
It is  apparent from these novels that the era was one of confusion and 
contradiction.  The Empire was at its zenith, but a sense of its frailty was 
perceptible.  Imperialism was losing favour and was viewed by some, in the 
words of Sir Charles  Lucas, as implying ‘military domination, despotic rule, 
aggression on other liberties’ and yet it continued to be seen by others as 
possessing a moral authority because of the benefits bestowed upon the 
colonised.225   George V was proclaimed the greatest Mohammedan leader, and 
yet the authorities lived in fear of pan-Islam and its  perceived relationship with 
fanaticism.  Progress  and industrialisation advanced relentlessly, and yet there 
was a yearning for a simpler, more spiritual life.  Racial theories  proclaimed the 
Anglo-Saxon to be the ultimate human race, and yet degeneracy was a prevailing 
fear.  The East was a prism for contemplating and reflecting upon these 
conflicting notions.  Once the war began, Britain identified herself in opposition 
to Germany, but, as has been shown from the examination of Greenmantle, it 
remains possible to discern the nuances of developing ideas  of the East in 
keeping with Britain’s wartime preoccupations and strategies.  A new approach 
emerged after the war, where the Arabs became unequivocally the stuff of 
romance, aided by the emerging legend of T.E. Lawrence and the excitement of 
the desert campaigns.  The extent to which this was a consequence of Mark 
Sykes’s  propagandist efforts remains open to speculation.  It may have been a 
factor, but in the drab, mournful period that followed the end of the war, there 
were many other reasons why an exotic Eastern trope was appealing.
What it is hoped is evident from this  chapter is a consistency in approach 
stemming across official propagandist material and the novels  of the period not 
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least because it was frequently those very novelists who were also responsible for 
Wellington House’s publications.  Masterman turned to them for a reason.  In the 
years leading up to the war, they were already engaged in answering the 
questions ‘Who are we?’ and ‘What are we doing here?’  Wartime writing was 
frequently simply a continuation of this theme.   
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Conclusion
Wellington House’s overriding remit was clear from the outset.  Under 
Masterman’s auspices the brief was to convince allies and neutrals  why, in the 
ideological battle with Germany, it was the British model that was more worthy. 
Articulating the merits of British civilisation was already a cornerstone of 
imperialist discourse and hence the propagandists  stepped seamlessly into their 
wartime role.  Britain’s  imperial status was equally determinative when Turkey 
joined the war in November 1914, this  time resulting in a period of relative stasis 
and uncertainty as Britain sought to balance her position as ruler of almost a 
hundred million Muslim subjects and her belligerent relationship with the holders 
of the caliphate.  As Pickthall put it, ‘[i]n Turkey beats the heart of Moslem India, 
Moslem Egypt – of every land where we [the British] bear rule over 
Mohammedans’.1  Despite committed efforts on the part of the Central Powers to 
stoke a global jihad, only two pamphlets were published by Wellington House on 
the causes  of the rupture with Turkey, whilst 1915 saw the publication of a mere 
two additional works, one on Gallipoli and another on the Armenian massacres.
By late 1915 Wellington House had found its stride, and, as its ties  with the 
Foreign Office became closer, and Mark Sykes, with his opportunistic and bullish 
approach towards  British imperialism, began to take an interest, a securer notion 
of what was wanted in terms of Muslim propaganda began to emerge.  There 
were two strands  to this developing approach: first, the depiction of Ottoman 
Asia and Britain’s  relationship with it to allies and neutrals, Wellington House’s 
target market; second, the articulation of a message of prestige and ‘friendship’ to 
the world’s Muslim population.  In this latter regard, no differentiation was made 
between Muslims within the British Empire and without.  There was assumed to 
be a standard ‘Mohammedan mind’.  As Wellington House’s Reports indicate, 
the quintessential Muslim was not the French-educated Turk, Bengali nationalist 
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or Iraqi scholar but a simple, literal fellow, who responded to pictures and 
evidence of military and economic might, and it was  principally through al-
Haqīqah and the other illustrated magazines, that Wellington House addressed 
this  need.  In Arthur Hirtzel’s  words, via pictures and simple captions, the 
purpose of the magazines was ‘to illustrate the strength and successes  of the 
allies, their honourable methods of fighting, their compassion for the weak and 
suffering, their respect for religion and what Great Britain especially has done to 
assist pilgrims etc.etc.’.2   This was cultural ‘outreach’ in its  most essential form, 
and it was through this striking and prolific work that the propagandists diverged 
dramatically from what was increasingly seen as their outmoded literary style 
and instead provided material that not only sat comfortably with the Ministry of 
Information’s approach to propaganda from March 1918 but also had ongoing 
currency after the war.  
The depiction of Ottoman Asia in pamphlets  aimed at allies and neutrals was  a 
more nuanced affair.  There is, on the whole, evidence of a benign approach 
towards the Turks in the first two years of the war.  There were several reasons 
for this, including the need not to undermine the British Empire’s own military 
performance by belittling the Ottoman victors in the Dardanelles and 
Mesopotamia, but other factors, in particular Britain’s desired status as ‘friend’ to 
Islam, were also important.  Although these pamphlets and books were not aimed 
directly at Muslim readers, they nevertheless  largely sought to avoid denigrating 
the Turks on the basis of their religion.  To have done so would have undermined 
the idea of the Empire as a tolerant and moral undertaking which was  part of 
Wellington House’s  projection of British civilisation as the exemplar of world 
order.  There was also the risk of exposure of British hypocrisy should such 
pamphlets end up, via enemy activities, or other means of distribution, in Muslim 
hands.  The exception in the early pamphlets was Toynbee’s  1915 work 
Armenian Atrocities which, drawing heavily on the testimony of Christian 
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missionaries and aimed, as it is asserted in this  thesis, entirely at an American 
audience, took an unequivocal East versus West, Islam versus Christianity, 
approach.
Written in the summer of 1916, John Buchan’s Greenmantle accorded with 
Wellington House’s  approach at this time.  Building on the cultural 
preoccupations of the prewar years, the respectable Anatolian and the ‘clean 
fighting Turk’ remained subjects  for approbation.  It was the CUP with its 
Levantine influences  that warranted disdain and the malign Prussian influence 
that explained Turkish aggression.  Islam was a noble and worthy religion, its 
ascetic appeal resonating in Buchan’s  description of the eponymous Islamic 
prophet and his  ethos.  Through Hannay and, in particular, Sandy Arbuthnot, 
Buchan made the case for British civilisation, contrasting it less  with an Oriental 
equivalent than with German militarism.  Whilst, the setting may have been 
‘Eastern’, Greenmantle was  a novel about Britain’s war with Germany which 
was, and remained, the propagandists’ overwhelming concern.
The summer of 1916 also witnessed the start of the Arab Revolt and the 
hardening of Sykes’ position regarding the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire 
and the espousal of the rights  of its  minority populations.  The Syria pamphlet, 
written in mid-1916, marked a turning point in the representation of the Turks 
and, especially, the Arabs.  No longer avaricious reprobates, the Arabs emerged, 
along with the Armenians, Greeks, Kurds  and Jews, as the tragic victims of 
Ottoman oppression.  The Blue Book consolidated this approach and it was 
further cemented by early 1917 with the articulation of the British position to 
Woodrow Wilson and the implementation of the ‘Turk Must Go’ campaign. 
Sykes’s  two articles in The Times of February and March respectively and the 
Baghdad Proclamation best illustrate the new approach, one that continued until 
the end of the war.  ‘Murderous tyranny’ became the catchword for the Ottoman 
regime, whose victims deserved help in realising their own aspirations under 
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Allied patronage.  Unthinking, unnurturing, devouring: the Ottoman Empire was 
the antithesis of the British version thereby disqualifying the Turks from 
involvement in the future of the heterogenous minorities currently under their 
sway.
If the whole history of Ottoman imperialism was to be damned as an exercise in 
violence and exploitation, the CUP continued to be the subject of specific odium 
for its  cynical abuse of Islam.  The failed exploitation of jihad confirmed the 
party’s irreligiousness whilst also, of course, underscoring the faith of the 
Empire’s Muslims in the British imperial project.  As Islam’s ‘friend’ it remained 
essential that Britain appear balanced and informed.  Then, as now, the British 
touted their ‘cultural sensitivity, experience and knowledge of the Orient’.3  Thus, 
the propagandists did not so much condemn the idea of jihad as emphasise that 
the CUP had used it insincerely.  To the extent that Islam was instrumentalised by 
Britain, it was as a means of differentiating the CUP, and often the entire 
Anatolian population, from other Muslims in the course of which the Turks were 
depicted as ‘bad’ Muslims, atheists  or ‘infidels’ whose actions no longer entitled 
them to the caliphate, or indeed, to espouse such a noble and worthy faith.  Thus, 
the Arab revolt was  attributed not only to nascent nationalism but to a desire to 
remove themselves from the yoke of the impious Young Turk administration. 
More generally, the propagandists sought to avoid religious allusions, including 
biblical and crusader references, that could lead to adverse implications in terms 
of Britain’s espousal of tolerance towards  other faiths, although as evidenced, for 
example, by Toynbee’s ongoing articulation of the Armenian massacres as a 
Muslim/Christian clash and Benson’s attribution of them to Islamic fanaticism, 
there remained a lack of absolute homogeneity in the pamphlets which speaks to 
the relative freedom given to writers  by Wellington House and the fact that not 
all were commissioned with the same purpose.
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That the propagandists largely shared a world view during the war is by now 
clear.  This  explains the self-censorship that determined the relative freedom 
given to Britain’s writers.  Pickthall took advantage of this in his journalism, but 
he, too, shared his generation’s views on the superiority of Western civilisation, 
comparing it with the less advanced Oriental version.  Pickthall’s particular 
objection was to the way many indiscriminately conflated Oriental government 
with the tenets of Islam which, in his view (as it developed during the war), was 
a more progressive religion than Christianity.  His novels  were exceptional 
because they took an enlightened approach to race as well as religion.  Whereas 
Pickthall earnestly attempted to convey the perspective of the colonised, the 
majority of authors had little interest in looking beyond the Western experience 
of the East.  As argued in Chapter Five, it was a forum for exploring their own 
preoccupations not understanding other cultures  or peoples.   The Muslims of 
Eastern fiction were thus as loosely connected to reality as was the archetypal 
‘Mohammedan’ of Wellington House’s propaganda.    
The overwhelming perspective of Britain’s writers  reflected the biodeterministic 
beliefs  of the age.  From Buchan, to Sykes, Parker, Benson, Stuermer, Hamilton, 
Toynbee, Bryce, Masterman and others, there was  a belief in the superiority not 
only of British civilisation (which encompassed Christianity) but of the British 
race.  Thus stereotypes abound in representations  of the Ottomans.  They could 
be stupid, stolid, cunning, cowardly, greedy, lascivious, hypocritical, dishonest, 
cruel.  They were also capable of fanaticism and barbarism, although, as has been 
seen, such labels were also applied enthusiastically to the Germans.  Postcolonial 
theorist, Homi Bhabha, observes  that the stereotype ‘is a form of knowledge and 
identification that vacillates between what is always “in place”, already known, 
and something that must be anxiously repeated ... as if the essential duplicity of 
the Asiatic or the bestial sexual licence of the African that needs no proof, can 
never really, in discourse, be proved’.4   This is a helpful reminder of the 
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contention that imperialist discourse, the assertion of superiority, went hand in 
hand with a sense of frailty, ephemerality and disenchantment.  The Ottomans 
were despised but could also prompt responses  of fear, admiration and respect. 
Equally, reliance on positive stereotypes, stemming from the romance and 
glamour of a region still perceived in the context of the Nights, was a means of 
asserting the difference and innate inferiority of the East, but also an articulation 
of concerns regarding what had been lost in the West in the interests of progress.  
A fascinating undertaking, touched upon in Chapter Five, would be a closer 
reading of post-war texts, films and theatrical productions to locate how the war 
effected changes in fictional Eastern tropes.  This is but one of a number of 
avenues yet to be explored.  For example, Russia and France also shared a long 
and complex history with Muslim populations.  How similar or divergent were 
their approaches during the war?  Similarly, whilst German propaganda aimed at 
Muslims has been touched upon, a thorough comparison remains to be 
undertaken.  A brief glimpse indicates that Wellington House’s  assertion that 
German efforts lacked the subtlety and sophistication of British methods is  a fair 
one.  A further important area requiring investigation is press reporting.  Whilst 
this  has been referred to, for example, in the context of Press  Notices, Sykes’s 
newspaper articles and efforts  to censor Pickthall’s  journalism, to illustrate how 
Whitehall sought to manage reporting to accord with their agenda, an analysis of 
the extent to which the press  fell in with Wellington House’s  approach is  called 
for.  An examination of pamphlets  produced by Wellington House on India, to 
consider why they were produced and the extent to which the Government of 
India deployed them, is also merited.  India Office records indicate that, like their 
reaction to al-Haqīqah, the response to propaganda produced in London was 
muted but then, as with Ottoman-related propaganda, London’s publications on 
India were aimed principally at allies and neutrals not at Indians.  
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These avenues for further exploration remind us of the range of historiographical 
debates the subject of propaganda touches upon and the importance of examining 
it from a number of perspectives.  There is  a danger in seeing its production 
strictly in terms of society’s racial or cultural stereotyping, or in light of the 
exigencies of war or government policy.  Instead, the construction of Ottoman 
Asia and its  Muslim peoples was a syncretism of all of these, not to mention the 
role of the individual.  Perhaps this is true of all wartime propaganda.  What 
made the depiction of the Ottomans different was that it was also part of a longer 
story of imperial identity and imperial ambition.
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Appendix 1
Extracts from Al-Haqīqah 
• Images 1 to 3 provide examples from early editions of British munitions 
factories emphasising the scale of Britain’s power.
• Images 4, 5 and 6 from 1918 show evidence of British military strength and 
prowess.
• Image 7 shows the Sherif of Mecca, who by the time of publication had styled 
himself the King of Hejaz.  The text emphasises that the Sherif is the true 
upholder and defender of Islam in contrast to the tyrannical and oppressive 
Ottoman regime and that his revolt was instigated from within.
• Image 8 shows Wellington House seeking to illustrate Arab autonomy in their 
pursuit of independence. 
• Images 9 and 10 show Britain and, indeed, France, as ‘friend’ and ‘protector’ of 
Islam.
• Image 11 suggests Turkish tyranny and also Indian support for Britain’s war 
effort.
• Image 12, again, shows Indian support for Britain’s war effort.
• Image 13 shows a title page from an early edition in which a picture of the King 




Al-Haqīqah: The Arabic translation at the top is roughly translated as follows: ‘Some 
views in English [munitions] factories where an innumerable number are being prepared 
to be shot at the Germans’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No. 2
Al-Haqīqah: ‘A great English battleship being built’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No.3
Al-Haqīqah: ‘Inside a great English factory that manufactures bombs’.  Below the 
picture: ‘This is one of the greatest English factories where they prepare millions of 
bombs to be launched at the enemy’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No. 4
Al-Haqīqah: From an edition dated 23 January 1918.  Pictures of a tank in action, 
‘destroying a trench’ and ‘driving in the street of a town destroyed by the firepower of 
the tank’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No.5
Al-Haqīqah: Also from the 23 January 1918 edition.  ‘British forces in Palestine’.  The 
top picture is described as a resting place for camels carrying munitions.  The middle 
picture shows British trenches in the desert made of sand bags.  The caption for the third 
photograph reads: ‘Thousands of Ottoman soldiers have been taken prisoner by the 
British.  In this picture you see one of the places where they are held’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
306
No.6
Al-Haqīqah: 23 January 1918.  Above the picture the caption reads, ‘This is a great 
British cannon, a ‘Howitzer’, on the Western Front’.
Underneath the picture a further caption explains, ‘This cannon throws its great shells in 
an arch trajectory over mountains and forests hitting enemy installations’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No.7
Al-Haqīqah: ‘King of Hejaz’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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Previous page:  The Arabic section at the top of the picture is roughly  translated as 
follows: ‘This is the picture of his Royal Highness Hussein bin Ali, the King of Hejaz, 
being descended from the prophet Mohammed and the Sherif of Mecca and Guardian of 
the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and he is the defender of Islam and 
acknowledged as such by  the believers in all the countries of the world.  The fiefdoms 
of the Hejaz were previously  independent but a few years ago, and after the Hejaz 
railway was built, the Turks took over the country.  The Arabs did not like the Turks 
taking their rights and privileges.  Since the beginning of the war the tyranny has 
become worse and they are persecuting and oppressing the people and treating them 
viciously.  Despite warnings and advice, because of crimes against the Arabs in Syria 
committed by  the Turks and, through them, the Ottoman Sultanate, the Sherif rose up 
and beat the Turks completely with his army.  A few months ago the Sherif declared his 
independence and his rule over the Hejaz.  He published a declaration that the Hejaz is 
fully  independent and free of the tyranny and enslavement of the Turks and from all 
foreign intervention and that all the sherifs, princes, the scholars of the two holy places 




Al-Haqīqah: 23 January  1918 edition. The Arabic caption accompanying the pictures 
reads, ‘In the first picture you can see His Royal Highness Prince Feisal (second person 
from the right) [it looks like Ronald Storrs to his right] and he is the son of His Majesty 
the King of the Hejaz and leader of one of the Hashemite armies that are successfully 
fighting the Turks during these times.  In the second picture you see a group of askaris 
with the Hashemite Arab flag [designed by Sykes]’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No. 9
Al-Haqīqah: The top pair of pictures refer to a mosque that has been set up in Paris for 
injured Muslim soldiers in France.  The bottom picture is described as showing princes 
of Sudan who met the Prince Regent when he visited Khartoum.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No. 10
Al-Haqīqah: ‘Views of Holy Jerusalem that the English took over’.  The caption 
beneath the bottom pair of pictures reads, ‘In these two photos you see the Citadel, the 
Western Wall and the Field of Bethlehem and the Dome of the Rock.  The Commander 
of the British troops has ordered that a guard of Indian Muslim officers and soldiers be 
set up around this famous mosque and he also ordered that non-Muslims are not 
allowed in proximitiy without the licence of the commander and the authority of the 
keeper of the mosque’.
 
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No. 11
Al-Haqīqah: 6 March 1918 - Title Page.  Caption in Arabic describes picture as ‘Indian 
askari guarding some wells in Palestine so they are not damaged by Ottoman spies’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No.12
Al-Haqīqah: 11 August 1916 - Title Page.  Caption in Arabic describes picture as ‘The 
British Commander talking to the Indian General Sir Pertab Singh who is fighting in 
France with the Indian troops’.
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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No. 13
Al-Haqīqah: 7 April 1916 - Title Page. Caption in Arabic describes picture as ‘His 
Royal Highness the King of England and the Emperor of India’. 
Source: Al-Haqīqah (British Library Microfilm: Or.Mic10535/1)
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Appendix 2
Distribution of Satya Vani and Jangi Akbar in India and Afghanistan
Distribution of Satya Vani and Jangi Akbar from a houseboat at the Hindu Mela Festival 
in India, 1918.  The distributors, Messrs. Wheeler and Co., wrote to Edward Long 
describing how successful their display had been.  By the end of the Mela month, the 
reporter, Mr Lisle Wheeler (in picture with topee), claimed there were very  few people 
at the Mela who had not heard of the papers.  ‘Whole villages from all parts of India 
attend this Mela, and each village has its own camp.  All the inhabitants were reading 
copies of the papers’.1
Source: British Library (India Office L/PS/10/581/567)
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1 ‘The Mela’, Memorandum on Distribution of Propaganda in India, by Lisle Wheeler, undated, BL IO L/PS/
10/581/565.
Newsagents of NW Frontier and Afghanistan in Peshawar holding 25,000 copies of 
Jangi Akbar (it was implemented in mid-1917 and used the same photographs as al-
Haqīqah but was printed in Urdu, Hindi and Gurumukhi and directed at the North and 
North-West of India) with ‘His Majesty at the Front conversing with Sir Douglas Haig’ 
on the front cover.  Long wrote to Shuckburgh, ‘I am informed that this issue was 
extremely popular on account of His Majesty’s portrait’.2
Source: British Library (India Office L/PS/10/581/482)
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